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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Drone strikes are sensational events.  The United States government uses remotely 
piloted aircraft (or drones) equipped with precision weapons systems to unilaterally hunt and kill 
its enemies across the globe.  The pervasiveness of American lethal force startles many 
Americans.  In many ways, drone strikes are unprecedented.  The technology, the frequency of 
use, and the geographic scope are all by-products of the twenty-first century.  The executive 
branch, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, have a deep history of 
debating whether to kill individual enemies and have a history of authorizing operations to do so.  
 Top personnel in the Obama administration have publicly addressed the administration’s 
policy regarding drone strikes for years.  From 2010 to 2013, President Barack Obama, Attorney 
General Eric Holder, the top lawyers from the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, 
and Department of Defense, and John Brennan—the former Counterterrorism Advisor for the 
President and current CIA Director—have all taken to public forums to convey the Obama 
Administration’s counterterrorism strategy.1  In particular, these speeches address the 
                                                            
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., May 
23, 2013), The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university;  
Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” (Speech, Chicago, 
IL, March 5, 2012), The Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html;  
Stephen Preston, “CIA and the Rule of Law,” (Speech, Cambridge, MA, April 10, 2012), The Central Intelligence 
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/cia-general-counsel-
harvard.html;  
Harold Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010,) 
The State Department, http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; 
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administration’s views and justifications for the use of remotely piloted aircraft to kill terrorists 
and insurgents.  These speeches all share common frameworks, arguments, and language, albeit 
with slightly different agendas.  The speeches by the nation’s top lawyers unsurprisingly focus 
on the legality.  They argue that drone strikes are legal under domestic and international law.  
John Brennan, the Director of the CIA, not only reiterates the legality of the drone strikes, but 
also defends their ethical necessity under the laws of war.2  Brennan also provides information, 
in the abstract, on how the White House’s National Security Council decides whom to target.3  
While all of the speeches speak to the legality or ethics underpinning drone strikes, the nation’s 
top policymakers frequently call on history.  
 The Obama administration’s top national security authorities use history as a justification 
for current actions and as a future standard.  Attorney General Eric Holder argued that lethally 
targeting terrorists must be rooted in a legal framework because “history has shown that it is also 
the most effective approach we can take in combating those who seek to do us harm.”4  In 
addition, these men invoke history to judge the actions of today and tomorrow.  Jeh Johnson, the 
top lawyer at the Pentagon and current Secretary of Homeland Security, eulogized, “As a student 
of history, I believe that those who govern today, must ask ourselves how we will be judged 10, 
20, or 50 years from now.”5  President Obama also called on history when he stated in a speech 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Jeh Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (Speech, New Haven, 
CT, February 22, 2012), Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-
speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448;  
John Brennan, “"Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws" (Speech, Cambridge, MA, 
September 16, 2011), The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-
brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an;  
John Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy” (Speech, Washington, D.C., 
April 30, 2012) Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-
counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100. 
2 Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
3 Ibid. 
4 Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law.” 
5 Johnson “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration.” 
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in 2013, “Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue.  But this war, 
like all wars, must end.  That’s what history advises.”6 
 Beneath the rhetoric, the arguments, and the opinions that dominate drone policy today 
there is something missing: the history.  Scholars, pundits, and government officials have 
exhausted reams of paper and hours of airtime arguing whether drone strikes are legal, ethical, or 
effective.  Few, however, have sought to expand the spectrum of study to the decades prior to 
September 11.  In a similar manner to others, John Yoo, a top attorney in the Bush 
administration, called on history when he defended targeted killings arguing, “precise attacks 
against individuals have long been a feature of warfare.”7  Very few scholars or public officials, 
however, have extended their arguments about history beyond implicit references.  This thesis’s 
purpose is to fill that lacuna and aims to substantiate the rhetoric about “history” with systematic 
empirical research.  This thesis will address the identified void by answering the question: What 
are the historical precedents for drone strikes and how do they inform policy?  
  Policymakers, scholars, and commentators often mention historical episodes for targeted 
lethal operations, but few rigorously analyze them.  Attorney General Eric Holder, the Director 
of the CIA, John Brennan, and the top attorneys at the State Department and Pentagon, all argued 
that targeting individual enemies was a hallmark of war.  All of these officials also cited an 
American military strike that downed the aircraft of a Japanese Admiral in World War II.8  
Similarly, The Economist published an article on the CIA’s role in drone warfare and drew on 
historic examples.  The Economist Special Report states, “Most of these attacks [drone strikes] 
were carried out by the CIA, which is not new to killing people it has identified as enemies; its 
                                                            
6 Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” 
7 John Yoo, “Assassinations or Targeted Killings After 9/11,” New York Law School Law Review 56, (2011/12): 63. 
8 This strike will be a case in this thesis.  Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University 
School of Law;” Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law;” Johnson “National Security Law, 
Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration;” Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's 
Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
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Operation Phoenix was responsible for the death of tens of thousands in South Vietnam in the 
1970s.”9  This thesis will go beyond passive reference and will rigorously analyze the 
aforementioned air strike on Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Phoenix Program in the 
Vietnam War, as well as several other cases to show a history of targeted lethal operations.  
 In order to study the history of targeted strikes, the first task is to remove the technology 
from the scope of study.  There are two elements of a drone strike.  The first modifying element 
is the technology.  The use of remotely piloted aircraft in conflict has a history that dates back to 
the Vietnam War.10  The drones used for counterterrorism purposes in the twenty-first century 
were first armed with precision missile systems by the United States military and the CIA in 
early 2001.11  Thus, to only study targeted lethal operations through the lens of an armed drone, 
limits the scope of study solely to the twenty-first century.  Therefore, the second task is to 
analyze the types of operations that target and kill individuals to uncover their history.  
 There are two types of operations employed in drone strikes: targeted killings and 
signature strikes.  Both targeted killings and signature strikes have historical precedents.  
Targeted killings are when leading decision-makers intentionally identify, then track, and kill 
individuals.  Signature strikes are targeted operations based on an individual’s patterns of 
behavior, or “signature,” not on their individual identity.   
                                                            
9 “Special Report: Robots,” The Economist, March 29, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/special-
report/21599524-drones-will-change-warand-more-up-air.  
10 The Air Force and CIA used small jet-propelled unmanned aerial vehicles during the Vietnam War called 
Lightning Bugs to carry out high-altitude reconnaissance missions.  The precursor to the MQ-1 Predator drone—the 
most prolifically used remotely piloted aircraft in the twenty-first century—dates back to late 1980s when an 
American contractor created the Gnat and the Amber, which were larger stand-off platforms.  The MQ-1 Predator 
drone was first deployed in the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, and then later armed in the twenty-first century.  For 
more on the history of remotely piloted aircraft see: Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on Al 
Qaeda (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), 20-25. 
11 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 210-
214.  
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 This thesis will argue that historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes 
can inform modern policy.  In order to argue that precedents can shape policy, this thesis must 
first fill the dearth of scholarship on the American history of targeted strikes by systematically 
establishing precedents.  Then, this thesis will dissect those precedents in order to analyze and 
extract the vectors of history that can shape modern policy.   
 There are several historical cases of targeted killings and signature strikes that this thesis 
will examine.  The chapter on targeted killings will examine the airstrike on Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto’s aircraft in World War II by Army aviators, the 1986 air strike on Libya, the Clinton 
administration’s attempts at killing Osama bin Laden in 1998 and 1999, and the Obama 
administration’s drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki.  The signature strikes chapter will 
examine the Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War and the Reagan Administration’s 
counterterrorism policy in 1984.  Both of these chapters will simultaneously identify and test 
whether these often cited cases are precedents by preselecting operation-specific criteria.  In each 
chapter, I will select criteria that define targeted killings and signature strikes and are identifiable 
throughout the history of these operations.  If these cases are precedents, this thesis will examine 
how they can shape policy by using the preselected criteria and case studies to identify historical 
trends.  These trends span the history of the operations and include the convergence between the 
military and intelligence communities and the shift towards greater executive transparency.  This 
thesis will conclude by analyzing those trends comprehensively and using them to make policy 
recommendations to show how historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes 
can inform modern policy.   
 The remainder of this first chapter will have five sections.  First, I will discuss the 
historiography of targeted lethal force in American history and the scholars that argue history can 
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inform policy.  Second, I will define the scope of my thesis, summarily address the use of 
primary sources, and define key terms.  Third, I will discuss my methodology for determining 
precedents and extrac/ting trends for policy recommendations.  Fourth, I will briefly examine the 
legal justifications by the Bush and Obama administrations for targeted strikes because 
understanding the legal framework is a necessary primer before analyzing operations.  Finally, 
this chapter will conclude with a brief roadmap for the entire thesis.    
 
Historiography   
Targeted Lethal Action 
 The argument that there are historical precedents for targeted killings and signature 
strikes intersects with several subfields in History and Political Science.  There are few scholars 
who have addressed the issue directly, but there are vital works in the fields of intelligence, 
military history, terrorism, and presidential politics, which are fundamental to this thesis.  Before 
examining the wider body of scholarship, it is first important to address the studies that have 
examined the history of targeted killings and signature strikes most directly.  Mark Mazzetti, a 
Pulitzer-Prize winning New York Times national security reporter, has written the most relevant 
work on modern targeted killings and signature strikes and their connection to the past.  In The 
Way of the Knife, Mazzetti traces how the CIA and the elite military unit, Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC), have waged a covert war against al Qaeda through drone strikes 
and Special Forces night raids.12  While Mazzetti aims to reveal these new lethal policies for the 
wider audience, his primary argument is that there has been an increasingly blurred line of 
responsibility between the military and the CIA where soldiers are becoming spies and vice 
                                                            
12 Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2013). 
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versa.  Mazzetti argues, “Prior to the attacks of September 11, the Pentagon did very little human 
spying, and the CIA was not officially permitted to kill. In the years since, each has done a great 
deal of both, and a military-intelligence complex has emerged to carry out the new American 
way of war.”13  In order to address this convergence between military and intelligence, Mazzetti 
examines key moments in the CIA’s history when Congress and Americans have skewered the 
CIA for contemplating lethal operations—namely when Congressional Committees revealed the 
Agency was plotting to kill foreign leaders—which Mazzetti uses as a mechanism to show how 
much the CIA has changed over time. This thesis, like The Way of the Knife, aims to 
counterbalance studying modern lethal policies with history, but aims to offer a deeper historical 
context than Mazzetti.   
 Micah Zenko’s work, Between Threats and War, examines analogous military operations 
to case studies in this thesis and analyzes them for similar purposes.  Zenko, a fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, analyzes discrete military operations, which are “a single or serial 
physical use of kinetic military force to achieve a defined military and political goal by inflicting 
casualties or causing destruction, without seeking to conquer an opposing army or to capture or 
control territory.”14  The primary purpose of Zenko’s book—to compile cases of historic targeted 
military operations and use them for policy recommendations—is similar to this thesis.  
Moreover, Zenko’s work and this thesis, both examine the 1998 cruise missile strike aimed at 
Osama bin Laden as a case study.  Between Threats and War, however, deviates from this thesis 
in three distinct ways.  First, Zenko examines different types of military operations.  Zenko 
examines other operations besides targeted killings and signature strikes, such as when the U.S. 
                                                            
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Micah Zenko, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 2.   
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military imposed no fly zones in Iraq from 1991-2003.15  Second, Zenko sets the scope of his 
research from the end of the Cold War to modern day; whereas, this thesis examines operations 
prior to and during the Cold War.  Third, while Zenko’s work does examine cases of armed 
drone targeted killings and their political ramifications, Between Threats and War focuses more 
on the military consequences for limited lethal force.  In contrast, this thesis examines political 
ramifications in the executive branch, but focuses more on the consequences for the intelligence 
community than on the military.  While Between Threats and War and this thesis examine 
different types and perspectives of lethal operations, both share a common purpose: examining 
historical operations to inform modern policy. 
 Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes directly counter this thesis’s primary argument 
about the historical precedents for targeted lethal action.  Anderson and Witters are Senior 
Fellows at the Brookings Institution and are leading commentators on targeted killings and 
signature strikes.  Anderson and Wittes argue, “drone technology enables a genuinely new means 
of counterterrorism: targeted killing.”16  They reiterate their argument by stating, “drones 
enabling targeted killing is a genuinely new capability in global counterterrorism.”17  Anderson 
and Wittes’s argument directly counters this thesis’s primary argument about historical 
precedents and does so by making drone technology and targeted killings mutually exclusive, 
which is ahistorical.  Targeted killing is a type of operation, not a technology.  Moreover, Daniel 
Byman, one of the ranking authorities on targeted killings, documents how Israel’s military and 
intelligence communities pioneered the lethal tactic and have employed it for decades in their 
                                                            
15 Ibid., 29-48. 
16 Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes, “What, If Anything Is Strategically New About Weaponized Drones?,” 
Strategika 10, (2014): 15. 
17 Ibid., 16. 
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practice of counterterrorism.18  Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes’s commentary is 
unsubstantiated by research or citation.  Nevertheless, their argument does serve as a 
counterweight to this thesis.  Anderson and Wittes reach their conclusion that targeted killings 
are unprecedented because they tie their existence to armed unmanned aircraft.  Using armed 
drones, however, is only a tool for lethal force, by removing the technological modifier from 
targeted killings research, this thesis will be able to expand on the history of the operations.  
These scholars share a proclivity for either presentism or ahistorcism.  
 Before examining the historical work on lethal policy, there are several other notable 
works that address the issues of targeted killings and signature strikes in the modern day.  Brian 
Glyn Williams, a terrorism scholar at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, wrote the most 
comprehensive history to date of America’s use drone strikes against al Qaeda.  In Predators, 
Williams traces the inception of drone policy under the Bush administration to the escalation of 
strikes in the Obama administration.19  Williams examines dozens of strikes on a case-by-case 
basis and is one of the few scholars to do so.  Predators serves a model for this thesis by 
compiling a history of an issue.  William’s work, however, was primarily limited to the twenty-
first century because, like Anderson and Wittes, Williams narrows the scope of his research by 
only examining targeted strikes through the lens of armed drones.20  Williams traces drone 
strikes from an overarching policy perspective, through the camera of a UAV, and by specific 
cases that occurred in Pakistan.  This thesis, on the other hand, will trace targeted operations 
from a policy perspective, through specific case studies, and within the national security 
bureaucracy.  
                                                            
18 For more on Israel’s use of targeted killings see: Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of 
Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
19 Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on Al Qaeda (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013). 
20 Williams does make references to past American history, but does not delve into the references.  For example, he 
mentions the origins of the Predator drone program has roots in the Vietnam War.  Williams, however, is primarily 
looking at the history of the drone technology, not the operations.  Ibid., 19. 
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 Daniel Klaidman, a former editor at Newsweek, also examines targeted operations from 
within the national security community.  Klaidman examined the Obama administration’s policy 
of targeted killings and signature strikes from reporting done inside the White House, Pentagon, 
and CIA.21  Klaidman’s work, Kill or Capture, focuses less on advancing an argument and more 
on revealing an inside-policy narrative surrounding targeted lethal action.  While Kill or Capture 
lacks argumentation, its narrative is still useful for this thesis because it is proves to be a unique 
source on the policy divisions within the Obama administration surrounding targeted killings and 
signature strikes. 
 The most substantial scholarly work on targeted killings comes from political scientists 
who study their effectiveness and legal authorities who study their legality.  There is a major 
debate within terrorism studies about whether targeted killings, drone strikes, and leadership 
decapitations work.  These journal articles primarily use datasets of strikes and determine how 
often they led collapse of an organization.22  These articles are excellent for questioning whether 
drone strikes and targeted killings are effective at dismantling terrorist organizations.  The 
                                                            
21 Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of Obama’s Presidency (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012). 
22 The bedrock empirical scholarship on the effectiveness of targeted strikes comes from three notable scholars. 
Brian Price argues for the effectiveness of leadership decapitations.  Jenna Jordan opposes Price and uses a 
substantial dataset on the effectiveness of decapitations to support her argument.  Patrick Johnson contributes to the 
debate, but takes a different angle by examining leadership in counterinsurgency, instead of counterterrorism. See: 
Brian C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” 
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 9-46.; Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719-755;   Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation 
Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International 
Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 47-79.   
Recently, Johnston and Jordan have reignited the debate by rehashing the question, but now use drone strikes 
for their empirics.  Both have forthcoming articles on the issue. Jenna Jordan, “Killing the Snake? Explaining 
Terrorist Group Resilience to Leadership Targeting,” International Security (Spring 2014), forthcoming. Patrick 
Johnson, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Working Paper, (July 2013), 
accessed via Empirical Studies of Conflict at Princeton, http://esoc.princeton.edu/files/impact-us-drone-strikes-
terrorism-pakistan-and-afghanistan.  Also, Javier Jordan recently published a similar study analyzing drone strikes’ 
effect on al Qaeda Central. See: Javier Jordan, “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against al Qaeda Central: 
A Case Study,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 4-29. 
Finally, a well-rounded debate on the issue of effectiveness without the empirics can be seen in: Daniel Byman, 
“Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43; 
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Fail,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (2013): 44-54. 
Mencini 
 
11 
primary objective of this thesis is not to examine the operations effectiveness, but to analyze how 
the operations history can shape policy.  
 The other primary body of work to consider, especially when making policy 
recommendations, is the legal scholarship.  There are hundreds of articles on the legality of 
targeted killings and drone strikes in academic law reviews.  Many look at specific frameworks, 
for example, whether targeted lethal action violates specific facets of domestic or international 
law.  This section will not discuss the myriad of legal articles that address the issue; however, 
there is one seminal volume that thoroughly discusses a range of legal and moral issues 
surrounding targeted lethal action.  Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical 
World, an edited volume, addresses the significant legal issues of drone strikes in domestic and 
international law as well as several other notable principles such as: targeting noncombatants, the 
theories of just war, belligerency, imminence, and decision-making.23  
 Moving backward in time, there is a plethora of substantial scholarship on intelligence, 
covert action, military operations, and presidential policies before September 11.  Christopher 
Andrew’s preeminent work on presidents and their use of intelligence, For the President Eyes 
Only, provides a historical framework in understanding events between the White House and the 
intelligence community.24  In addition, scholars such as Gregory Treverton narrow their history 
of intelligence by discussing specific facets of the field—such as the CIA’s use of covert 
action.25  Treverton, a former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provides 
unique insights on the CIA’s covert action programs during the Cold War.  Most notably, he 
                                                            
23 Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and 
Andrew Altman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
24 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from 
Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1996). 
25 Covert action is when the United States government influences political conditions abroad through activities 
ranging from economic manipulation to paramilitary operations, where the United States government intends to 
maintain a secret role. For more see: Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2011), 181-198. 
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studies the concept of plausible deniability—when presidents use mechanisms to isolate 
themselves from negative fallout from botched CIA operations—in excellent detail.26  While 
Treverton’s and Andrew’s scholarship are essential to contextualize the wider history of 
intelligence, this thesis relies on them more as fundamental guides than overarching history.  
Most of the literature that aids in determining historical precedents is related to specific cases.  
Therefore, the works used, addressed, or dismissed vary from case to case.  
 This thesis has the challenge of bridging the substantial, but broad, historical scholarship 
with the rapidly developing contemporary literature.  When examining historical cases of 
targeted killings and signature strikes, this analysis employs specific secondary sources for each 
case study.  Thus, this thesis engages with the existing scholarship in a unique way.  On the 
historical side, the overarching histories—such as Andrew or Treverton—provide a framework 
filled in with case-specific propositions.  Treverton, for example, analyzes the theme of plausible 
deniability by examining the concept and then showing how it has occurred in history.  This 
thesis, however, will examine cases that then reveal the concepts.  On the contemporary side, 
while recognizing the value in the legal and effectiveness scholarly works, more comprehensive 
histories—such as those by Williams and Mazzetti—will guide this thesis.  Williams and 
Mazzetti compile their works in a case-based and often chronological pattern, instead of 
thematically based.  This thesis, first will make the thematic breakdown between targeted 
killings and signature strikes; but in each chapter, will examine cases chronologically.  In sum, 
while few have addressed the topic of historical precedents for targeted killings and signature 
strikes directly, many have addressed the issue indirectly, which when combined, provide a 
substantial foundation for this thesis.  
 
                                                            
26 Gregory Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988). 
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Using History to Inform Policy 
 This thesis extracts its primary argument—that historical precedents can inform modern 
policy—from a certain type of historical analysis.  Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian is 
often considered the father of using history to inform the present.  He believed, “Those who want 
to understand clearly the events which happen in the past and which will at some time or other 
and in much the same ways be repeated in the future.”27  Thucydides approach has been 
modified to the study of war.  Strategika, a journal focused on national security issues and 
published through Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, noted that their scholars share the 
approach that “the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts…New 
technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic 
assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernible only through the study 
of history.”28  
 Ernest May, an international historian, rigorously promulgated and studied this practice. 
May argued in “Lessons” of the Past that framers of foreign policy are influenced about what 
history teaches and if policymakers can use history discriminatingly they can dissect the forces 
that create history in order to determine whether the same vectors will continue.29  May examines 
cases of how policymakers drew on historical examples from World War II, the Cold War, and 
the Korean War to frame and inform their decisions.  After examining the history, May applied 
historical lessons to address a then-contemporary question: the effectiveness of aerial bombing to 
persuade foreign governments, which was a pertinent question during the Vietnam War.30  May 
                                                            
27 Thucydides, History of Peloponnesian Wars, trans/ Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 24; Found in 
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: The 
Free Press, 1986), 232. 
28 Victor Hanson, Bruce Thornton, and David Berkey, Strategika, issue 10 (2014). 
29 Ernest May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), ix-xiv. 
30 Ibid., 125-142. 
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concludes, with notable bias, “the most important function for the historian as historian is 
analysis of those instances which men in government are most likely to see as parallels, 
analogies, or precedents.”31  Moreover, May reasons that in order to use historical lessons to 
inform policy, a unique blend of History, Political Science, and other social sciences is 
necessary.32  In a different work, May and Richard Neustadt conclude that in order to use history 
to inform policy, one must recognize that the future has no place to come from but the past; that 
recognition—through continuous comparison and oscillation between past, present, and future—
is required to extract informative historical lessons.33  By systematically analyzing historical case 
studies this thesis will oscillate between past and present in order to extract lessons for the future.  
 Robert Jervis, a preeminent political scientist, also studies the influence of the past on 
policymakers, but does so through a different lens.  Jervis, in his work Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics, studies the causal links between historical events and the 
decisions of future policymakers.  He argues that events that are seen firsthand by young policy 
personnel have a great impact on their later perceptions as policymakers.34  Jervis’s findings are 
predicated on causal links.  He strongly argues that in linking history, “causality must be shown 
to flow from the interpretations for the past to the perceptions of the present.”35   
 This thesis will use May’s model more than Jervis’s.  Jervis focuses on how historical 
events can and have affected policymakers’ perceptions, where causality is needed for evidence.  
May’s model also argues that history influences policymakers, but in addition attempts to dissect 
the forces of history in order to inform policy.  This thesis will employ the requisite provided by 
Neustadt and May—continuous comparison and historical oscillation—to extract informative 
                                                            
31 Ibid., 178. 
32 Ibid., 142-143. 
33 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 251. 
34 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1976): 281. 
35 Ibid., 225. 
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policy prescriptions.  Jervis’s argument is important to this thesis, however, because there are 
searing events in the history of lethal American history—the assassination plots of the 1970s—
that heavily influenced modern policymakers.  Juan Zarate, the Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Counterterrorism in the George W. Bush administration, supported Jervis’s thesis 
when he stated in an author interview, “The history of past operations are undoubtedly embedded 
in the minds of the IC [intelligence community] and the military based on their past 
experience.”36  Thus, this thesis subscribes to May’s prescriptive model but clearly recognizes 
the value of Jervis’s causal model.  
 While preeminent scholars such as Ernest May, Robert Jervis, and others have studied the 
effect of history, their conclusions are not without strong dissent.37  Many critics argue that 
analogies and precedents for policymaking purposes are used more for advocacy and justifying 
policy positions than systematic analysis.38  Arthur Schlesinger, a widely respected historian of 
twentieth century U.S. politics, countered Ernest May and argued, “The past is an enormous grab 
bag for everybody.  The issue of history as rationalization somewhat diminishes the force of the 
argument that history is per se a powerful formal determination of policy.”39  While many in 
decision-making positions certainly can, and do, use history to advocate or justify policy 
positions, it does not make the practice mutually exclusive.  Historian Christopher Jespersen also 
criticizes using historical precedents to inform the present.  Jespersen argues, “Politicians and 
pundits latch onto analogies for understanding the present, but in so doing, they obscure more 
                                                            
36 Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014). 
37 Yuen Foong Khong is another preeminent scholar in this field of historical precedents.  For Khong’s work on the 
subject see: Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 
1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Arthur Schlesinger, “Review of ‘Lessons’ of the Past,” The Journal of American History 61, (1974): 444. 
Originally found and cited in Khong, Analogies at War, 8. 
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complicated situations.”40  This thesis will directly counter Jepersen’s argument and will argue 
that history—especially in the context of targeted lethal action—can clarify, not convolute, the 
immensely tangled and mired debates that surround modern drone policy.  Policymakers can use 
history to inform and/or advocate a policy position, but that decision ultimately rests with the 
arbiter.  In an author interview with Juan Zarate, a member of George W. Bush’s National 
Security Council, the former policymaker argued that precedents and history are used in 
constructing policy.  Zarate stated, “No question history was used when constructing the legal 
framework and during the formative years of counterterrorism policy.” 41  Therefore, while 
policymakers may use historical precedents or analogies differently, it is definite that decision-
makers consider precedent when crafting policy. 
 
Background and Definitions 
 In determining historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, this thesis 
will not set a specific chronological or geographic scope.  Instead, the thesis will employ several 
case studies.  The United States government conducted all of the cases in this thesis.  Instead of 
examining historical precedents for targeted lethal action from other nations, such as Israel, this 
thesis tailors recommendations specifically for U.S. targeted strikes policy by only analyzing 
American operations.  While there was no initial requirement for setting the chronological scope 
of study, after selecting the case studies, the timeline of analyzed cases fall between 1943 and 
2014.  
 A major issue for this thesis, like many other works in national security studies, is finding 
primary sources.  As noted in the former section, there are a plethora of secondary sources on the 
                                                            
40 Christopher Jespersen, “Analogies at War: Vietnam, the Bush Administration’s War in Iraq, and the Search for a 
Usable Past,” Pacific Historical Review 74, no. 3 (August 2005): 411. 
41 Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014). 
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issues, but primary sources, specifically government documents, are more difficult to find.  This 
thesis uses declassified documents when available, but also relies on speeches, contemporary 
news articles, and interviews to fill any voids left in the absence of government documents.  
  There were two types of subjects this author interviewed: experts and practitioners.  The 
experts are those who have contributed significant scholarship on targeted lethal action, 
intelligence, or military histories and ranged from academics to reporters.  Some of these experts 
include: Mark Mazzetti—a New York Times national security reporter and author of The Way of 
the Knife, Daniel Byman—a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, 
and Seth Jones—the Associate Director for International Security and Defense Policy at the 
RAND Corporation.  The practitioners interviewed were those who were involved in decision-
making or operations, and ranged from leading national security policymakers in the Bush 
administration, to retired, recently retired, or active CIA and FBI personnel.  These policymakers 
and practitioners include: Juan Zarate—the Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Counterterrorism from 2005-2009, Hank Crumpton—Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 
Ambassador for Counterterrorism, and Michael Sulick—the Director of the CIA’s National 
Clandestine Service from 2007-2010.   
 Combining these primary sources with the aforementioned secondary sources and case-
specific works, made it possible to argue historical precedents.  In order to argue historical 
precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, this thesis uses a certain framework in 
order to determine if a case constitutes a precedent.  Before examining the methodology, 
however, it is first important to define precedent and other key terms used throughout this thesis. 
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Precedent 
 What is a historical precedent?  Precedent is by many definitions, a legal term; as such, 
there are two variations: a black and white version, and another with shades of gray.  History is 
construed in the eyes of the beholder, and therefore, this thesis will use the gray version.  The 
black and white version makes a strong distinction between precedent and analogy.  Grant 
Lamond, a legal philosopher at the University of Oxford, promulgates the black and white 
version.  He argues, “Precedent involves an earlier decision being followed in a later case 
because both cases are the same. Analogy involves an earlier decision being followed in a later 
case because the later case is similar to the earlier one.”42  The issue with the black and white 
version lies in its strict polarity.  Very few, if any, events in history are black-and-white. There is 
always a counterargument or counter-interpretation, making this definition unusable for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
 The definition this thesis will use for precedent removes the strict polarity in favor of 
relevance.  Frederick Schauer, a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, argues that 
precedent is forward-looking and cannot be black and white.  Even though precedents are rooted 
in the past and are found by looking backwards in history, Schauer argues that by nature, 
precedents also look forward.  He writes, “an argument from precedent looks forward as well, 
asking us to view today’s decisions as a precedent for tomorrow’s decision-makers.”43  Schauer’s 
definition of precedent overlaps with May’s model of using the past to inform the future.  
Schauer avers:  
No two events are exactly alike.  For a decision to be precedent for another 
decision does not require the facts of the earlier and the later cases be absolutely 
identical.  Were that required, nothing would be a precedent for anything else.  
                                                            
42 Grant Lamond, “Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(forthcoming, Spring 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/. 
43 Frederick Schauer, “Precedent,” Stanford Law Review 39, no. 3 (1987): 572. 
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We must therefore leave the realm of absolute identity.  Once we do so, however, 
it is clear that the relevance of an earlier precedent depends upon how we 
characterize the facts arising in the earlier case.  It is a commonplace that these 
characterizations are inevitably theory-laden.  In order to assess what is a 
precedent for what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant 
similarities between the two events.44 
 
 Juan Zarate, the former Bush administration policymaker and current Harvard Law 
lecturer, noted that there are two definitions of precedents—a policy version and a legal version.  
Zarate defined the legal version as “binding legal judgments that aid decision-makers in similar 
or equivalent cases.”45  Zarate also notes, however, that there is a policy version, which he 
defines as, “instances from the past that help inform policy making decisions in the future.”46  
Yuen Foong Khong, an International Relations scholar at the University of Oxford and author of 
Analogies at War, also favors a loose interpretation of precedent that mirrors Zarate’s policy 
version of precedent.  Khong outlined his rationale for using precedent in an author interview, “I 
probably used ‘historical precedent’ synonymously with ‘lessons of the past’ or ‘lessons of 
history’ to mean previous historical episodes with similar characteristics to the issue/event under 
consideration.”47   Therefore, this thesis will graft Schauer, Zarate, and Khong’s definitions 
together and define precedent as: instances from the past, judged on the basis of relevance, not 
on exact similarity, that inform decision-makers in the future.  By working with the policy 
version of precedent, it is possible to better understand the development of targeted killings and 
signature strikes on a historical continuum.  
 
 
                                                            
44 Ibid., 577. 
45 Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Yuen Foong Khong, interview with author, (March 2014).  
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Targeted Killings, Assassinations, and Signature Strikes 
 The two types of drone strikes that this thesis will examine are targeted killings and 
signature strikes.  There is no accepted definition of a targeted killing that the United States 
government uses, therefore, this thesis will use a definition provided to the United Nations.  In 
2010, Philip Alston, a scholar from New York University was designated Special Rapporteur to 
the United Nations Human Rights Council.  In his report, Alston defines targeted killings as, “the 
intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under 
colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual 
who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”48  The key characteristics of this definition 
that will be a cornerstone of establishing historical precedents are: intentional, premeditated, 
deliberate, lethal force, legal, against a specific individual, and not in physical custody. 
Exchanging or removing these core characteristics from the definition, drastically alters the term 
targeted killing.  For example, by removing the word “legal” changes the term from a targeted 
killing to an assassination.  
 Assassination is the most difficult term to define in this thesis.  The problem is derived 
from the United States government.  Multiple executive administrations have outlawed 
assassination, but all failed to provide a definition.  While many legal scholars often opine on 
why no administration provided a definition, it is likely that the executive branch did not want to 
constrain the military or intelligence community’s activity with legal red tape.  William Banks 
and Peter Raven-Hansen, legal scholars, note the difficulty in defining assassination in their 
work “Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework.”  They write, “The 
                                                            
48 Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United 
Nations General Assembly, (Human Rights Council: Fourteenth session, May 28 2010): 3. 
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difficulty is that there are no consensus definitions in the literature, laws or cases.”49  Banks and 
Raven-Hansen note that many scholars try to distinguish assassination by who it is aimed against 
and whether it is for “political” purposes.50  The difficulty is compounded when scholars or 
pundits who write on targeted killing use “assassinate” as a verb for political, stylistic, or 
pejorative purposes.  Eric Holder, the Obama administration’s Attorney General, commented on 
using the term assassination and provided a short definition.  Holder starkly stated, “Some have 
called operations ‘assassinations.’  They are not, and the use of the loaded term is misplaced.  
Assassinations are unlawful killings.”51  This thesis will follow the only lead the executive 
branch provided: whether the killing of the individual target is legal or illegal.  Therefore, this 
thesis will define assassination as the illegal use of lethal force that is intentional, premeditated, 
and deliberate, by a State, their agents, or by an organized armed group, against a specific 
individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.  
 The definition for signature strikes is much less contested in scholarship because the 
operations were only recently revealed to the public through a variety of media outlets.  
Signature strikes are operations where target selection is not based on an individual’s 
identification, but instead on a pattern of behavior or unique characteristics that are associated 
with other individuals or wider militant organizations.  For example, if a group of individuals is 
seen handling weapons in a known al Qaeda facility, the targets may be considered for lethal 
action.  Signature strikes are also preemptive.  When operators base their decisions to kill 
suspected militants based on activities they are performing—such as handling weapons at an al 
Qaeda facility—they expect that militants will eventually attack and would prefer to strike first.  
                                                            
49 William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework,” 
University of Richmond Law Review 37 (2003): 2. 
50 Ibid., 3. 
51 Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law.” 
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Therefore, to retain continuity with the definitions for targeted killings and assassinations, this 
thesis will define signature strikes as: the use of lethal force that is intentional, preemptive, and 
deliberate by a state, their agents, or by an organized armed group, against an individual or group 
of individuals based on patters of behavior often associated with militant organizations.  The 
common elements in all three definitions are presented in Table A.  The major differences in the 
definitions are that assassinations are illegal, and signature strikes are preemptive and against 
individuals based on patterns of behavior, not identity.52   
Table A: Definitional Elements of Targeted Operations 
Targeted Killing Assassination Signature Strikes 
Intentional Intentional Intentional  
Premeditated  Premeditated  Preemptive 
Deliberate  Deliberate  Deliberate 
Legal Illegal  Legal 
Use of lethal force Use of lethal force Use of Lethal force 
Against a specific 
individual  
Against a specific 
individual  
Against an individual or 
group of individuals 
based on patterns of 
behaviors often 
associated with militant 
organizations  
By a State, its agents, 
or an armed group 
By a State, its agents, 
or an armed group 
By a State, its agents, or 
an armed group 
Not in the physical 
custody of the 
perpetrator  
Not in the physical 
custody of the 
perpetrator  
Not in the physical 
custody of the 
perpetrator 
 
Methodology 
 In order to determine what constitutes a precedent, this thesis uses a framework for each 
chapter on targeted killings and signature strikes.  To argue historical precedents, at the 
beginning of each chapter, this thesis will identify defining criteria for each type of operation.  
                                                            
52 Targeted killings, like signature strikes, can also be preemptive.  Signature strikes, however, are solely preemptive 
because the rationale for striking is authorized on the assumption that the adversary will strike because of their 
unique patterns of behavior.  Targeted killings, on the other hand, may be preemptive but may also be preventative 
because the State may already be engaged in conflict with the specific individual.  For more on preemption, 
prevention and signature strikes see: page 79 of this thesis.  
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These criteria create a framework for evaluating historical precedents.  As noted in the definition 
section, precedents are not defined by whether they are the same but on the degrees of similarity. 
Therefore, some cases have more of the specified criteria than others, but there will never be a 
perfect match.  Each chapter will present a series of cases that will be evaluated by the selected 
criteria and framework identified at the beginning of each chapter.  Then, at the conclusion of 
each chapter, this thesis will identify unique trends that were extracted from the historical cases.  
I did not preselect these trends, but rather, the facts spoke for themselves during the research and 
each chapter’s evaluation of historical precedents.  The trends often are interrelated with the 
criteria outlined for determining historical precedents, but also are recurring patterns that arise 
from the cases.  These trends then form the foundation for the final chapter, which outlines a 
theory regarding targeted killings and signature strikes, as well as specific policy 
recommendations extracted from the history. 
 
Legal Justifications 
 Targeted killings and signature strikes are not authorized in a vacuum.  The Bush and 
Obama administrations have made diligent efforts to justify targeted lethal action under domestic 
and international law.  It is important to understand the basic legal framework and justifications 
outlined by both administrations.  Nevertheless, the legal debates that accompany targeted lethal 
action and the legal precedents involved with them are not the center of this thesis.  Therefore, 
this section will be substantiated by the speeches, documents, and articles of officials from the 
Bush and Obama administrations, not by the plethora of legal articles that debate minute details 
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in these justifications.53  This section provides a brief framework for the legal justifications for 
targeted lethal action, as provided by the Bush and Obama administrations.  These legal 
justifications are found throughout the historical case studies because many presidents justify 
lethal force using the same legal rationale.  This section also anticipates a counterargument that 
there are no historic precedents for targeted strikes because the legal authority for lethal action 
was only given to the White House after the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in 2001.  
Before addressing this potential counterargument, this section will aggregate the legal 
justifications for targeted strikes into domestic law and international law. 
 
Domestic Law 
 Officials from both administrations—Juan Zarate and John Brennan—have noted that the 
Constitution provides sufficient authority for the executive branch to authorize targeted lethal 
action.  John Brennan, the current Director of the CIA, noted in a speech that “The Constitution 
empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of attack.”54  Under 
Article 1 Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may not 
engage in war without Congressional consent, “unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
danger as will not admit of delay.”55  In a leaked White Paper, the Department of Justice outlined 
a set of legal criteria under which the Attorney General deems it lawful for the United States to 
conduct a lethal operation against a U.S. Citizen who is a senior and operational leader of al 
Qaeda.  The first criterion is whether “an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government 
has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
                                                            
53 For an excellent primer on more detailed debates about the legality of targeted strikes see: Targeted Killings: Law 
and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman (Oxford UK; 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
54 Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
55 The Constitution of the United States, Article 1 Section 10, accessed via, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html. 
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United States.”56  In an author interview with Juan Zarate, the former Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Counterterrorism, noted that the George W. Bush administration primarily justified 
targeted strikes on this authority bestowed to the Commander-in-Chief.57  In comparison, the 
Obama administration also uses the imminent clause in the Constitution, but has shifted to use 
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force as the primary backbone for their lethal 
legal framework.58  
 Congress passed The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) within a week 
after September 11.  The AUMF authorized the President to:  
Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 
by such nations, organizations or persons.59 
 
Jeh Johnson, the former General Counsel for the Department of Defense and current Secretary of 
Homeland Security, called the AUMF “the bedrock of the military’s domestic legal authority.”60  
The AUMF is one of the most debated legal justifications for lethal action because many have 
questioned whether it provides the authority to target individuals outside of Afghanistan and 
associated al Qaeda organizations.61  John Brennan, the Director of the CIA, said in a speech 
that, “There is nothing in the AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al-Qa’ida to 
Afghanistan.”62  Noting a potential change to this justification, President Obama said in a speech 
                                                            
56 “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-
Qaeda or an Associated Force,” Department of Justice (White Paper: 2013). 
57 Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Section 2, 107th Congress 2001-2002 (September 18, 2001). 
60 Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration.” 
61 Since 2001, al Qaeda has many associated movements or adherents.  The original branch, led by Osama bin Laden 
and responsible for the 9/11 attacks, resides on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  There are additional affiliated 
organizations that have sworn allegiance to al Qaeda Central (the original branch).  These affiliated movements exist 
in Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Somalia. 
62 Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
Mencini 
 
26 
in 2013, that he aims to “refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”63  Nevertheless, 
the Obama administration has made no significant strides in reforming the AUMF.  Taken 
together, the Constitutional authority provided to the Commander-in-Chief to wage war in the 
face of imminent danger and the AUMF’s authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” 
to pursue al Qaeda and associated movements, comprise the twin legal pillars for targeted lethal 
action in U.S. domestic law. 
 
International Law  
 The Bush and Obama administrations have justified their use of targeted lethal force 
under international law because the United States is involved in an armed conflict and has an 
inherent right to national self-defense.  The legal basis for this stems from the United Nations 
Charter.  Article 51 of the Charter, stipulates, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations.”64  John Yoo, a legal advisor for the Bush administration, argued that self-
defense under international law is a “right [that] applies not only after a nation has suffered an 
attack, but also in anticipation of an ‘imminent’ attack.”65  In addition, the Obama administration 
officials have vehemently defended the use of unmanned technology, arguing that there is no 
stipulation under international law that “bans the use of remotely piloted aircraft for this purpose 
[national self defense] or that prohibits us [the United States] from using lethal force against our 
enemies outside of an active battlefield.”66  While counterterrorism can easily be justified as 
national self-defense, Yoo notes that the UN Charter adds a stipulation that member states must 
                                                            
63 Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” 
64 United Nations Charter, Article 51. 
65 Yoo, “Assassinations or Targeted Killings After 9/11,” 72. 
66 Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
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refrain “from the threat to use of force against the territorial integrity or political interdependence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”67  
Therefore, the Obama administration in particular has made a particular effort to justify targeted 
lethal action under the laws of war.   
 John Brennan has given the most thorough account of why the war against al Qaeda 
adheres to the laws of war.  The laws of war are long standing justifications that govern how a 
State can conduct itself in armed conflict and use lethal force.68  According to Brennan, targeted 
strikes conform to the principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.  They are 
necessary because al Qaeda militants are legitimate military targets, and the principle of 
necessity requires that the targets have definite military value.69  Lethal force also adheres to the 
principle of distinction, which ensures the ability to intentionally identify and attack military 
targets while civilian targets can remain protected.  Brennan argues targeted strikes adhere to the 
distinction principle because remotely piloted aircraft provide the unique ability to “precisely 
target a military objective while minimizing collateral damage.”70  The Obama administration 
argues targeted strikes are proportionate—the stipulation that collateral damage cannot exceed 
military advantage—because the UAV technology allows the United States to target terrorists 
with “ordnance that can be adapted to avoid harming others in the vicinity.”71  Lastly, Brennan 
notes that targeted strikes conform to the principle of humanity, which stipulates the use of 
weapons will not inflict unnecessary suffering, because the weapons systems are very precise.72  
President Obama reiterated that targeted strikes adhere to the internationally accepted laws of 
                                                            
67 United Nations Charter, Article 2; cited in Yoo, “Assassinations or Targeted Killings After 9/11,” 72. 
68 Craig Martin, “Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum Regime,” in Targeted 
Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew 
Altman (Oxford UK; Oxford University Press, 2012), 223-252.  
69 Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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war when he stated, “We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many 
Americans as they could if we did not stop them first.  So this is a just war—a war waged 
proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.”73 
 Understanding the legal justifications for lethal targeted strikes is imperative to this thesis 
for it anticipates a counterargument and lays a foundation for later precedents.  A critic could 
argue that there are no historic precedents for targeted strikes before September 11 because the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force—a document that granted the President full 
authorization to use force to pursue al Qaeda—was signed after the attack.  The AUMF, 
however, as seen from the analysis above, is only one of several legal justifications for targeted 
strikes.  Consecutive administrations have defended the practice under Constitutional Authority 
and international legal rights to self-defense.  Furthermore, the Bush administration, as noted by 
Juan Zarate, relied more heavily on privileges bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief to authorize 
targeted strikes than the AUMF.  The Obama administration, on the other hand, is more reliant 
on the AUMF to justify lethal action against al Qaeda; Juan Zarate opines that this shift in legal 
justification is because the Obama administration “relied very much on distancing itself from the 
Bush administration by changing the legal process.”74  Zarate added that the real change between 
the administration’s legal justifications occurred to the legal process.  He stated in an author 
interview, “Harold Koh [the State Department’s top legal advisor] made a real attempt to change 
the process and forms of legal argumentation—by reiterating and reforming the process 
calculus—without changing the activity [targeted strikes]. Actually, the Obama administration 
                                                            
73 Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” 
74 Juan Zarate, interview with author (Cambridge, MA: March 2014). 
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amplified the activity.”75  Therefore, while the AUMF is undoubtedly a legal justification for 
targeted strikes, it is not the sole legal justification.   
 Throughout this thesis many presidents justified the use of lethal force against specific 
individuals on the legal basis of imminence and national self-defense.  This section not only 
provides a brief summary of how the Bush and Obama administrations legally vindicate targeted 
strikes, it also establishes a foundation.  By establishing the legal foundation for how 
administrations in the twenty-first century justify targeted strikes, it becomes significantly easier 
to recognize when administrations in the twentieth century used the same justifications for lethal 
force. 
Roadmap 
 The remainder of this thesis will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will 
examine historical precedents for targeted killings.  In this chapter, I examine several cases for 
targeted killings—Isoroko Yamamoto in 1943, Muammar Qaddafi in 1986, Osama bin Laden in 
1998, and Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011.  In addition, I briefly examine the CIA’s Cold War plots to 
assassinate foreign leaders, which is instrumental in understanding the impact it had on future 
administrations when contemplating the use of lethal force.  The second chapter examines 
historical precedents for signature strikes, namely, the Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War and 
the Reagan administration’s proposed preemptive counterterrorism policy in 1984.  In the 
conclusion of each chapter, I will briefly identify historical patterns to further examine in the 
final chapter.  The last chapter summarizes this thesis’s findings, and extrapolates on the 
identified patterns, which will be then used to craft contemporary policy recommendations to 
show how history can inform policy.  
 
                                                            
75 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TARGETED KILLINGS 
 
 
“From the early days of the CIA, its officers contemplated the 
use of lethal force against named, specific individuals.” 1  
 -[REDACTED] 
 
 
 
 General ‘Wild’ Bill Donovan created a wartime intelligence agency that revolved around 
covert action.  Donovan, the founder and director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the 
predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency—used cloak and dagger operations to subvert the 
Axis powers in World War II.  Wild Bill Donovan was an ardent Catholic, World War I war 
hero, and an ardent American patriot.  One project, codenamed “Cross,” which never became 
operational, called for training left-leaning German nationals to kill top Nazi leaders such as 
Adolph Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Göring, and every Gestapo official with a rank of 
major or higher.2  A memo to General Dwight Eisenhower called the operation objective 
“organized killings.”3  Barrett McGurn, a foreign correspondent for the Herald Tribune, 
interviewed Donovan and top OSS veterans after the end of the Second World War regarding the 
intelligence agency’s subversive and lethal activities.  In the interview, Donovan told McGurn, 
“If what you do is for your country, even if it’s stealing and killing, it is no offense to God.”4  
                                                            
1 The quote came from an article in the CIA’s in house journal—Studies in Intelligence  “Covert Action, Loss of 
Life and the Prohibition on Assassination,” 1976-1996," Studies in Intelligence, 40, 2 (1996): 15, accessed via the 
National Security Archives. 
2 Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New 
York: Free Press, 2011), 316. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Barrett McGurn Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, MSS 149AF, Box 7, Folder: Herald Tribune: SPIES (OSS-
CIA). 
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McGurn also prodded John Shaheen, the former head of “special projects” for the OSS, about his 
role in covert action and Shaheen recalled, “I approved for the killing of a whole group of enemy 
leaders. Our people said it would surely work but President Roosevelt turned it down.”5  
 The debate of whether to kill individual enemy leaders was clearly present in the days of 
the OSS, just as it is today with the discussions about drone strikes.  The question of whether it is 
permissible to kill an individual enemy in national self-defense is a pervasive concept in the 
study of war, but one that leaders and scholars simply take at face value.  This chapter serves to 
rectify that dearth of scholarship.  It argues that there are several historical precedents for 
targeted killings in American history, not all of which were successful in killing the individual.  
Targeted killings are not limited to drones killing identified terrorists with Hellfire missiles in the 
twenty-first century.  In fact, America has a history of debating whether to kill certain enemies, 
actively targeting individuals, and in some cases, authorizing lethal force.  This chapter will trace 
the history of targeted killings in the United States from World War II to 2014.  In the process, 
this chapter will actively identify cases of historical precedents and scrutinize them to identify 
foundational frameworks and trends that, once extracted, will reveal lessons to help inform 
modern policy on targeted killing drone strikes.   
 This chapter will analyze the historical cases using the accepted definition of a targeted 
killing and specific targeting criteria.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis will 
adhere to a definition presented to the United Nations.  In 2010, Philip Alston, a scholar from 
New York University, delivered a special report on targeted killings to the United Nations 
General Assembly.  In this report, Alston defines targeted killings as, “the intentional, 
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of 
                                                            
5 Ibid. 
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law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in 
the physical custody of the perpetrator.”6  
 This chapter will also analyze all targeted killings cases with the targeting criteria—find, 
fix, finish.  These criteria will enable an analysis of the historical cases, an assessment of the 
historical precedents, and an ability to retain a sense of continuity across decades of American 
history.  Find, fix, finish was originally a phrase used to describe the targeting methodology for 
missions carried out by U.S. Special Forces during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.7  These 
targeted operations are broken down into three phases: find, fix and finish.  During the find 
phase, possible targets are identified and recorded for further action.8  The fix stage is when the 
intelligence functions of the operation identify the location of a potential target.9  The final 
phase, finish, is when “action is taken against the target.”10  Although the term was originally 
used for Special Forces operations, it has evolved to describe drone strikes.11  By combining the 
find, fix, finish criteria with Philip Alston’s definition of a targeted killing, this chapter will 
create a framework for analyzing the historical cases.  This framework is presented in Table B.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” United 
Nations General Assembly, (Human Rights Council: Fourteenth session, May 28 2010). 
7 Charles Faint and Marshall Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” The SOF Targeting Process,” 
smallwarsjournal.com, January 31, 2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-
%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-targeting-process. 
8 Department of Defense, “Joint Targeting,” Joint Publication 3-60, (April 13 2007): ix. 
9 Ibid., x. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report no. 65 
(January 2013): 6. 
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Table B: Historical Precedents for Targeted Killings 
Operation Criteria Precedents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Targeted Killings 
Find 
 
 
The intentional targeting 
of an individual by a 
State. 
 
Osama bin Laden (1998) 
The Clinton administration authorized the CIA to 
locate Osama bin Laden for lethal targeting purposes. 
 
Anwar al-Awlaki (2011) 
The Obama administration authorized the CIA to hunt 
al-Awlaki in Yemen for an armed drone operation.   
Fix 
 
 
 
 
Deliberately locating an 
individual target who is 
not in physical custody 
of the State. 
 
Isoroku Yamamoto (1943) 
American intelligence units decrypted a message 
explicitly detailing Yamamoto’s travel itinerary for 
April 18, 1943 in the Southern Pacific. 
 
Osama bin Laden (1998) 
The CIA located Osama bin Laden near Khowst, 
Afghanistan on August 20, 1998.   
 
Anwar al-Awlaki (2011) 
Through human intelligence operations in Yemen, the 
CIA leaders informed the Obama administration 
Anwar al-Awlaki would be traveling by convoy in 
Northwest Yemen.  
Finish 
 
The intentional, 
premeditated, deliberate, 
and legal use of lethal 
force against a targeted 
individual. 
 
Isoroku Yamamoto (1943) 
American Army aviators gunned down Yamamoto’s 
plane near Guadalcanal on April 18, 1943.  
 
Anwar al-Awlaki (2011) 
On September 30, 2011, a fleet of CIA-operated 
armed drones killed Anwar al-Awlaki in a truck while 
traveling through Jawf Province.   
 
 This chapter will present and analyze four cases of strikes against individuals cited in 
targeted killings scholarship.  Not all of the cases serve as a find-fix-finish precedent for 
contemporary targeted killings drone strikes; however, all cases presented serve a vital purpose 
in understanding U.S. policymakers’ dilemma of whether to kill individual enemy combatants.  
The first operation presented was a successful targeted killing against Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto during World War II.  The second case analyzes the U.S. air strike against Libyan 
terrorist facilities in 1986, which was not a targeted killing, but is fundamental in understanding 
later targeted killings.  The third case examines the unsuccessful targeted killing of Osama bin 
Laden in 1998 by the Clinton administration.  Finally, the fourth case is a modern drone strike, 
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which targeted Anwar al-Awlaki.  Interwoven throughout these cases, this thesis will interject 
and provide a history of certain events that are integral to understanding the broader historical 
continuum of targeted killings.  For example, Congress intensely investigated the CIA during the 
1970s on allegations that it plotted to assassinate foreign leaders.  As discussed in the first 
chapter of this thesis, targeted killings are not assassinations.  This interlude on assassinations, 
however, greatly influenced future generations of CIA officers and policymakers and its 
ramifications are still present today.  This chapter will delve into the historical precedents, 
uncover trends to dissect, and piece together a general history of the targeted killings continuum 
spanning between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
 
Isoroku Yamamoto, 1943 
 Americans loathed Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto during World War II.  When the news 
broke after the war had ended that American aviators gunned him down in a special operations 
mission, Americans rejoiced.12  Yamamoto was the architect of the surprise Pearl Harbor attack, 
the commander of the Japanese fleet at the Battle of Midway, and reportedly bragged in a 
published letter at the beginning of World War II, “I shall not be content merely to capture Guam 
and the Philippines and occupy Hawaii and San Francisco.  I’m looking forward to dictating 
peace to the United States in the White House.”13  For his actions and statements, Yamamoto 
was described in the media as being at the top of “General MacArthur’s list of war criminals,” 
and “America’s No. 1 enemy.”14  After the details of the 1943 Yamamoto mission were released 
                                                            
12 Roger Beaumont, “Targeting Military Leaders,” in Lightning Over Bougainville, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, 
D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990), 38. 
13 “‘I’ll Capture White House,’ Jap Admiral Bragged Year Ago,” The Washington Post, December 17, 1941, 
Proquest Historical Newspapers. 
14 “The End of Yamamoto,” The New York Times, September 14, 1945; “Tokyo Broadcasts News; He Hated 
America Bitterly: Yamamoto, Top Jap Sea Officer, Killed,” The Washington Post, May 22, 1943, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers. 
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in 1945, Colonel Thomas Lanphier Jr., the ace originally credited with downing Yamamoto’s 
plane, wrote an exposé for the New York Times and trumpeted his feat by writing that the 
Japanese Admiral was, “an easy man to hate,” and “one it would be an honor to destroy.”15  
 Many historians and political scientists acknowledge and accept the Yamamoto mission in 
targeted killings literature.16  Two scholars, however, contend that the Yamamoto mission was 
not a targeted killing.  Gary Solis argues that the Yamamoto mission was not a targeted killing 
because Admiral Yamamoto was a uniformed combatant.17  In a legal memorandum for the 
Army, W. Hays Park also argues that the Yamamoto mission was incorrectly labeled as a 
targeted killing because it occurred during conventional war.18  Solis and Park are in the minority 
of targeted killings scholarship.  Disqualifying the Yamamoto mission because Admiral 
Yamamoto was a uniformed combatant and the operation took place in a conventional war are 
minute distinctions that are not referenced in existing literature or in this thesis’s definition of a 
targeted killing extracted from Alston’s 2010 UN Report.  
 Extending this premise, modern political leaders have also cited the Yamamoto mission to 
justify modern targeted killings.  The top lawyers in the State Department, Pentagon, and 
Department of Justice have all mentioned the air raid on Admiral Yamamoto in public speeches 
defending the legality of targeted killings in the Obama administration.19  Eric Holder, the 82nd 
                                                            
15 Thomas Lanphier, “Flier Who Shot Down Yamamoto Says White House Baited the Trap,” New York Times, 
September 12,1945. 
16 For scholarly references on the Yamamoto mission see: Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of 
International Assassination,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 114; Kevin Govern, “Operation Neptune 
Spear: Was Killing Bin Laden a Legitimate Military Objective?,” in Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an 
Asymmetrical World, ed. Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman (Oxford UK; Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 358-359; Jeffrey Richelson, “When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National Security Option,” 
International Journal on Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 2, (2010): 247. 
17 Gary Solis, “Targeted Killings and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 2, (2007): 
128. 
18 W. Hays Park, “Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,” Memorandum of Law, Department of the Army, 
November 2, 1989. 
19 Harold Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010,) 
The State Department, http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; Jeh Johnson, “National Security Law, 
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U.S. Attorney general, has been in charge of outlining and defending the legality for drone 
strikes in the Obama administration.  In a speech given at Northwestern University Law School 
in 2005, Holder justified targeted killings as legal and cited the Yamamoto strike as a historical 
example. Holder argued: 
It is entirely lawful – under both United States law and applicable law of war 
principles – to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated 
forces.  This is not a novel concept. In fact, during World War II, the United States 
tracked the plane flying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the commander of Japanese 
forces in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway – and shot it down 
specifically because he was on board.  As I explained to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee following the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the same rules 
apply today.20 
 
 The examination of the raid on Yamamoto, from find, to fix, to finish, will provide a 
historical foundation for modern counterterrorism drone strikes as the one of the earliest, if not 
first, targeted killing in American history.  The mission against Admiral Yamamoto precisely 
aligns with the accepted UN definition of a targeted killing: the intentional, deliberate, and 
premeditated use of lethal force against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody 
of the perpetrator and fits into the find-fix-finish framework.  After examining the operational 
similarities with the find, fix, finish criteria, this case will show the major differences with 
modern targeted killings.  Most notably, how the Executive Branch completely hid how 
Yamamoto died until after the war was over, and the strong tension between the intelligence and 
policy community.  Finally, this case will conclude with a brief examination of the ethical 
objections to the targeted killing of Admiral Yamamoto, which provide an empirical example for 
understanding the often cited legal rationales for targeted killings.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (Speech, New Haven, CT, February 22, 2012), Council on 
Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-
lawyering-obama-administration/p27448. 
20 Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” (speech, 
Chicago, IL  March 5, 2012), Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html. 
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 In 1942, the Allied war strategy in the Southern Pacific hinged on ousting the Japanese 
from the Solomon Islands.  The ousting campaign began in August 1942 and lasted until 
February 1943 when the Allies successfully chiseled a foothold on the island of Guadalcanal.  
Admiral Yamamoto, a firm believer in air power, in April 1943 helped design a plan, called 
“Operation I,” for an aerial assault on American positions in Guadalcanal.21  The Japanese 
operation was largely unsuccessful and Yamamoto, discouraged by another defeat, made plans to 
visit Japanese forward operating bases beyond Guadalcanal that had begun to experience 
increased Allied aerial attacks in early April.  On April 13, 1943, American naval intelligence 
cryptologists decoded and deciphered a Japanese message that included the details of 
Yamamoto’s itinerary for his April 18 trip.22  The decrypted radio message identified that the 
Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet (Yamamoto) would inspect three forward operating 
bases.  It gave the exact times he would arrive and depart from each base, and said that he would 
be held in a mid-sized bomber and would be escorted by six fighter planes.23  The allied 
intelligence and military functions were not actively searching for Yamamoto, but when the 
American Naval intelligence cryptologists broke the Japanese message, they found and fixed 
Yamamoto’s precise location.  The following day, April 14, Yamamoto’s American equivalent, 
Admiral Chester Nimitz, was briefed on the decrypted document and subsequently ordered his 
Vice-Admiral, William Halsey, to proceed with an interception at Yamamoto’s first stop and told 
Halsey, “Good luck and good hunting.”24 
 United States military and intelligence services had Admiral Yamamoto’s location fixed 
and a green light to strike the architect of Pearl Harbor.  The Navy was not equipped to handle 
                                                            
21 R. Cargill Hill, “The Yamamoto Mission,” in Lightning Over Bougainville, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990), 18. 
22 Roger Pineau, “The Code Break,” in Lightning Over Bougainville, 40. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hill, “The Yamamoto Mission,” 20. 
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the air raid for Yamamoto and was forced to use Army aviators for the special operation.25  Top 
commanders planned the strike on Yamamoto carefully.  They chose to use a new class of 
fighters, the P-38 Lightning, which could out-climb and out-dive the maneuverable Japanese 
Zero.26  The commanders designed a stealth mission.  Fourteen Lightning fighters, flying at 
20,000 feet, would engage Yamamoto’s escorts while four pilots, hand-selected because they 
were excellent gunners, would skim the waves of the ocean to avoid enemy radar and jet from 
below to surprise Yamamoto’s bomber.27  On April 17, the army aviators met with top Navy, 
Marine, and Army commanders.  Thomas Lanphier, the ace attributed with gunning down 
Yamamoto, later recalled all of the Army aviators being handed cablegrams printed on blue 
tissue, to distinguish that the operation was Top Secret.28  The cablegram, Lanphier said, directed 
the aviators to apply “maximum effort” to destroying Yamamoto and was signed “Knox.”29  
Frank Knox was the Secretary of the Navy for President Franklin Roosevelt.  While some 
historians debate whether Roosevelt authorized the mission, it is clear that top policymakers, 
such as Knox, authorized the Yamamoto raid.30  On April 18, the covert operation against 
Admiral Yamamoto succeeded and some strike combination by Thomas Lanphier and his fellow 
gunner, Rex Barber, finished Yamamoto.31   
 From fix to finish, the Yamamoto operation mirrored common elements in modern day 
targeted killings. The entire mission was Top Secret and covert in nature.  Delaying public 
knowledge of the raid preserved this secrecy.  Leading American decision-makers did not want 
to expose to the Japanese that they had decrypted their cipher and therefore, did not reveal the 
                                                            
25 Daniel Haulman makes the argument that the Yamamoto mission was akin to a special operation.  For more see: 
Daniel Haulman, “The Yamamoto Mission,” Air Power History (2003): 33. 
26 Hill, “The Yamamoto Mission,” 19. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Lanphier, “Flier Who Shot Down Yamamoto.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 Haulman, “The Yamamoto Mission,” 32. 
31 Ibid. 
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operation until after the war was over.  The special operation on Yamamoto was akin to drone 
strikes because it also involved the deployment of new aerial technology, the P-38 Lightning, 
which was introduced into the war in 1942.  In addition, there was a high-level degree of 
complicity by top policymakers in Washington, and possibly, President Roosevelt himself.  The 
main difference between the Yamamoto strike and today’s drone strikes is that top national 
security leaders were not actively searching to kill Pearl Harbor’s architect, but they sprang on 
the opportunity once his location was fixed.  Nevertheless, operationally, the strike on 
Yamamoto was intentional, deliberate and used “maximum effort” to “hunt” and use lethal force 
on a specific individual.  
 The primary differences between the Yamamoto raid and contemporary drone strikes 
occurred after American aces gunned down the Admiral’s plane.  The White House did not 
release any information about the raid.  Americans did not know of Yamamoto’s death until a 
Tokyo radio station solemnly announced the Admiral’s death a month later and the New York 
Times published a cover story on May 21, 1943.32  The same day, the Office of War Information 
said the commander of the combined Japanese fleet died aboard a warplane “during his direction 
of operations.”33  The rumor mill also churned out various explanations for how the hated 
Admiral died; some even reported that he had committed suicide.34  The Associated Press and 
American media widely relied on Japanese radio stations for their information regarding the 
death of Yamamoto.  Many American Naval officers were surprised by the operation and were 
“unaware of any sea-air combat in April sufficiently important to have claimed the attention of 
                                                            
32 “Japanese Admiral Killed in Combat,” The New York Times, May 21, 1943. 
33 “Chief of Jap Fleet Killed Fighting U.S.” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 21, 1932, Proquest Historical Newspapers. 
34 “Yamamoto Death Called Mystery: One Authority Suspects Suicide,” The New York Times, May 22, 1943. 
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Japan’s ranking officer.”35  Moreover, the military hid the raid from the official “air actions 
listed” communiqués in April of 1943.36  When reporters questioned Roosevelt on Yamamoto’s 
death, the President gasped, “Is he dead? Gosh!”37  Americans were not informed that the United 
States military tracked and killed Yamamoto until a month after Victory in Japan Day and a 
week after Japanese representatives officially surrendered aboard the USS Missouri.  On 
September 10 and 11, 1945, American newspapers published numerous stories with headlines 
describing how: “American Pilots Killed Jap Sea Chief,” and “Navy Broke Japanese Code.”38  
The following day, the Army informed the media that Thomas Lanphier was responsible for 
gunning down Yamamoto.39  
 The delay in informing the American public of the killing of Yamamoto and admitting that 
the United States government was responsible for his death occurred due to internal tension over 
intelligence. This tension over intelligence is the second major difference when compared with 
modern drone strikes.  When the New York Times first reported that Yamamoto was killed in 
May 1943 Winston Churchill was irate.  Churchill reportedly lambasted Roosevelt because the 
United States risked jeopardizing the security of communications intelligence, which was vital 
for the Allied war effort, for a venal pursuit of an enemy admiral.40  Moreover, in a 
Congressional Committee’s investigation into Pearl Harbor in 1945, Vice-Admiral Halsey 
mentioned that there were disagreements within the Navy and with Admiral Nimitz over whether 
                                                            
35 “Japan’s Navy Chief Killed in Action, The Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1943, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers. 
36 “Tokyo Broadcasts News; He Hated America Bitterly,” The Washington Post. 
37 “‘Gosh!’” Says Roosevelt On Death of Yamamoto,” The New York Times, May 21, 2013. 
38 “How American Pilots Killed Jap Sea Chief,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 10, 1945, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers; “Navy Broke Japanese Code, Causing Yamamoto’s Death,” The Washington Post, September 11, 
1945, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
39 “Yamamoto’s Killer Identified by Army,” The New York Times, September 12, 1945, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers. 
40 Hill, “The Yamamoto Mission,” 26. 
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to authorize the Yamamoto mission, as it could risk exposing the intelligence operations aimed at 
the Japanese.41   
 After World War II, more information surfaced on Admiral Yamamoto and the air raid that 
killed him, and some scholars and government figures questioned the ethics of the strikes.  In 
1946, Admiral Nimitz was furious when he discovered at an Associated Press event that the 
often-cited bit that Yamamoto boasted he would “dictate peace to the White House,” was 
actually a hoax perpetrated by the Japanese government for increased morale in Japan.  This 
purported phrase had served as a lightning rod in the case against Yamamoto in the United 
States.42   Historians have discovered that Yamamoto was not fiercely anti-American (as he was 
often depicted) and initially argued against making war with the United States, but was overruled 
by ultra-nationalist Japanese politicians.43  Later Rex Barber—one of the select gunners in the 
Yamamoto mission who was eventually found to share responsibility for gunning down the 
Admiral’s bomber—would later write that “the more I study and read about Admiral Yamamoto, 
the more I respect and admire him…the world did lose a great man.”44  In addition, former 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who served as a cryptographer and helped break the 
code that fixed Yamamoto’s location, told Jeffery Rosen of the New York Times: 
I was on the desk, on watch, when I got word that they had shot down Yamamoto in 
the Solomon Islands, and I remember thinking: this is a particular individual they 
went out to intercept. There is a very different notion when you’re thinking about 
killing an individual, as opposed to killing a soldier in the line of fire.45 
 
                                                            
41 “Yamamoto Trap Threatened U.S. Secret About Jap Code,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 1945, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
42 “Yamamoto ‘Boast’ Declared a Hoax,” The New York Times, January 11, 1946, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
43 John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 2003), 189-190. 
44 Tom Crouch, “Foreword,” in Lightning Over Bougainville, IX. 
45 Jeffrey Rosen, “The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens,” The New York Times, September 23, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
Mencini 
 
42 
 Paul Woodruff, a philosophy professor, during an academic panel at the Smithsonian 
decades after the strike also questioned the ethics of the Yamamoto raid.46  Woodruff stated that 
the morality of Yamamoto’s raid depends on whether the motives for killing Yamamoto looked 
forward or backward.47  If revenge and vengeance had guided the decision to kill Yamamoto, the 
action would be less ethical.  Despite being called “Operation Vengeance,” Woodruff ultimately 
concluded that the mission was ethical because it was forward motivated; Yamamoto was 
irreplaceable in the Japanese military and his death would save American lives.48  The forward-
thinking rationale for gunning down Yamamoto was to hasten the victory in the Pacific theatre 
and to save American troops.  Forward-thinking rationale is aligned with the notion of 
preventative self-defense. By eliminating an individual who has a record of doing you harm, you 
can assume that the same person will do harm to you again, and you are therefore justified to 
defend yourself against said person.  Justifying targeted killings as self-defense is a common 
attribute of the other historical cases discussed in this chapter.  
 
CIA Assassinations and the Church Committee, 1975-76 
 In 1975, a Congressional Committee, the Church Committee, unearthed the CIA’s 
deepest secrets: the nation’s top intelligence agency planned to assassinate several of the world’s 
leaders who were Communist sympathizers.  The CIA’s Cold War assassination attempts on 
world leaders do not act as precedents for targeted killings, but are frequently mentioned by 
scholars in targeted killings literature.49  The public revelations regarding the assassinations were 
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a watershed moment for the American public about the CIA and the American presidents who 
seemingly unleashed it.  The Church Committee hearings led to subsequent executive orders by 
three different presidents barring assassinations from America’s foreign policy toolkit.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, this section will not go into the details of the assassinations, but will 
discuss the wider implications by examining the Church Committee and its findings.  The results 
are important because when future presidents, policymakers, and intelligence officials weighed 
targeted killing operations they were forced to address the pressing question remaining from 
1975: Is this an assassination? 
 After the media’s revelations about the CIA document dubbed “The Family Jewels,” the 
media, Congress, and Americans became fixated on CIA covert action.  Senator Frank Church, a 
Democrat from Idaho, led the “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities Committee” in 1975.  The Senate Select Committee, 
commonly referred to as the Church Committee, began to examine the CIA’s role in covert 
action and it immediately investigated allegations that the U.S. government attempted to 
assassinate foreign leaders.50  The Church Committee examined cases of alleged CIA 
assassinations on the leaders of South Vietnam, Chile, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and 
Cuba, concluding “the United States was implicated in several assassination plots.”51  All of the 
plots took place from 1960 to 1970.  The CIA was implicated in plotting to assassinate the 
leaders, although the planned operations were not successful.  The Committee placed the 
hearings into the wider context of the Cold War and understood that coercive covert action was 
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used in the Cold War, but made the strong distinction between killing leaders and meddling in 
other nations’ politics.  The authors wrote, “[there is] a significant difference between a 
coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of 
intervening in the affairs of foreign nations.”52  The main scope of the committee was to examine 
how and why the plots happened, where they were authorized, and by whom.   
 The major implication from the findings, and for the purpose of this thesis, was the 
Church Committee’s discovery of “plausible deniability” by the executive branch.  Covert action 
is an accepted practice of the CIA and is used to conceal the nation’s identity in sponsoring 
foreign policy objectives by permitting a buffer of plausible deniability by policymakers.53  The 
Committee uncovered that in the assassination cases the National Security Council created a 
maze of special committees able to authorize covert action—in this case assassinations—to 
insulate the president.54  The committee concluded “this concept [plausible deniability], [was] 
designed to protect the United States and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has 
been expanded to mask decisions of the president and his senior staff members.”55  The 
conclusion regarding plausible deniability, along with other the details unearthed in the 
individual plots, led the Church Committee to determine that “assassination is incompatible with 
American principles, international order, and morality.”56  Moreover, the committee called for it 
to be rejected as a tool of American foreign policy and advocated that a “flat ban against 
assassination should be written into law.”57  
 The Church Committee findings were the icing on the cake for an American public 
already weary of the government.  They came after the withdrawal from Vietnam, Watergate, 
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and the resignation of a President Nixon.  These events coupled with the jarring findings from 
the Church Committee, scarred the image of the CIA and depicted it as a “rogue elephant.”58  
The Church Committee led to more rigorous Congressional intelligence oversight, including a 
standing Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.59  In addition, in 1976 President Ford 
responded by signing Executive Order 11,905, which banned “political assassination.”  President 
Carter removed the word “political” from the order in 1978.  President Reagan superseded both 
executive orders with Executive Order 12,333 in 1981, which stipulated, “No one employed or 
acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in 
assassination.”60  
 The Church Committee and its investigation of assassinations have two implications for 
this thesis.  First, the Church Committee led to one of the legal constructs that all targeted lethal 
policies must abide by: Executive Order 12,333.  The subsequent executive orders barring 
assassinations are the result of the Church Committee and as noted in the first chapter, one of the 
primary legal frameworks for targeted killings.  Banning assassinations by executive order 
instead of Congressional law, however, has some benefit for the White House because it makes it 
possible to rewrite, revoke, or create a new Executive Order.61  Moreover, Executive Order 
12,333 would provide a legal framework that would narrow government officials’ deliberations 
on using lethal force because they believe executive order legally restricts their policy options.62  
The second important implication is that the Church Committee created a firestorm for the CIA 
and nearly destroyed its reputation with the American public, creating a cadre of CIA officers 
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and national security policymakers weary, or at least very aware, of the political ramifications of 
lethal security policy.63  This weariness is clearly seen in the decades following the Church 
Committee.  
 
Muammar Qaddafi, 1986 
 In 1986, Ronald Reagan authorized an airstrike on Libyan “terrorist facilities,” one of 
which was a command-and-control structure where Libya’s dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, was 
residing.64  Scholars frequently mention the 1986 strike, codenamed Operation El Dorado 
Canyon, in assassination and targeted killings literature.65  Operation El Dorado Canyon was not 
a targeted killing and is not a historical precedent for targeted killings using the find-fix-finish 
framework.  The 1986 Libyan strike, however, does serve as a foundational legal precedent and 
operational concept that future administrations are known to have mirrored while crafting their 
own targeted killings policy.  The airstrike does not qualify as a targeted killing.  Muammar 
Qaddafi was not actively targeted.  U.S. intelligence services did not actively look to find and fix 
Qaddafi’s location, thus, eliminating two legs of a find-fix-finish operation.66  In addition, there 
was no “finish” on the airstrike on an individual target, eliminating the third criterion of a 
targeted killing.  
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 Nevertheless, the airstrike on Muammar Qaddafi provides important ramifications for 
this chapter.  Presenting Operation El Dorado Canyon as a failed case study for a targeted killing 
acts a theoretical exercise.  By examining what is not a targeted killing it will clarify what is one.  
While not an operational precedent, this case will serve as a historical precedent for some of the 
legal arguments made by future administrations to justify targeted killings.  Thus, while the air 
assault on Libyan terrorist facilities was not an operational historical precedent for targeted 
killings, it is important because American decision makers invoked the legal right to self-defense 
as a legal justification for a counterterrorist operation.  Finally, although the operation was not a 
targeted killing, it was the first time in American history that the executive branch responded 
with lethal force to terrorism.  This becomes especially pertinent when later administrations 
looked to the 1986 strike as a precedent for counterterrorism targeted killings.  
 The Reagan administration labeled Qaddafi’s Libyan regime as a state exporter of terror 
and believed that the Libyan dictator was behind a string of deadly terrorist attacks aimed at 
American interests in late 1985 and early 1986.67  In the final months of 1985, a Palestinian 
group with ties to Libya—Abu Nidal—orchestrated numerous attacks.  Abu Nidal bombed a cafe 
next to a U.S. Embassy in Rome, seized a cruise ship and brutally murdered an elderly American 
in a wheelchair, firebombed a U.S. military post exchange in Germany, and unleashed 
coordinated assaults on the Rome and Vienna airports that killed 25 people including five 
Americans.68  Qaddafi worsened his international standing by not only presumably backing the 
terrorist attacks, but also welcoming the commandos that carried out the cruise ship seizure into 
Libya and publicly praising the airport assaults.69   
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  For months, the Reagan administration debated retribution against Qaddafi, but finally 
codified a policy for the Libyan threat when President Reagan signed National Security Decision 
Directive 205 on January 8, 1986.  The declassified document argues that the “evidence of 
Qadhafi’s support for terrorism to include the December 27 attacks in Rome and Vienna, is 
indisputable.”70  The Reagan administration noted that “The scope and tempo of Libyan-
supported terrorist activity against Western targets is widening and accelerating,” and that the 
“support of international terrorism by the Government of Libya constitute[s] an unusual and 
extraordinary threat” to American national security.71  By early 1986, the Reagan administration 
poised itself for retaliation against Libya by outlining a military plan to “heighten the readiness 
of U.S. forces to conduct military action.”72  The forces positioning against Libya in early 1986 
mobilized after a terrorist attack in April.   
 The final straw for the Reagan administration occurred on April 5, 1986 when terrorists 
slid a bomb underneath a disc jockey’s booth at the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin.  The 
attack on the discotheque, which U.S. personne frequented, killed two Americans and injured 
hundreds more.73  The National Security Agency intercepted radio transmissions between Libyan 
officials and terrorists suggesting certain Western social gathering places, dispatching special 
teams to Western European capitals to plan attacks, and designating orders to carry out plans.74  
After the bombing in West Berlin, American policymakers now had a “smoking gun” and 
planned a strike on Libyan terrorist facilities.75  
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 The Reagan Administration carefully planned a strike that would cripple Libya’s terrorist 
operations, not political institutions to avoid international recrimination.  Margaret Thatcher, the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, supported the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism 
agenda in Libya when she asserted, “I have no illusion that these actions will eliminate the 
terrorist threat…the loss of such state sponsorship will inevitably weaken the ability of terrorist 
organizations.”76  There were five targets that President Reagan approved for retaliation: (1) a 
naval commando school near Tripoli that trained Palestinian Liberation Organization militants, 
(2) an airfield near Tripoli used to export nefarious materials, (3) a military Barracks near 
Benghazi that served as a training facility and alternate command center, (4) a military airfield 
that although not tied to terrorism was necessary to damage Libya’s air defenses for the 
American raid, (5) and the most contested—the Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli—that served as 
Qaddafi’s command and control center and residence on occasion.77  Navy and Air Force pilots 
carried out Operation El Dorado Canyon on April 15, 1986 and resulted in 36 Libyan deaths, 
damage to all of the targeted facilities, and (later disproved) accusations by Qaddafi, who 
claimed that American forces targeted his residential Gucci-made tent and killed his adopted 
daughter.78   
 Operation El Dorado Canyon leaves a pressing question for the purpose of this thesis: did 
the Reagan administration use intentional, premeditated, and deliberate use of force against a 
specific individual?  In other words, did the United States attempt to target and kill Muammar 
Qaddafi?  The answer is no.  Historians, legal scholars, and former government officials have 
vehemently argued that Qaddafi was not a primary target for Operation El Dorado Canyon.  The 
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1986 airstrike is cited as a precedent because U.S. forces struck the Aziziyah Barracks, where 
Qaddafi was known to reside and, in fact, was residing the night of the strike.79  Before they 
authorized the strike, American intelligence officials and policymakers recognized that Qaddafi 
had erratic residency behavior and was known to change locations three times in any given night 
out of fear of internal overthrow.80  Moreover, intelligence assessments of the Aziziyah Barracks 
revealed an underground bunker designed by the Soviets, where many in the U.S. intelligence 
community assumed Qaddafi would be staying if at the command center.  Although the 
intelligence community knew of the bunker, the aircraft were not even equipped with bunker-
busting ordnance.81  As noted earlier, there was no find, fix, or finish in Operation El Dorado 
Canyon.  On the contrary, American decision-makers could only guess whether Qaddafi would 
be at the barracks.   
 Operation El Dorado Canyon did not intentionally or deliberately target Qaddafi, which 
fails to qualify as a targeted killing precedent.  Ronald Reagan noted the primary objective of the 
operation in his memoirs.  Reagan wrote that he wanted to show the “attack was not intended to 
kill Qaddafi…The objective was to let him know that we weren’t going to accept his terrorism 
anymore.”82  Officials in the White House, however, were prepared that his death could be a 
possibility.  One NSC staff member said in an interview, “Killing him [Qaddafi] was never part 
of our plan.  On the other hand, we certainly made no attempt to protect him from our bombs.”83 
The White House Press Secretary’s office was prepared to call Qaddafi’s death “a fortuitous by-
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product of our act of self-defense.”84  The controversial issue over killing a head of state was 
exacerbated when Seymour Hersh wrote a feature story for the New York Times magazine a year 
after the bombing that claimed the “assassination of Qaddafi was the primary goal of the Libyan 
bombing.” 85  Hersh’s story, however, has been “sharply disputed” by legal, governmental, and 
scholarly authorities.86  
 Targeted killings literature cites the Qaddafi air raid because the study and discussion of 
assassinations utilizes this same literature.  The theoretical question of whether a successful 
killing of Qaddafi in 1986 by American forces would be an assassination under international and 
domestic law has provoked a massive debate.  The complexity with targeting Qaddafi is that he 
wore two hats.  Qaddafi was the commander of an international terrorist network, but he was also 
the Libyan President.  The legal consensus for targeted killings, as noted earlier, is that it is legal 
to target terrorist leaders under international law and it does not violate the domestic ban on 
assassinations.  Mark Vlasic notes that Operation El Dorado Canyon illustrates the White 
House’s interpretation of Executive Order 12,333 as “inapplicable in times of armed conflict.”87 
The question, however, is whether killing him would have been illegal because he was the sitting 
Libyan President.  The debate about whether the theoretical killing of Qaddafi would be an 
assassination is out of the scope of this thesis.88  It is important to note, however, that some 
scholars have argued that an overt military mission’s acts are legal (here, a hypothetical Qaddafi 
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killing), rather than the acts by a covert operation similar to the attempts against foreign leaders 
during the Cold War and unearthed by the Church Committee.  Stephen Hosmer, who studies 
leadership attacks, noted that overt military missions have been permissible because they are 
conducted by uniformed members of the armed services in accordance with the laws of armed 
conflict.89  While the question of whether killing Qaddafi would be an assassination is out of the 
scope of the thesis, it does facilitate a discussion on precedents that is integral to better 
understanding the American history of targeted killings.  
 The 1986 airstrike on Qaddafi was not a historical precedent for modern targeted killings 
from an operational perspective; however, it is a historical precedent for Obama’s drone strikes 
against terrorist leaders from a legal perspective.  The Reagan administration had to consider the 
possibility of Qaddafi being killed in El Dorado Canyon; therefore, top decision-makers outlined 
a legal framework that would justify killing a sponsor of state terrorism.  The legal arguments 
used by the Reagan administration are a historical precedent for the Obama administration’s 
framework for targeting terrorists today.  As noted in the introduction of this thesis, the Obama 
administration uses a domestic and international law to justify targeted killings.  A fundamental 
justification for targeted killing is the right to a nation’s self-defense as stipulated by the United 
Nations Charter in Article 51.  Ronald Reagan invoked Article 51 to justify his strike against 
Qaddafi’s terrorist operation facilities.  In his speech to the American people, Reagan trumpeted, 
“Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty.  It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken 
tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”90  In addition, 
after the strike on Qaddafi, senior government officials offered a second legal justification that 
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coincides with rationale for modern targeted killings.  State Department Legal Adviser Judge 
Adam Sofaer said Qaddafi was: “personally responsible for Libya’s policy of training, assisting, 
and utilizing terrorists in attacks on Untied States citizens…His position as head of state 
provided him no legal immunity from being attacked when present at a proper military target.”91  
Mark Vlasic, a legal scholar, argues that emphasizing the military target aspect is a trend in U.S. 
policy to characterize an attack.92 
 Operation El Dorado Canyon is important to understanding the history of targeted 
killings for three reasons.  First, the operation as performed was not a targeted killing.  American 
intelligence services and military forces did not find, fix, or finish the Libyan Dictator and 
terrorist puppeteer.  Moreover, United States decision-makers did not intentionally or 
deliberately target Qaddafi with lethal force.  The Reagan administration, however, was prepared 
to accept his death as a casualty of the strike, but given the dearth of intelligence on Qaddafi’s 
location and the insufficient ordnance for destroying the bunker at the Aziziyah Barracks, it is 
clear that the administration was not actively targeting Libya’s leader.  Further, by understanding 
what the operation was not, it becomes more clear what an actual targeted killing is—such as the 
raid on Yamamoto or certain drone strikes in the Obama administration.  Second, although the 
air strike against Libya’s terrorist hubs was not a targeted killing operationally, it serves as a 
legal precedent for the Obama administration.  Ronald Reagan invoked Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter after a series of international terrorist incidents and used it as a legal justification 
to authorize a surgical strike in the name of self-defense against a terrorist network.  By invoking 
Article 51 to justify the potentially lethal strike, the Reagan administration set a precedent for 
future administrations that there is no specific legal framework for targeted strikes.  Instead, 
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presidents can invoke international law—in this case Article 51—on a case-by-case basis.  
Finally, the strike on Qaddafi serves as the first time the United States used lethal force to 
respond to an act of terrorism, which is another precedent that is matched in the Clinton, George 
W. Bush, and Obama administrations.  
  
Osama bin Laden,1998-2000 
 President Bill Clinton authorized an unsuccessful targeted killing on Osama bin Laden in 
1998, and his administration considered killing al Qaeda’s leader several other times using a 
variety of methods.  This case study establishes another, albeit unsuccessful, historical precedent 
for U.S. targeted killings before September 11.  It also shows how the Clinton administration 
built off the Qaddafi precedent and how senior government officials in 1998 still were hamstrung 
by the remnants of the Church Committee.  Finally, this case analyzes the origins of the 
technological tool for twenty-first century—the armed drone.93  
 
Operation Infinite Reach, 1998 
 During the last five years of the twentieth century, Osama bin Laden became increasingly 
bellicose towards the United States and the American intelligence community implicated him in 
several terrorist attacks against U.S interests around the world.  In response, the Clinton 
administration became increasingly determined to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.  By late 
1997, the CIA was planning to capture and remove him from Afghanistan.94  The CIA 
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) developed a plan to use two tribal proxy groups in Afghanistan to 
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capture Osama bin Laden and extract him from the country.95  These tribal groups collected 
reliable intelligence on Bin Laden’s whereabouts and in the first months of 1998, the CIA was 
ready to submit the proposal to the White House for approval.96  On May 18, 1998, the CIA 
drafted a Memorandum of Notification authorizing the capture operation.  A 1986 presidential 
finding of Ronald Reagan, which authorized worldwide covert action to combat international 
terrorism, “probably” provided the authority for such an operation.97  The National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, or 9/11 Commission, reasoned that although the 
CIA had authority, many of the senior officers were scarred from the “old ‘rogue elephant’ 
charge” from the Church Committee and wanted “something on paper to show they were not 
acting on their own.”98  This Memorandum of Notification caused severe consternation inside the 
Clinton administration over whether the capture operation would look like an assassination.  
James Pavitt, a senior officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, was concerned about the 
memo because he thought the operation had “at least a slight flavor of a plan for an 
assassination.”99  The proxy capture operation was turned down because of fear of collateral 
damage, concern with the tribal groups safety, and fear that the “purpose and nature of the 
operation would be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and misrepresentation—and 
probably recriminations—in the event that Bin Ladin, despite our best intentions and efforts, did 
not survive.”100 
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 After the Clinton administration denied the CIA capture operation, General Hugh 
Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the Pentagon’s Central Command to 
develop a plan for military action against Osama bin Laden.101  General Zinni, of Central 
Command, proposed a plan that called for Tomahawk cruise missiles to strike eight terrorist base 
camps in Afghanistan.  The 9/11 Commission authors opine that, “Zinni’s planners surely 
considered the two previous times the United States had used force to respond to terrorism, the 
1986 strike on Libya and the 1993 strike against Iraq.”102  While the raid on Qaddafi was not a 
targeted killing, it served as important precedent for the Clinton administration when planning 
their targeted killing on Osama bin Laden in 1998.  
 The Clinton administration’s concern over killing Osama bin Laden evaporated when al 
Qaeda suicide bombers simultaneously attacked U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing 
224 people on August 8, 1998.  The CTC quickly identified al Qaeda as the perpetrators of the 
attack and the day after the strike, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, brought 
intelligence to the National Security Council Principals Committee that terrorist leaders, 
including Bin Laden, were expected to gather at a camp near Khowst, Afghanistan.103  In other 
words, the CIA’s CTC found and fixed Osama bin Laden’s location and were waiting on the 
finish confirmation.  During the NSC meeting, the principals reached a consensus that “the 
strike’s purpose was to kill Bin Ladin and his Chief lieutenants.”104  The deliberation in the 
Principals Committee confirms that the strike against Bin Laden was a targeted killing because it 
was an intentional and premeditated use of lethal force against a specific individual.  
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 On August 20, President Clinton authorized Operation Infinite Reach.  Navy Vessels in 
the Red Sea fired thirteen cruise missiles at al-Shifa—a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that the 
CIA reported was manufacturing a chemical for VX poison gas to which Bin Laden “almost 
certainly” had access.105  Simultaneously, Navy ships in the Arabian Sea unleashed sixty-six 
cruise missiles at the camp in Khwost.106  Most of the cruise missiles hit their targets but none 
killed Osama bin Laden or top terrorist leaders.  In a post-operation review, Tenet concluded that 
the strikes killed 20 to 30 people in the camps but missed Bin Laden by a few hours.107  
Tomahawk cruise missiles spared Air Force pilots flying over foreign territory, minimizing the 
risk to U.S. personnel, but were ineffective because there were hours of flight time between fix 
and finish.  In similar fashion to the Reagan administration, the Clinton Administration promptly 
notified the United Nations Security Council that the military strikes were legally justified as 
self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.108  Moreover, President Clinton 
justified the imminent nature of the threat when he addressed the nation following the strike 
announcing that he struck terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan “because of the imminent 
threat they presented to our national security.”109  
 The immediate and revisionist reaction to Operation Infinite Reach was not positive.  The 
strikes failed to kill al Qaeda’s leader and the fallout was muddled in political controversy 
because many saw it as a “wag the dog” strategy for the ongoing Monica Lewinsky affair.110  
Sandy Berger, the National Security advisor, admitted that he was particularly discouraged by an 
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Economist editorial, which questioned the cruise missile strikes’ effectiveness and whether they 
created new jihadists.111  The following year, several legal scholars tore into the operation.  Jules 
Lobel argued that the “August 20 missile strikes represent the assertion of imperial might and 
arrogance in opposition to international law.”112  Another lawyer, Leah Campbell, argued that the 
mission did not abide by the principles of necessity or proportionality and the world response to 
the mission shows that, “it is not certain that the world community has agreed to expand 
permissible use of force to include retaliatory strike against terrorists.”113  Even the U.S. 
Department of Energy poked holes in the operation.  A 400-page report compiled by Sandia 
National Laboratories in 1999 found more disadvantages than advantages in the retaliatory 
strike.  Some of the disadvantages included: questionable morality, legality, and effectiveness, 
domestic and international criticism, undermining the rule of law, and sidestepping due 
process.114  In addition, with direct connection to this thesis’s argument, one of the advantages 
stated by Sandia Laboratories was: “followed precedents by previous presidents.”115    
 While some condemned the action, others pointed to the followed inaction and the 
historical context of the operation.  Daniel Byman, a member of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and preeminent counterterrorism scholar, stated in an 
author interview, “[you have to remember] How many Americans did al Qaeda kill in 1998 so 
pretend that’s your baseline and you need to break the assassination thing.  The mentality of the 
people had no appetite for this.”116  The far-reaching effects of the Church Committee are 
evident in the Clinton administration’s deliberations and decisions to target Bin Laden in 
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Operation Infinite Reach.  Questions over whether killing Bin Laden would constitute an 
assassination hamstrung top policymakers and intelligence officials.  Hank Crumpton, a senior 
officer in the CTC, disagreed with the mission because of the inaction that followed.  Crumpton 
argued that “As the weeks rolled by, the U.S. did nothing more to exercise its military might.  
AQ [al Qaeda] grew more confident than ever, believing there was nothing to fear.  They were 
correct.  There was no substantive U.S. response.”117  Crumpton goes onto explain that while 
there was no substantive U.S. response there were “limited CIA clandestine operations.”118 
These limited operations were instrumental in the Executive Branch’s transition from worrying 
about assassination to accepting targeted killing and adopting the armed UAV. 
 
 
Operation Infinite Resolve, 1998-2000 
 Following the August 20 cruise missile strikes, the White House authorized Operation 
Infinite Resolve, which were follow-up plans to pursue Osama bin Laden.119  The high threshold 
for killing Bin Laden was considerably lowered in the various operations considered, but never 
implemented, during Operation Infinite Resolve.  After the initial bombardment of al Qaeda’s 
facilities, Richard Clarke, the Chief Counterterrorism advisor in the Clinton administration, 
envisioned a campaign of strikes against Bin Laden’s base inside and outside of Afghanistan, 
whenever target information was available.120  While this forecast never came to be because 
intelligence collection and analysis was slower, Clarke’s strategy is analogous to the 
contemporary frequency of drone strikes on al Qaeda and associated movements.  Another 
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chance to target Osama bin Laden came in December 1998, when the CIA reported that Bin 
Laden would travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan and could be targeted with cruise missiles from the 
Arabian sea within a few hours of receiving the targeting data.121  The Principals Committee 
turned down the December strike because the chance of collateral damage was too high—
between 150 and 300 civilians—due to a near-by mosque.122  Declining the strike angered many 
of the lower-level CTC officers.  
 After the missed chance in December 1998, the NSC pushed for more aggressive covert 
and overt alternatives.  The current Memorandum of Notification on file at the time allowed the 
CIA’s tribal proxies to use lethal force only in self-defense, but shortly after the second missed 
opportunity, the National Security Council worked on a new order that would allow the CIA and 
their tribal groups to kill when capture was not feasible.123  The Clinton administration 
determined that this order was legal because “under the law of armed conflict, killing a person 
who posed an imminent threat to the United States would be an act of self-defense, not an 
assassination.”124  At this point in 1999, the CIA directed their proxies that they could lower the 
threshold on killing bin Laden from self-defense to lack of feasible capture.  Although this new 
standard presented an opportunity, the CIA never made progress with the tribal groups during 
this time to make such an ambush possible.  
 Simultaneously, the military was examining new methods for targeting Bin Laden, using 
weapons other than cruise missiles.  The Pentagon considered Special Forces raids but was 
discouraged because their history was not necessarily marked with successes, especially after the 
disastrous operation in Somalia in the first half of Clinton’s presidency.  The second option was 
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to use an AC-130 gunship, which could fly undetected at high-altitudes and use precise weapons 
to limit collateral damage.  The AC-130 gunship, however, posed problems because it required 
near-by basing, a limited flight time due to fuel-requirements, and would need search-and-rescue 
contingencies in the event it was gunned down or crashed.125  Although not authorized because 
of George Tenet’s lack of confidence in the intelligence, perhaps “the best opportunity” to target 
Bin Laden with cruise missiles occurred in May 1999.126  The 9/11 Commission highlighted two 
deterring factors to the 1999 strike in Kandahar.  The first factor related to the previous proposed 
strike (December 1998).  Bin Laden left his room abruptly and avoided the missile salvo.  The 
second deterring factor is attributable to the intense public scrutiny accorded the CIA following 
their providing inaccurate targeting data to NATO forces in Serbia, which had resulted in 
accidentally bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.127  
 Technological problems created the primary obstacle to the options presented for killing 
Bin Laden during Operation Infinite Resolve.  Even though the White House lowered the 
threshold for killing Bin Laden via tribal proxy, which is significant given the administration’s 
hesitations with assassination, it still posed logistical issues for the CIA.  Hank Crumpton noted 
in his book Art of Intelligence that a fellow CTC official expressed great frustration with the 
tribal option and vented, “We can only kill him if we’re capturing him?  But we can’t get 
resources or the green light to do this ourselves.  So we depend on Afghan tribesmen, but we 
hang all these legal and operational limits on them…Most of them can’t even read.”128  
Moreover, the long find-fix-finish loop hamstrung the overt military option.  Once the CIA 
acquired bin Laden’s location, it would take several hours for cruise missiles to get to the 
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location and with cruise missiles, the risk of collateral damage existed.  Moreover, the other 
options were not feasible because both options risked American lives.  The AC-130, while more 
precise, could not fly long missions due to its refueling cycle.  Therefore, the White House, CIA, 
and Pentagon needed a solution that did not risk American lives, was precise, and ideally, could 
loiter for extended periods. 
 
“The Predator Initiative”129  
 For the U.S. counterterrorism community, the second millennium was rung in with 
intense chest pain.  On January 1, 2000, the Clinton administration narrowly avoided the al 
Qaeda terrorist attacks at Los Angeles International Airport and on the USS Sullivan in 
Yemen.130  Following the millennium plot, the National Security Council issued a memorandum 
in July 2000 directing the CIA to find a means to locate and identify Osama bin Laden, which 
Hank Crumpton said, “would be designed to support a lethal military strike.”131  The Clinton 
administration designated the CIA, specifically the CTC, to drive the initiative to “come up with 
new ideas to go after terrorists in Afghanistan,” which began as a mission for reconnaissance 
purposes only.132  Once the CTC team worked with the Pentagon to use an Air Force drone 
called the Predator, the Clinton administration gave the CTC the authorization to command the 
reconnaissance system.133  The MQ-1 Predator was a small unmanned aircraft with a 55-foot 
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wingspan that was deployed in the NATO intervention in Bosnia, which showed it was 
battlefield capable.134   
 On September 7, 2000, the CIA conducted its first Predator mission over Afghanistan.135  
Top officials from the CIA and the White House watched a grainy satellite feed of a tall man in 
long white robes flanked by a security detail get out of a vehicle.  As Hank Crumpton, who was 
one of the officials watching, recounts, “This was UBL [Osama bin Laden].  We watched as he 
walked into the courtyard of the large compound…The sky war clear, the image excellent.  No 
women or children. We had him.”136  Members of the CIA and the White House called for 
authorization to strike the al Qaeda leader, but the White House needed confirmation that the 
notorious terrorist would be there for six hours before authorizing a cruise missile strike.137  It 
became clear that the Predator offered an unprecedented ability to close the find-fix-finish loop, 
if it was armed.   
 Arming the Predator drone was the second phase of the initiative, and it came with more 
bureaucratic wrangling and heated policy debates.  The CIA determined that the Hellfire missile, 
an anti-tank laser-guided missile, was the best munitions system for the Predator in the first 
months of the Bush administration in 2001.138  Complex bureaucratic issues arose because the 
CIA controlled the reconnaissance predator missions, the Air Force owned the Predator, and the 
Army owned the Hellfire missiles.139  Meanwhile, the White House, CIA, and Pentagon debated 
who should pull the trigger.  George Tenet actively advocated that legal permission was a 
requisite for whoever controlled the weaponized Predator.140  According to the 9/11 
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Commission, Tenet also raised a series of key questions: “What is the chain of command?  Who 
takes the shot?  Are America’s leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of 
normal military command and control?”141  The situation was even more complicated because 
within each bureaucratic division there were internal factions.  For example, some officers in the 
CTC supported the CIA running the armed drone while others, like James Pavitt, stood firmly in 
opposition.142  Some of the leaders of the CIA were longtime career officers who endured the 
Church Committee hearings in 1976 had no appetite for covert action.  Pavvitt worried about the 
CIA running lethal operations against targeted individuals, which in his mind, constituted 
assassination.143  
 On August 1, 2001, after the Predator successfully fired Hellfire missiles in a test, the 
Deputies Committee on the National Security Council concluded it would be legal for the CIA to 
kill Bin Laden or one of his deputies with the Predator.  The Deputies Committee found killing 
Bin Laden would be an act of self-defense that would not violate Executive Order 12,333.144  
The Deputies Committee left the major issues—who would fund the project, who would 
authorize strikes and who would pull the trigger—to the Principals Committee.145  The Principals 
Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4, 2001.  At the Principals meeting, 
Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser, brought up the Predator debate by saying it 
would not be ready until the spring of 2002, but that the Principals Committee needed to reach a 
decision on its command and usage.  Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, supported the armed 
Predator.  Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was concerned about the implications of trying to kill 
an individual.  The Defense Department saw the Predator’s value in surveillance, but not in 
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lethal action, and “favored going after Bin Ladin as a part of a larger air strike, similar to what 
had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya.”146  The Principals Committee ended with 
Rice summarizing that the armed predator was needed but not ready.  In addition, according to 
the heavily redacted 2004 Director of Central Intelligence Report on al Qaida, “[redacted] 
September 4.  As a result, CIA was authorized [redacted] reconnaissance purpose only.”147  After 
September 11, 2001, however, the administration resolved the authorization issues and question 
of whether the CIA could conduct lethal strikes.  
 The Clinton administration’s targeting of Osama bin Laden establishes the August 20, 
1998 strike as an operational precedent for a targeted killing.  The Clinton administration 
actively targeted Osama bin Laden with the intent to use lethal force, but was unsuccessful in 
finishing the target.  The threat Osama bin Laden posed played a key role in the Clinton 
administration’s calculation to authorize Operation Infinite Reach.  Furthermore, the transition 
from Afghan proxy operation to missile strike shows that the Clinton Administration rationalized 
overt action was acceptable because Bin Laden attacked American Embassies in Africa.  The 
case also shows how the historical issues addressed in this chapter weighed on decision-makers.  
The Clinton administration drew on the 1986 Libya precedent many times in determining how to 
counter international terrorism.  In addition, the Clinton administration and senior CIA officials 
in the 1990s had vivid memories of the Church Committee and the accusation of being a “rogue 
elephant” and incessantly debated whether the CIA should get back into the killing business.  
Finally, the failures to kill Osama bin Laden during the Clinton administration created the 
technological foundation for the current targeted killings campaign—the armed Predator UAV.  
The time between find to fix to finish while using cruise missiles was too long; national security 
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policymakers needed a solution that would tighten that loop, mitigate risk to U.S. forces, and 
execute operations with precision.  The solution that addressed these problems was found in the 
MQ-1 Predator.  The precedents established in the twentieth century—often overlooked in 
targeted killings scholarship—reveal a deep history of tense discussions at the highest levels of 
government over whether to kill an individual enemy.  These precedents are integral to 
understanding the targeted killings that have come to define the war against al Qaeda in the 
Obama administration.  
 
Anwar al-Awlaki, 2011 
 The targeted killings campaign in the twenty-first century against al Qaeda started slowly 
under the Bush administration and reached new heights in the Obama administration.  The first 
armed predator drone strike did not occur in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but in Yemen in 2002.  A 
CIA-operated Predator targeted the vehicle of Qaed al-Harethi, who was an al Qaeda leader and 
was the mastermind behind the USS Cole bombing during the Clinton administration.148  
Unintentionally, the same strike against al-Harethi also killed an American citizen turned al 
Qaeda terrorist, Kemal Darwish.149  The Bush administration continued to use armed predator 
drones for targeted killings against al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Yemen, and the Philippines, as well as against Iraqi insurgents.150  Targeted killings, however, 
are not exclusive to drone strikes.  Special Forces institutionalized targeted killings as a linchpin 
in its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, where they conducted 10 to 15 capture or kill missions 
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a night, utilizing the same find-fix-finish targeting methodology.151  In the latter years of the 
Bush administration, the CIA was authorized to target more terrorists with armed drones in 
Pakistan and Yemen.  
 Upon President Obama’s arrival into office, he quickly adopted the use of armed drones for 
targeted killings in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya (during the NATO intervention), and 
Somalia.152  In fact, targeted killings have become so common in the Obama administration that 
they have created a “next generation” program to organize the kill lists.  The program, called the 
“disposition matrix,” manages the intelligence and locations of targeted individuals.153  The 
matrix is multilayered software that tracks and prioritizes targeted terrorists.  The disposition 
matrix has facilitated the coordination of multiple national security entities.  The Central 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, and Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) all add names to the program and update intelligence on targeted 
militants.154  President Obama’s National Security Council then culls the roster of terrorists and 
sends them to President Obama for approval.155  The functional collaboration of multiple 
national security agencies with the White House, fostered through the disposition matrix, reflects 
the institutionalization of armed drone targeted killings operations in the Obama administration.  
Some of these targeted killings have received intense public notoriety, including the one 
examined in this case study against Anwar al-Awlaki.   
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 Anwar al-Awlaki—an American citizen turned radical firebrand preacher—was connected 
to nearly every terrorist plot or attack in the United States from September 11 to the Boston 
Marathon Bombing.  Awlaki spoke with two of the 9/11 hijackers in his San Diego mosque.156  
He exchanged emails with Nidal Hasan—the Army Major who went on a shooting spree at Fort 
Hood in 2009.157  Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young Nigerian who failed to detonate a 
bomb in his underwear on a Detroit-bound flight in 2009, confessed to American investigators 
that he moved to Yemen to track down Awlaki.  There, Awlaki discussed martyrdom and jihad 
with Abdulmutallab, approved him for a suicide mission, and directed the would-be bomber to 
ensure he detonated the bomb over United States territory.158  Awlaki was also a planner behind 
the failed attempt to put bomb-laden printers in cargo planes bound to the United States in 
October 2010.159  Moreover, his virulent anti-American sermons were found on the computers of 
the 2005 London bombers, the would-be terrorists in Toronto in 2006, the six extremists who 
planned an attack on Fort Dix in 2007, and the Tsarnaev brothers implicated in the 2013 Boston 
Marathon attack.160  After Awlaki was killed by a CIA drone in September 2011, President 
Obama described him as the “leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula,” and in that role, “took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent 
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Americans.”161  A little over a year before President Obama’s speech and before the raid that 
killed Osama bin Laden, Representative Jane Harman, chairwoman of the House subcommittee 
on homeland security, called Awlaki the “number one [terrorist] in terms of threat against us.”162 
 Awlaki’s targeted killing is a quintessential example of a find-fix-finish operation by an 
unmanned aerial vehicle.  This section will trace the hunt for Awlaki from find to finish and will 
address some of the public’s concerns with the operation.  There is one major reason why this 
chapter will analyze the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki for the contemporary targeted 
killing case: public knowledge.  Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA’s use of drones 
to kill terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is a secret.  While it is widely reported that the 
drone strikes come from American drones, the agencies specific role remains covert.  Reporters, 
however, often uncover the perpetrating agency.  Greg Miller, the primary intelligence reporter 
for the Washington Post, argues the CIA’s role in the targeted stikes “is one of the worst kept 
secrets in Washington.”163  The CIA has never acknowledged the program exists; but the Obama 
administration openly discusses the program and certain strikes.164  A recently retired CIA case 
officer stated in an author interview, “I can tell you I worked Pakistan for three years, but I 
cannot say anything about the drone program in Pakistan that the media frequently reports 
on.”165  President Obama, for example, gave a speech in September 2011 acknowledging the 
drone strike on Awlaki and called the operation, “another significant milestone in the broader 
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effort to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates.”166  Moreover, because Awlaki was an American 
citizen, the targeted killing operation against him has been well reported by international media, 
debated in the press and by scholars, and carefully examined by Congressional subcommittees.  
Therefore, even though the operation remains classified by the CIA, there is an abundance of 
information on Awlaki, the strike that killed him, and the public debate that ensued.   
 The failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing disturbed President Obama.  Sensing this, 
intelligence agencies competed to put details about Anwar al-Awlaki’s location into the 
President’s Daily Brief.167  The underwear plot changed Anwar al-Awlaki’s terrorist status from 
an inspirer to an operator because he was now directly involved in plotting terrorist attacks 
against the United States.  A few months after the Christmas Day plot, in April 2010, the 
National Security Council took the unprecedented step of authorizing the targeted killing of 
Awlaki, which was the first time an American citizen was actively targeted.168  A month after his 
new designation on the Obama administration’s target list, Awlaki released a video taunting the 
administration in which he urged jihadists not to distinguish between military and civilian targets 
in the West.169  Awlaki also noted he cut off his telephone communications to avoid being 
detected and said, “If the Americans want me, let them search for me.”170  The hunt to find 
Awlaki was on.   
 Three days after the Osama bin Laden raid in 2011, the United States military found and 
fixed Awlaki’s location in Yemen’s Shabwa province, but failed to finish.  Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC), a top-secret military division that houses elite Special Forces and 
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runs a drone program out of the Horn of Africa, carried out the strike.171  The military drones 
fired three rockets but missed the truck in which Awlaki was traveling.172  Awlaki got out, 
hopped in a different car, and travelled in the opposite direction.173  For this mission, the CIA 
was in an intelligence support role and was assisting JSOC with the intelligence while the 
military unit handled the lethal portion.  After JSOC failed to finish Awlaki, the White House 
transferred the mission to hunt Awlaki—codenamed Operation Troy —from JSOC to the CIA.174  
The transfer from a military entity to an intelligence agency was part of the White House’s 
strategy.  John Brennan, Obama’s counterterrorism advisor, believed the CIA was better at 
targeting terrorists because of its experience in Pakistan.175  JSOC was then relegated to a 
supporting role because the elite military unit had strong connections with the Yemeni 
government.176  
 In the summer months of 2011, there were important developments that facilitated the 
eventual killing of al-Awlaki.  The CIA began developing its own drone base in Saudi Arabia 
enabling it to run its own operations, parallel to JSOC’s fleet in the Horn of Africa.177  The CIA 
then began to transfer drones from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia to open up a new drone front for the 
intelligence agency.178  The CIA was also actively deploying human intelligence assets to track 
Awlaki’s location.  In collaboration with Saudi Arabian intelligence, the CIA ran extensive 
human intelligence operations in Yemen to find and fix Anwar al-Awlaki’s location.  The CIA 
                                                            
171 Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 307. 
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worked with Danish intelligence and tried to put a tracker in the suitcase of Awlaki’s courier, but 
the operation failed.179  Eventually, in mid-September, the CIA found a source inside al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula who led the intelligence agency to Awlaki.180  Finally, on September 30, 
several American drones killed Awlaki and destroyed a convoy of vehicles.181  On that day, 
Awlaki and a small group (including another American turned extremist, Samir Kahn) exited 
from a breakfast break when they met a barrage of Hellfire II missiles.182  Two weeks later—in 
what the intelligence community and executive branch have yet to publicly recognize—a 
Predator drone killed Awlaki’s sixteen-year-old son, who was also an American citizen, by 
accident while trying to target an Al Qaeda bomb maker.183  
 The American reaction to the targeted of Anwar al-Awlaki was not met with the same 
public approval as most targeted killing operations because Awlaki was an American citizen. 
According to a Gallup poll in 2013, 65 percent of Americans support targeted killings of 
suspected terrorists in foreign countries, while only 28 percent oppose such operations.184  On the 
other hand, when asked about the targeting of American citizens, only 41 percent of Americans 
approve while 52 percent believe the United States should not launch strikes against American 
citizens abroad.185  There is one clear issue with the poll: the survey does not ask whether 
Americans approve of the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, but instead generalize the 
question and ask whether they believe the United States should not launch strikes against 
American citizens.  
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 The major issues raised with the Awlaki killing were, and continue to be, legal.  After the 
Obama administration authorized the targeting of Awlaki, the cleric’s father—with the help of 
the American Civil Liberties Union and Center for Constitutional Rights—filed a lawsuit against 
President Obama.186  The courts dismissed the suit.187  Nevertheless, the issue of legality and 
constitutionality is the most argued aspect of the Awlaki killing.  In response to the critics, the 
Department of Justice released a white paper outlining the legality of targeting American citizens 
who are “senior operational leaders” of al Qaeda.188  In the white paper, the Obama 
administration outlined three criteria that make such a targeting legal: (1) an informed, high-level 
official of the United States government has determined that the individual poses an imminent 
threat of violent attack to the United States; (2) capture is infeasible; and (3) the operation is 
consistent with the applicable laws of war.189   
 In a Congressional subcommittee hearing in February 2013, a slew of legal experts 
concurred that the Awlaki strike was legal.190  Moreover, legal scholars have also found that the 
Awlaki targeted killing is legal according to the United Nations charter and international human 
rights law.191  Even after the dismissal of the lawsuit, the Obama administration’s white paper, 
the Congressional hearing, and legal scholarship, Awlaki’s father published an op-ed in the New 
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York Times in July 2013 arguing that his son and grandson were deprived their constitutional 
rights and summarily executed without due process.192 
 The case of Anwar al-Awlaki clearly shows a modern find-fix-finish operation.  The 
Obama administration authorized his targeting and the intelligence community, military, and 
regional allies fiercely tracked the American cleric for over a year before fixing his location with 
a drone.  The Awlaki case, for the purposes of this thesis, sets a contemporary standard by which 
to compare the targeted killing of Awlaki with the other historical cases presented.  In addition, 
the Awlaki case is the historical capstone to analyze the historical trends underpinning the cases 
in this chapter, which can inform policy.  
 
Conclusion 
 The debate of whether to kill individual enemies has long been discussed as an implicit 
aspect of warfare, but few have sought to rectify that by establishing a history.  This chapter 
rectifies that vacancy in scholarship by establishing historical precedents for targeted killings. 
This chapter used a framework to determine historical precedents.  In each case, this chapter 
analyzed whether the operation matches the definition provided by Phillip Alston to the United 
Nations and whether the operation aligned with the find-fix-finish criteria. 
 This chapter analyzed four cases of strikes against individuals.  The strike against 
Admiral Yamamoto was by definition and framework a targeted killing.  The air strike against 
Libyan terrorist facilities in 1986 was not an operational precedent because American decision-
makers and intelligence officers did not actively target Muammar Qaddafi for execution.  
Operation El Dorado Canyon, however, was an important legal precedent because the Reagan 
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administration justified the action under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.  In addition, 
the raid on Qaddafi was the first time the United States responded with lethal force in self-
defense to international terrorism, and as such, became a precedent in future counterterrorism 
targeted killing deliberations.  This chapter also examined the Clinton administration’s failed 
targeted killing against Osama bin Laden in 1998, which by definition and framework, was a 
targeted killing, although the operation failed to finish al Qaeda’s leader.  The final case 
analyzed the Obama administration’s targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, which is an example 
of a modern targeted killing executed by armed drones.  
 In addition to these cases, this chapter examined important aspects of history that 
influenced the history of targeted killings.  The first such event was the Church Committee, 
which exposed the CIA’s plots to assassinate foreign leaders in the Cold War.  The Church 
Committee resulted in three president’s signing consecutive executive orders barring 
assassination as a tool in American covert action.  The impact of the Church Committee 
reverberated through the Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations because 
each president and their national security staff had to clarify any proposed lethal action in terms 
of whether it constituted an assassination.  The other fundamental event that influenced the 
history of targeted killings was the Clinton administration’s failed attempts to kill Bin Laden, 
and subsequent search for a better technology that could finish the operation.  This search 
concluded when the CIA and DOD found the MQ-1 Predator drone and armed it with Hellfire 
missiles.  The MQ-1 and its predecessors would become the principal tool used in the twenty-
first century to execute individual enemies around the world.   
 The primary objective of this chapter and thesis is to establish historical precedents for  
targeted killings by examining cases that predate September 11 and to find how they can inform 
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modern policy. Through systematic research and analysis this chapter has determined patterns 
that, when extracted, can reveal lessons to help inform modern policy on targeted killing drone 
strikes.  Through these cases, I have identified three trends, which I will analyze in the final 
chapter of this thesis.  
1.   In the course of American targeted killings, there has been an increasing fusion between 
the traditional roles of military and intelligence.  The military has become more involved 
in intelligence and collection, and the intelligence community has become increasingly 
invested in war fighting abilities.  
 
2.   There have been more transparent executive command mechanisms during targeted 
killing operations.  The era of “plausible deniability” and hiding operations from the 
public has become increasingly obsolete, as the president has taken a more identifiable 
role in authorizing strikes and informing the public of targeted killing operations.   
 
3.   Targeted killing operations often take place under the highest levels of authority, and as 
such, frequently look to employ new technology.  The public and media closely examine 
the use of technology in targeted killing operations today because the operations employ 
UAVs.  By examining the history of targeted killings, however, it is clear that this 
attribute is not limited to the twenty-first century and in fact, is an identifiable trend.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SIGNATURE STRIKES 
 
 
“We are killing these sons of bitches faster than they can 
grow them now.”1   
-CIA Counterterrorism Center Chief, 2011 
  
 
 Mir Ahmad, Daraz, and Jarhan Gir—local Afghans—were walking collecting scrap metal 
outside in Zawhar Khili on February 4, 2002.2  The men were outside of an old mujahideen 
complex used in the 1980s by resistance fighters and even Osama bin Laden.3  Overhead, an 
armed MQ-1 Predator relayed the footage back to an Air Force pilot contracted to the CIA.4  The 
pilot noticed that Mir Ahmad was taller than his Afghan companions and that Daraz and Jarhan 
Gir were acting reverently towards Mir Ahmad.5  Zawhar Khili was near Khwost Afghanistan, a 
hot-bed for al Qaeda fighters and leaders.  The pilot and supporting analysts added up the facts.  
One suspect was tall and was flanked by two others who were gave their tall companion special 
treatment.  All three were walking in an al Qaeda-operated area.  This could be Osama bin 
Laden.  The al Qaeda leader was tall, usually had an entourage, and had a history of residing near 
Khwost.  The pilot flicked the dual-lock trigger on the joystick and unleashed a laser-designated 
                                                            
1 Anonymous CIA official provided quote to reporters; see: Greg Miller and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Target 
Killings,” Washington Post, September 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-
focus-to-killing-targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_story.html. 
2 Doug Struck, “Casualties of U.S. Calculations: Afghan Victims of CIA Missile Strikes Described as Peasants, Not 
al Qaeda,” Washington Post, February, 10, 2002. 
3 Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on Al Qaeda (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), 
36. 
4 Ibid., The CIA contracts Air Force pilots for specific missions. J.R. Reid, interview with author (Washington D.C., 
August 2013); Mark Mazzetti, interview with author (Washington D.C., August, 2013).  
5 Williams, Predators, 36. 
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Hellfire missile careening towards the targets.  The hundred pound missile killed all three 
Afghans.  This was the first known signature strike in the war against al Qaeda.6    
 Signature strikes are operations where the operator bases the target selection on a pattern 
of behavior or unique characteristics (or “signatures”) that are associated with wider militant or 
terrorist organizations, rather than the identification of an individual.  Daniel Klaidman, an editor 
for Newsweek, reported that the origins of signature strikes date back to the George W. Bush 
administration.  According to Klaidman, the logic for the strikes is that by targeting groups of 
militants based on patterns of behavior, rather than the individual’s identity, the government can 
eliminate more threats.  Thus, there is no longer the need for targeting data for a specific 
individual, instead armed drone pilots and analysts can make judgments based on certain 
characteristics.7  Under President Obama, there have been more signature strikes than targeted 
killings.8  Although they occur more frequently, there is less information and scholarship on 
signature strikes.  The former chapter on targeted killing used a find-fix-finish framework to 
analyze targeted killings cases.  Signature strikes are less methodical.  Signature strikes occur 
when drone pilots target military combatants by behavior patterns, not by identity, and the targets 
are not preselected.  For example, in a strike, pilots operating armed drones will identify 
combatants by unique signatures, ask their commanders permission to strike, and then engage the 
target.9  Therefore, this chapter will use a new framework for evaluating historical precedents.  
                                                            
6 Kevin Jon Heller, “‘One Hell of a Killing Machine:’ Signature Strikes and International Law,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11, (2013): 95. 
7 Daniel Klaidman, “Drones: The Silent Killers,” Newsweek, May 28, 2012, http://www.newsweek.com/drones-
silent-killers-64909.  
8 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal, November 
4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836. 
9 Martha McSally, witness testimony, “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of 
Targeted Killing,” Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 
(Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2013). 
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 There will be two criteria for this new framework—target devolution and preemption.  
This chapter will use these criteria to determine whether the cases are historical precedents for 
signature strikes.  The first criterion is target devolution, which stems from a theory proposed by 
Peter Bergen regarding signature strikes.  Bergen, a leading terrorism expert, and curator of the 
preeminent drone strike database at the New American Foundation, argued in a written 
congressional testimony in 2013 that because of the increased use of signature strikes in 
Obama’s drone policy, “the drone program has increasingly evolved into a counterinsurgency air 
platform, the victims are mostly lower-ranking members of Taliban and lower-level members of 
al Qaeda and associated groups.”10  Steve Coll, the Dean of Columbia’s Journalism School, 
promulgates the same argument—the drone program has evolved from a counterterrorist 
platform to a counterinsurgency tool.  Coll writes, “Increasingly, the CIA and JSOC came to see 
their campaign against al Qaeda as a worldwide counter-insurgency.”11  Bergen and Coll both 
use the term “counterinsurgency.”  The definitions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
are complex and heavily debated.  The idea that Bergen and Coll convey is that drone strikes 
have shifted from killing high-value targets to low-value combatants.  Therefore, the first 
criterion that this chapter will use to analyze the case studies for signature strikes is whether 
target selection devolved from high-value targets to low-level fighters.  
 The second criterion is the concept of preemption.  The basis of preemptive attacks is the 
expectation that an adversary will attack and the conclusion that striking first is better than 
suffering an attack.12  Preemptive attacks are different from preventative strikes, in which the 
                                                            
10 Peter Bergen, written testimony, “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted 
Killing,” Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 
(Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2013): 4. 
11 Steve Coll, “Remote Control: Our Drone Delusion,” The New Yorker, May 6, 2013. 
12 Karl Mueller, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen, Striking First: Preemptive and 
Preventative Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 6-8. 
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motivation arises from the desire to fight sooner rather than later.13  Signature strikes by design, 
are preemptive.  Kevin Heller, a legal scholar, found that there are several scenarios that the 
United States government authorizes signature strikes against unknown militants: when they are 
planning attacks, transporting weapons, handling explosives, seen at al Qaeda compound or 
training camp, military age males consorting with known militants, armed men traveling in 
trucks towards a conflict, trainees and facilitators in suspicious camps in al Qaeda controlled 
areas.14  All of these instances are preemptive in nature—the drone pilots and commanding 
officers recognize that the activities that the militants are performing are imminent threats and 
therefore, justify the use of preemptive force.  Thus, the second criterion in establishing 
historical precedence for signature strikes is whether the cases examined use preemptive lethal 
force.  Similar to the former chapter on targeted killings, these criteria are outlined in Table C, 
along with summary explanations of the cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 Ibid. 
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Table C: Historical Precedents for Signature Strikes 
Operation Criteria Precedents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature Strikes 
Target Devolution 
 
The shift from high-
value to low-value 
targets.  The operator 
evaluates targets based 
on patterns of behavior 
or unique characteristics 
often associated with 
militant movements. 
 
The Phoenix Program (1967-1972) 
Over time, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units 
(PRUs) focused more on neutralizing low-level Viet 
Cong members than high-value leaders.  PRUs 
evaluated potential Viet Cong on patterns of behavior 
in special targeting folders.  
 
Signature Strikes in Pakistan (2009-2011) 
In the final years in the Bush administration, the CIA 
began to conduct drone strikes in Pakistan based on 
an individual’s pattern of life, not identity.  The 
Obama administration continued this policy, which 
led to a spike in targeting low-value targets from 
2009-2011 in Pakistan.   
Preemption 
 
 
The expectation that the 
adversary will attack 
and attacking first is 
better than suffering an 
attack.  Preemption, like 
target devolution, is 
based on the activities, 
behaviors, or 
characteristics of the 
targets. 
 
Reagan’s Preemptive Counterterrorism Policy  (1984) 
National Security Decision Directive 138 and a 
speech by Secretary of State George Schultz call for 
preemptive military and intelligence operations to 
combat terrorist organizations in Lebanon.  
 
Signature Strikes in Yemen (2012-2013) 
The Obama administration, in 2012 approved the use 
of signature strikes in Yemen after al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula became more of a direct threat to 
the United States.  The administration began to 
authorize preemptive “terror-attack-disruption” 
strikes shortly thereafter.   
 
  This chapter will examine two historical precedents for signature strikes.  First, the 
Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War shows an operational precedent for signature strikes 
because when American-advised, Vietnamese teams looked for Viet Cong, they often targeted 
individuals based on patterns of behavior.  The Phoenix Program is an example of a shift in 
target selection from high to low value.  The second precedent occurred in the first term of the 
Reagan administration.  Top officials in Reagan’s National Security Council authorized, but 
never implemented, a counterterrorism policy that sought authority to use force preemptively 
against terrorists.  While it was not an operational precedent, released documents and speeches 
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shed light on decision-making precedents regarding the use of preemptive force in 
counterterrorism.  This section will conclude by analyzing the signature strikes in the twenty-first 
century.  The main objective of this chapter are the same as the previous chapter on targeted 
killings: to determine whether there are historical precedents for signature strikes prior to 
September 11 by using the aforementioned criteria, and to extract trends from cases the 
precedents in order to inform modern drone policy.  
 
The Phoenix Program, 1967-1972 
 The United States military faced an asymmetric threat and full-scale insurgency in the 
Vietnam War.  Hank Crumpton was a career CIA case officer, a leading figure in the CIA’s 
Counterterrorism Center during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, and one of the 
first Agency personnel to set foot in Afghanistan after September 11.  Crumpton argues that the 
Vietnam War was the first time that United States saw “micro actors making a macro impact.”15 
Daniel Byman, an authority on terrorism and targeted killings and Director of Georgetown 
University’s Security Studies, stated in author interview that the Phoenix Program was the first 
institutionalized rendition and killing program that the CIA and military employed.  Byman 
argues that the operations were analogous to modern rendition and targeted strikes programs.16  
 During the Vietnam War and into the 1980s, the Phoenix Program became widely 
synonymous as a full-scale assassination program.  This was a misconception.  The Phoenix 
Program captured the nation’s attention in 1970 when Newsweek featured a story  “The Rise of 
the Phoenix.”  Newsweek described the purpose of the program as “countering the terror of the 
                                                            
15 Hank Crumpton, interview with author (Washington D.C., August 2013) 
16 Daniel Byman, interview with author (Washington D.C., July 2013). 
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Viet Cong with an anti-VC terror of its own.”17  The magazine went on to recount two former 
Army officers who said that in their Phoenix training, they were informed by their instructors 
they would be required to kill 50 Viet Cong every month.  Another account said that the kill 
teams received a payment for each head or ear they collected from a Viet Cong cadre.18  Later 
verification revealed that the Army officers quoted in the story lied about their service and never 
actually went to Vietnam.19  Similar accounts underscore the lack of reliability and credibility of 
Phoenix scholarship and reporting; however, American interventions in the 1990s and the 2003 
Iraq invasion spurred the public’s attention to rediscover U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.  
Prominent scholars and historians then stepped forward to reevaluate the Phoenix Program with 
more reliability and less politicization.  Recent revisions to the Phoenix Program have disputed 
the Phoenix Program’s systematic murderous reputation and argued that while Phoenix operators 
did kill suspected Viet Cong, it was not the primary objective of the Phoenix Program.  One 
prominent counterinsurgency theorist, after September 11, even went so far as to recommend a 
“global Phoenix Program” aimed at dismantling contemporary jihadist and extremist threat 
networks.20   
 The linchpin of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in the Vietnam War was to secure 
and pacify the South Vietnamese countryside.  Most of the operations included the strategic 
hamlet program where the United States set up local villages to reinforce the countryside from 
Viet Cong (VC) expansion and exploitation.  The goal was to deny the Viet Cong and its 
infrastructure a safe haven.  The military led the security effort through Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) and consolidated all pacification programs into one entity, the 
                                                            
17 “The Rise of the Phoenix,” Newsweek, January 12, 1970, 25. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dale Andradé, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 
1990), 212. 
20 David Kilculllen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, version 2.2, (2004): 40. 
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Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).21  Although established 
to dismantle Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), CORDS was largely a defensive program, which 
worked on village security and civil action programs.  In June 1967, Ambassador Robert Komer 
wanted to consolidate anti-VCI operations and won approval from the CIA to establish a 
program called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program, later known as the Phoenix 
Program.22  The CIA funded and administered the Phoenix Program, but the South Vietnamese 
Government largely ran it.23  William Colby succeeded Komer in 1968 and ran the Phoenix 
Program until its termination in 1972.  Colby was a leading CIA official and previously served as 
Chief of the CIA’s Far Eastern Division.  After Viet Cong orchestrated the Tet Offennsive, 
which began in January 1968, the Phoenix Program accelerated and became increasingly 
offensive to counterbalance CORDS.24    
 The Phoenix Program’s primary objective was to dismantle the Viet Cong Infrastructure 
in South Vietnam by neutralizing members of the Viet Cong and those who aided them (the 
infrastructure).25  In addition, the Phoenix Program was an intelligence exploitation program, 
which meant that while neutralizing the VCI was imperative, intelligence fueled the Phoenix 
Program’s dismantling of the VCI.  Phoenix operators needed fresh intelligence on VCI targets 
to continue debasing the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.  
                                                            
21 Andrew Finlayson, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance 
Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70,” Center for the Study of Intelligence 51, no. 2, (2009), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-
retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html; William Rosenau and Austin Long, “The Phoenix Program and 
Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” RAND, (2009): 7. 
22 Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” 7. 
23 Finlayson, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations.” 
24 Tal Tovy, “The Theoretical Aspects of Targeted Killings: The Phoenix Program as a Case Study,” Journal of 
Military and Strategic Studies 11, no. 4, (2009): 10. 
25 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Phung Hoang Adviser Handbook, (Saigon: U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, November 20, 1970): 1. 
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 Understanding the term “neutralize” is pivotal in understanding the Phoenix Program.  
Neutralizing the VCI meant capturing, inducing desertion, turning politically, or killing.26  The 
media during the Vietnam War equated neutralization to assassination and William Colby 
directly addressed the issue in his hearing before Congress to clarify the connotation.27  
Therefore, because intelligence fueled the Phoenix Program, the preferred method of 
neutralization was capture, interrogation, and detention.  Phoenix leaders preferred capturing 
VCI, but killing was often easier.  Official statistics for the Phoenix Program reveal that in its 
years of operation, the operators neutralized 33,368 VCI and killed 26,329.28  For the purposes of 
this thesis the most pertinent aspect of the Phoenix Program was the Provincial Reconnaissance 
Units (PRUs).  These small teams as described by Vietnam historian, Dale Andradé, were “the 
best anti-infrastructure arm in the Phoenix Program.”29 
 The Provincial Reconnaissance Units were the tip of the Phoenix’s counterinsurgency 
spear.  The PRUs were unconventional paramilitary teams that took the fight directly to the VCI 
through unconventional methods.30  By 1972, there were over 4000 PRU members and a PRU in 
each of South Vietnam’s 44 provinces.31  Usually five 18-man teams with a few American 
advisers comprised each PRU.32  The American advisers were CIA personnel, senior military 
officers, or noncommissioned officers.33  The advisers gave policy and technical direction, as 
                                                            
26 Tal Tovy, “The Theoretical Aspects of Targeted Killings,” 13; Mark Moyar, Phoenix and Birds of Prey 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 189-190; Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary 
Counterinsurgency,” 14; and Michael Wilcheck, “Risen from the Ashes: Phoenix and the Struggle against the Viet 
Cong Shadow Government,” (Master’s Thesis, Hawaii Pacific University, 2008): 79. 
27 United States Senate Select Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services 
United States Senate: Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence,” (Washington D.C. 
1973): 6. 
28 Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 236. 
29 Dale Andradé, Ashes to Ashes, 172, 185-186. 
30 Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 172. 
31 Finlayson, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations.” 
32 Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” 12. 
33 Finlayson, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations.” 
Mencini 
 
86 
well as support and coordination for each of the teams.34  The other members of the PRU were 
CIA-recruited South Vietnamese, often with military background, who had reputations for 
brutality and virulent anti-VC sentiment.35  While officially a part of the military and the 
CORDS program, the PRUs were organized, trained, equipped, funded, and advised mostly by 
the CIA.36  The use of PRUs or small, asymmetric counter forces predated the official start of the 
Phoenix Program in 1967.  Preceding the Phoenix Program and the implementation of PRUs, the 
CIA directed and funded Counter-Terror Teams in the 1960s with similar objectives and similar 
methods of behind the lines, hit-and-run operations.37  Once Colby directed Phoenix, however, 
he changed the name from Counter-Terror Teams to Provincial Reconnaissance Units because he 
thought the name and reputation of Counter-Terror Teams was too lurid.38 
 The Provincial Reconnaissance Units dismantled Viet Cong infrastructure by aiming to 
neutralize key Viet Cong personnel in each of their respective provinces.  According to the 
official advisers’ handbook provided by MACV, each of the American advisers had VCI target 
folders with key details on VCI cadre including: their habits, contacts, schedule, sufficient 
evidence on their activities, name and position, and continually updated local VCI organizational 
charts.39  The VCI target folders share strikingly similar organizational categories to the Obama 
administration’s disposition matrix, discussed in the former chapter.  The disposition matrix is a 
software program designed by the Obama administration to manage the intelligence and 
locations of targeted individuals.40  The matrix is multi-layered software that tracks and 
prioritizes targeted terrorists.  The VCI target folders also share similar targeting criteria for 
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35 Andradé, Ashes to Ashes, 172. 
36 Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” 11. 
37 Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 172. 
38 Ibid. 
39 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Phung Hoang Adviser Handbook, (Saigon: U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, November 20, 1970): 9.  
40 For more on the disposition matrix see: pages 67-68 of this thesis. 
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establishing patterns of behavior—such as who VCI are meeting with and their “habits.”41  These 
patterns of behavior are similar criteria to that used by UAV pilots when determining signature 
strikes.  Once the PRUs selected VCI provincial targets they were aggregated into three 
categories: most wanted persons such as political cadres or senior military commanders, lower 
command positions, and ordinary level fighters.42  There was an apparent stipulation for three 
positive confirmations of a targets identify from three different intelligence sources; however, 
Andrew Finlayson, a retired Marine who commanded a PRU, said that the sources of intelligence 
were at times widely inaccurate.43  
 While the PRUs were effective at neutralizing VCI, they were poorly supervised.  
Moreover, because locals with fierce hatreds for Viet Cong made up the bulk of each PRU, they 
would often dictate the methods of neutralization.  The American advisers, for example, wanted 
to exploit intelligence from the captives, but the local PRU members would take other action.  In 
December 1969, an American adviser reported abuses by his own team when his PRU captured 
eight VCI after killing seven others.  A number of the captives were district-level cadre and 
without interrogating the prisoners, the local PRU members executed five of the members.44  
While most American advisers—notably the CIA advisers—drove their PRUs to capture instead 
of kill, some advisers—especially those with combat experience—were skeptical of South 
Vietnamese prison systems and were more likely to kill VCI targets.45  To combat excessive 
killing, CIA and CORDS created incentives for capture, but because of the decentralized and 
provincial-based organizational structure, applying program-wide incentives was difficult.46
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 The PRUs targeting of high-value fighters devolved during the Phoenix Program.  
Whether it was lack of reliable intelligence on high-value targets, or ease of neutralizing low-
level combatants, the PRUs shifted from targeting high-value targets to low-level militants and 
facilitators.  Many of the VCI neutralized were not senior cadre or commanders, but tax 
collectors, propagandists, and new recruits.47  As William Rosenau and Austin Long note: 
Critics of the effectiveness of the anti-infrastructure operations also note that 
most of the VCI who were neutralized were low-ranking individuals rather than 
the high-value targets that Phoenix and related efforts were deigned to 
apprehend.  Although it is true that most neutralization were of low-level figures, 
they nevertheless had a powerful effect on the VCI.48   
 
As the Phoenix Program aged, the successful neutralizations were less aimed at high-ranking 
VCI and more prolific at eliminating low-level figures and facilitators. 
 Statistics measured the Phoenix Program and the PRUs effectiveness.49  While the 
Phoenix Program in sum neutralized 81,740 VCI, the measure of how many VCI the Phoenix 
Program killed is highly contested.50  Historical media reports often cite William Colby’s 
Congressional Hearing in 1971 when he stated that Phoenix killed 20,500 and 87 percent of VCI 
deaths were due to combat circumstances.51  Colby’s distinction between combat deaths and 
                                                            
47 Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” 14. 
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other deaths fed the public speculation that the Phoenix Program was a systematic extermination 
program.  Mark Moyar, an authority on PRUs, argues that is nearly impossible to differentiate 
between lethal neutralizations that occurred in combat and those that did not.  He argues that 
because the PRUs’ operations took place primarily at night and that most resulted in combat with 
VCI members make for incomplete statistics.52  Moreover, Moyar adds that “the statistics are 
grossly inaccurate” because neutralization reporting was highly inflated or deflated for 
evaluators and incentives, compounding the inability to differentiate who died defenseless and 
who died in combat.53  Yet for the sake of comparison, if Colby’s testimony was correct in 
saying that 87 percent of VCI deaths occurred in combat, then 13 percent of the official MACV 
kill count of 26,320 equates to 3,422 VCI deaths that did not occur in combat.  The Council on 
Foreign Relations averaged three different non-governmental organizations that track U.S. drone 
strikes’ and averaged 3,520 total deaths (combatant and civilian) in Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia during the Bush and Obama administrations.54  While it is an unfair to directly compare 
death statistics from two highly contested programs with known skewed statistics and different 
circumstances, it highlights the massive scale of the Phoenix Program’s neutralization policy.  
 The highest levels of government received the Phoenix Program well, despite its killer 
public perception.  Seymour Hersh, a  journalist who was instrumental in exposing the Phoenix 
Program and CIA attempted assassinations to the American public.  Hersh quoted President 
Richard Nixon as angrily reacting to proposed cuts on the PRU program by declaring, “[w]e’ve 
got to have more of this. Assassinations.  That’s what they are doing.”55 
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 The Phoenix Program serves as a historical precedent for signature strikes because of 
target devolution.  The manner by which the PRUs’ categorized their targets into VCI folders 
shares many commonalities with current software that tracks intelligence for targeted 
individuals.  The PRUs also sought to dismantle Viet Cong Infrastructure by eliminating three 
categories: most wanted persons, lower-level commanders, and ordinary level fighters and 
facilitators.  The devolution in target selection affirms that over time the Phoenix Program 
focused more on neutralizing low-level fighters and facilitators and less on high-value targets.  
 
Reagan’s Preemptive Counterterrorism Policy, 1984 
 Ronald Reagan’s first term as President ended with several terrorist attacks.  In the last 
twenty-two months of his first term as President, Islamist terrorists in Lebanon orchestrated three 
terrorist attacks against U.S. assets in Lebanon, killing a total of 260 Americans, as well as 
kidnapping multiple Americans including the CIA’s Beirut Station Chief.56  In the second debate 
during Reagan’s re-election campaign in 1984, his opponent, Walter Mondale, challenged him 
on his counterterrorism policy.  Mondale grilled Reagan on his lack of retaliation: “The terrorists 
have won each time.  The President told the terrorists he was going to retaliate.  He didn't.  They 
called their bluff.  And the bottom line is that the United States [is] left in humiliation, and our 
enemies are stronger.”57  Reagan rebutted, “We're busy trying to find the centers where these 
operations stem from, and retaliation will be taken.  But we're not going to simply kill some 
                                                            
56 Statistics compiled based off of “Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988,” pbs.org, 
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57 “Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri, October 
21, 1984” Library at University of Texas, Transcript, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/102184b.htm. 
Mencini 
 
91 
people to say, `Oh, look, we got even.’’’58  A few days after the debate, William Beecher of the 
Boston Globe reiterated Mondale and called for a response to terrorism.  Beecher wrote,  
Officials charged with trying to find meaningful answers are nearly stumped…But 
they know that to simply bomb a suspected terrorist center near Baalbeck, Lebanon 
may kill some innocent bystanders and perhaps lead to an escalation of anti-US 
violence throughout the Mideast and beyond…Would that be moral, legal, 
justifiable, or effective?…It [terrorism] presents a threat that demands an answer-
and not just television repartee.59  
 
What Mondale and Beecher did not know, however, was that Reagan’s National Security Team 
was already discussing a range of options for how to preemptively respond to international 
terrorism.60   
 This case will highlight the development of the Reagan administration’s preemptive 
counterterrorism policy.  The policy authorized by President Reagan, National Security Decision 
Directive 138, will be the primary subject of this case study, in addition to speeches by 
administration officials and debates within the National Security Council over the use of force.  
The Reagan administration did not implement this preemptive counterterrorism policy.  They 
only authorized it, which means this case is not an operational precedent and evaluating the shift 
from high-value to low-level targets will not be possible.  The term “neutralize,” as noted in the 
former section is very controversial.  Thus, when examining the Reagan administration’s 
proposed, but never implemented, terrorist neutralization policy it is important to recognize that 
neutralize does not inherently equate to killing.  Thus, speculating whether it meant to kill or not, 
is irrelevant because the proposal was never employed.   
                                                            
58 Ibid. 
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 The Reagan administration crafted their counterterrorism policy after several lethal 
terrorist attacks against American targets overseas.  In June 1982, the Israeli military invaded 
Lebanon to uproot Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters.  As a response, the Reagan 
administration sent a multinational force to help PLO fighters withdraw from Beirut and to 
establish a “presence” while American diplomats negotiated a deal between Israeli and Lebanese 
governments.61  While establishing a presence in Lebanon, a string of terrorist attacks targeted 
Americans.  In April of 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was struck by a suicide bomber in an 
explosive-laden pickup truck, which resulted in 63 deaths; 17 were Americans and eight of 
whom were CIA officials including the CIA’s Beirut Station Chief and chief Middle East 
analyst.62  Six months later, a suicide bomber detonated a massive truck bomb outside of the  
U.S. Marine Barracks at the Beirut International airport killing 243 Marines and injuring an 
additional hundred.  In March of 1984, terrorists captured William Buckley, the CIA’s new 
Beirut Station Chief, who was the fourth Western hostage taken and second American taken in 
Lebanon.  Finally, six months later in September, terrorists bombed a U.S. Embassy annex in 
Beirut killing 24 people, two of whom were American military officials.  According to American 
officials, Hezbollah—an Islamic extremist group with ties to Iran—either was directly or 
strongly assumed to be involved with all of the terrorist attacks against American targets in 
Lebanon in 1983 and 1984.63  
 Ronald Reagan was not the first president to face the complexities of Islamic extremism 
however; he was the first president who wanted to use lethal force against radical Islamists.64  
After the Marine Barracks bombing, there were clear factions within the Reagan administration. 
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The Secretary of State George Schultz, Director of the Central Intelligence William Casey, and 
other top National Security Council staffers wanted to strike at Hezbollah with overt military 
force.65  Schultz and Casey were the most adamant supporters of retaliating and future lethal 
policies against Hezbollah.  Schultz strove to be the main counterterrorism strategist for the 
administration and the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger counterbalanced him.66  
Weinberger and Deputy Director of the CIA John McMahon led the opposing faction who 
wanted to be more prudent with retaliatory strikes.67  After terrorists kidnapped William 
Buckley, the National Security Council constructed a more offensive policy that was designed to 
preempt terrorism. 
 On April 3, 1984 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138 
(NSDD 138), which was designed “to prevent, counter, and combat terrorism.”68  The Top Secret 
policy initiative’s goal was to “ameliorate the subversive effect of terrorism on foreign 
democratic institutions and pro-Western governments.”69  In the beginning of the document, the 
authors state they plan to act in full accord with the “provisions of Executive Order 12,333 and 
other applicable laws and statues.”70  Executive Order 12,333, as discussed in the last chapter, 
was President Reagan’s law banning assassinations.  Therefore, NSDD 138 intended to distance 
itself from any connection to assassination.71  As seen in the former chapter, every administration 
since the Church Committee considered whether their covert or overt actions were in accord with 
Executive Order 12,3333.  Moreover, all of the directions given to the respective Directors or 
Secretaries included the provision that they must consult with the Attorney General.   
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 The document outlines two phases for implementation that delegates responsibilities to 
the respective U.S. government agencies.  For example, the Secretary of State was charged with 
improving bilateral and multilateral relations to combat terrorism and “develop a full range of 
options for dealing directly with terrorism, both at the threat stage and after such attacks are 
carried out.”72  The Directive tasked the Secretary of Defense to “develop a military strategy that 
is supportive of an active, preventive program to combat state-sponsored terrorism.”73  In 
addition, it charged the Pentagon with developing a “full range of military options to combat 
terrorism throughout the entire spectrum.”74  Finally, and most important for the purposes of this 
chapter, this Directive tasked the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense and the Attorney General to execute the following 
objectives: 
• Develop, in coordination with other friendly security services, capabilities for the 
pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which, plan, support, 
or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. Citizens, interests, and property 
overseas. 
• Develop a clandestine service capability, using all lawful means, for effective 
response against terrorist acts committed against U.S. Citizens, facilities or interests.  
• Provide a new finding on combatting terrorism which includes, inter alia, lawful 
measures to: Unilaterally and/or in concert with other countries neutralize or 
counter terrorists organizations and terrorist leaders.75  
 
 What does NSDD 138 reveal about the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism policy? 
The Reagan administration sought preemptive military and intelligence operations that would 
combat terrorism, all of which were in full accord with the law.  Although the Reagan 
administration was fully prepared to retaliate through a variety of means, no operations were 
ever executed.  The NSC left a variety of methods to counter terrorism: overt military options, 
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diplomatic options, and clandestine options.  While one can only speculate on the meaning of 
“neutralize,” it is evidentiary that the Reagan administration fully supported preemptive 
offensive measures to counter terrorism.  Any preemptive measure though, according to the 
policy, must be in accord with Executive Order 12,333.  When examining the legal stipulation, 
however, it is important to note that the cases discussed in the former chapter on targeted killings 
acted in accord with the law, but still acted lethally.  For example, the Reagan administration 
justified the 1986 strike against Libyan terrorist-facilities under the legal authority of Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter.76  Moreover, the Bush administration found on August 4, 2001, 
that killing an individual with an armed predator drone would not violate Executive Order 
12,3333.77  Therefore, if the Reagan administration employed NSDD 138 operationally they 
could use lethal force, but it would have been legal in a manner consistent with Executive Order 
12,333.  Nevertheless, NSDD 138 clearly shows that the Reagan administration accepted using 
preemptive force to combat terrorism.  
 On October 25, 1984, months after NSDD 138 and four days after the debate between 
Walter Mondale and Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Schultz delivered a blistering 
speech outlining an offensive counterterrorism doctrine.  In the Park Avenue Synagogue, Schultz 
gave a speech titled “Terrorism and the Modern World.”  Daniel Henninger, an editor at the Wall 
Street Journal, would later assert that the speech made Schultz the de facto “Father of the Bush 
Doctrine.”78  Excerpts from Schultz’s speech reveal that the administration was fully prepared to 
utilize force and a variety of means to combat terrorism.  Schultz asserted:  
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We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond 
passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and 
retaliation…We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around 
the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military 
force…The public must understand before the fact that some will seek to cast any 
preemptive or retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will appear to make our 
military and policymakers-rather than the terrorists-appear to be the culprits.  The 
public must understand before the fact that occasions will come when their 
government must act before each and every fact is known—and the decision cannot be 
tied to the opinion polls.  If we are going to respond or preempt effectively, our 
policies will have to have an element of unpredictably and surprise.  And the 
prerequisite for such a policy must be a broad public consensus on the moral and 
strategic necessity of actions. We will need the capability to act on a moment’s 
notice…We may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American 
court of law. But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, 
worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond.79   
 
 George Schultz sharply advocated in his speech the need to be able to use preemptive force 
to combat terrorism.  Schultz recognized that public and moral considerations must be met, 
however warns the American people that the government needs to respond before “each and 
every fact is known” and “at a moment’s notice.”80  Schultz’s speech demonstrates the pro-
retaliation faction within the National Security Council’s ardent support of the United States 
government’s right to use preemptive and preventative force.  Moreover, as seen through the 
1986 strike Libyan facilities, the Reagan administration did not oppose the use of lethal force to 
counter terrorism.  
 In addition to Schultz’s speech, Robert Gates delivered a briefing to Congress at a time 
when Congress was debating preemptive lethal counterterrorism measures. Robert Gates, a 
career-long CIA official and Secretary of Defense under the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations, briefed Congress during the Reagan administration about retaliatory 
counterterrorism measures that have strong similarities to the criteria used in signature strikes.  
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Gates was in a secret briefing with Congress and remembered they had a hypothetical argument 
of when the U.S. government could kill a terrorist.81  Gates recalled the substance of the debate, 
“Well, if the guy is driving toward the barracks, with a truck full of explosives, can you kill him?  
‘Yeah.’  Well, what if he’s in the apartment putting the explosives together? ‘Well, I don’t 
know.’”82  The hypothetical situation imagined by Gates and Congressional leaders mirrors the 
signature strike scenarios outlined by Kevin Heller.  For example, when militants are: planning 
attacks, transporting weapons, or handling explosives.83 
 The Reagan administration’s proposed policy for retaliatory force against terrorists 
during 1984 is an important historical precedent for signature strikes.  The measures codified in 
NSDD 138 and articulated in George Schutlz’s speech and Robert Gates’s briefing with 
Congress all highlight the preemptive nature of the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism 
policy.  In NSDD 138, the Reagan administration outlines a range of options for preemptive 
measures for combatting terrorism.  The document not only stipulates the measures were 
preemptive, but outlined several different types of methods to counter terrorism.  George 
Schultz’s speech also clearly articulates a strategy for retaliating against terrorists with 
preventative and preemptive measures.  Finally, Robert Gates’s recalled testimony in Congress 
about whether the United States may use lethal force to kill a terrorist is extremely similar to 
acceptable scenarios for signature strikes such as when militants are transporting weapons, 
handling explosives, or seen at al Qaeda compound or training camp.84    
 While NSDD 138 was never implemented, one of the Reagan administration’s 
counterterrorism policies created an integral institution to the modern drone program.  William 
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Casey, in an attempt to combat the growing terrorist threat, proposed and created a new fusion 
center within the CIA.  Casey designed this center to break down the traditional geographic 
divisions within the CIA and fuse the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence at a single point: 
the Counterterrorist Center.85  The CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, later renamed the 
Counterterrorism Center, would become the control room for the Obama administration’s drone 
strikes.  
 
Signature Strikes, 2008- 
 The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center is the hub of all modern counterterror operations.86 
On September 11, 2001 the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) had 300 employees.  A 
decade after the attack, the fusion center’s employees swelled to 2000 accounting for roughly 10 
percent of the Agency’s workforce.  The CTC occupies a sizable footprint at Langley that many 
employees have called the “new headquarters building.”  Within the CTC, there are separate 
floors for different departments.  One floor is for the “PAD” Unit, or Pakistan-Afghanistan 
Department, where traditional regional analysts, targeting analysts, and operations officers 
coalesce to guide human intelligence operations and track a variety of terrorist and insurgent 
organizations.  CTC also established new departments for Yemen and Somalia to replicate the 
impact of PAD.  The CTC coordinates with elite military units for Special Forces raids, guides 
Afghan militia proxies that the CIA’s paramilitary branch—the Special Activities Division—
train, and most importantly for this thesis, is the logistical and operational arm for drone strikes. 
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 This section will proceed in two parts.  First, it will apply the criteria used to assess 
historical precedence—target devolution and preemption—to signature strikes.  By analyzing 
these criteria in signature strikes, this section will place the use of signature strikes on a wider 
historical continuum with the Phoenix Program and the Reagan administration’s preemptive 
policy.  Second, because of the dearth of scholarship on signature strikes it will present some of 
the problems that accompany the signature strike policy, which will lay a foundation for the final 
chapter that will develop policy recommendations.  
 
Target Devolution and Preemption 
 President Bush inaugurated the signature strike policy and began to authorize the use of 
drones to target unidentified enemy combatants in his final year in the Oval Office.87  According 
to Brian Glyn Williams, a scholar who studies drone strikes, the signature strike policy 
originated as a military idea.  The Pentagon wanted to see the CIA’s drone fleet play a “force 
protection” role by disrupting cross-border militant activities between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.88  The CIA was initially hesitant of the idea because it became more of a military force 
pursuing targets by “patterns-of-life.”89  While President Bush inaugurated the policy, President 
Obama saw his first example of a signature strike in the first month after assuming the Oval 
Office.  On January 23, 2009, President Obama had a tense debate on signature strike policy with 
then CIA Director Michael Hayden after a drone strike in South Waziristan killed seven 
civilians; it was President Obama’s inauguration into signature strikes.90  Obama’s CIA was also 
hesitant to adopt the signature strike policy.  General David Petraeus as Director of the CIA 
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voiced “caution against strikes on large groups of fighters,” and initially top CIA officials were 
wary of spending resources on signature strikes, while the military advocated for it.91   
 During his final year in office, President Bush authorized 36 drone strikes in Pakistan, 
which was the most for any year of his presidency.92  While President Bush initiated the 
signature strike policy, President Obama and his top national security advisers adopted it quickly 
and strengthened the by policy by adding new drone orbits in Pakistan.  By 2010, the Obama 
administration expanded the CIA’s drone program to 14 new flight orbits—each orbit includes 3 
drones and is a designated area where drones are allowed to fly—which is sufficient to provide 
constant surveillance over Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the vast majority of the drone strikes 
occur.93  The approval of new drone orbits signifies that the UAV pilots are hovering above 
Pakistan’s tribal regions, looking for targets, as opposed to targeted killings where they have 
intelligence pinpointing a target and then the National Security Council authorizes the CIA or 
JSOC to pursue the combatant.  In comparison to President Bush, during Obama’s first year in 
office he authorized 52 strikes in Pakistan, and after the expansion of the CIA’s flight orbits, the 
Obama administration authorized a record 122 strikes in 2010.94  
 The statistics on drone strikes under the Bush and Obama administrations reveal how 
target selection has devolved.  Using the New America Foundation’s database for drone strikes 
in Pakistan—which is the most cited database—these figures aggregate the strikes against 
terrorist leaders from other targeted combatants in Pakistan from 2004-2014.95  The following 
                                                            
91 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal, November 
4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836. 
92 “Drone Wars Pakistan,” New America Foundation, database. 
93  Entous, et. al, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules.” 
94 “Drone Wars Pakistan,” New America Foundation, database. 
95 Three non-governmental organizations track drone strikes: the New America Foundation, the Long War Journal, 
and the London-based Bureau of Investigative of Journalism.  While all have different methodologies, scholars and 
journalists deem the New America foundation the most accurate because how it measures civilian casualties. How 
each database measures civilian casualties often is a good indication of each organization’s political biases.  The less 
Mencini 
 
101 
figures display how the Obama administration has used drones more, but targeted high-value 
targets less than the Bush administration.  This illustrates the shift from high-value to low-level 
targets.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
casualties the more the organization tends support them and vice versa for high casualty estimates.  The Long War 
Journal database on average has the least amount of civilian casualties. In contrast, the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism has the most. The New America Foundation lies in between both of the other NGOs and is the most cited 
by scholars and journalists.  Therefore, this chapter relies on the New America Foundation’s data for analysis. 
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 Figure 1 and Figure 2 are statistical portraits of the shift from high-value to low-level 
targets in the CIA drone program in Pakistan.  The New America Foundation employs Taliban 
and al Qaeda experts to label which strikes are against leaders, but fails to give a precise 
methodology in defining what makes a leader; however, most appear to be “number 2 or number 
3” organizational leaders or high-level commanders.  In 2008, for example, the Bush 
administration authorized a targeted killing on Abu Laith al-Libi, a Libyan militant who the 
intelligence community believed to be al Qaeda’s “number three” and “director of operations.”96  
The Obama administration, in 2012, authorized a strike that killed a similar target—al Qaeda’s 
then deputy in Pakistan, Abu Yahya al-Libi.97  While the methodology and labeling may not be 
ideal given that the drone program is classified and the fuzzy organizational structures of terrorist 
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and militant groups, the statistics paint a clear picture of what kind of targets both 
administrations killed.  In five years of overseeing drone strikes in Pakistan, President Bush 
authorized 17 strikes against leaders out of 48 total strikes—a little more than every third strike 
under the Bush administration was against a leader.  In addition, 82 percent of the Bush 
administration’s leadership targets were al Qaeda commanders operating in Pakistan.  On the 
other hand, President Obama has authorized many more strikes against leaders—41 in five 
years—but a much smaller percentage of the total number of strikes in Pakistan are against high-
value targets.  Only 13 percent of President Obama’s drone strikes targeted enemy leaders.  
Moreover, President Obama pursued Taliban leaders more aggressively than his predecessor did.  
President Obama’s drone strikes targeted Taliban leaders, as opposed to al Qaeda commanders, 
48 percent of the time.  In addition, President Obama has targeted more strikes against the 
Haqqani Network—an experienced insurgent organization that attacks NATO troops in 
Afghanistan and is a subset of the Taliban umbrella organization—in Pakistan’s tribal region.  
Given this data, it is apparent that President Obama uses drones in Pakistan as a fighting tool of 
war for combatting the low-level al Qaeda and Taliban militants in Pakistan, as opposed to 
targeting high-value leaders. 
 While the data from New America Foundation suggests a shift within the Obama 
administration towards signature strikes, media reports affirm the tactical shift.  In the beginning 
of the Obama administration, the CIA was more cautious about conducting signature strikes 
because Agency officials were unsure about the value of expending resources on lower-level 
combatants, while the military was in favor.98  Then, as the CIA received more funding and 
expanded its jurisdiction in Pakistan, the military reversed their positions and opposed signature 
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strikes.99  Once the program picked up speed, CIA officials reported that the signature strikes 
netted more terrorists than targeted killings; although, CIA Director David Petraeus still voiced 
preference for smaller strikes against high value targets as opposed to foot soldiers.  Despite the 
CIA initial reservations, the Washington Post and NBC News report that the surge in the drone 
campaign in 2010 was in large part due to signature strikes; one official reported they 
contributed about half of the strikes in Pakistan and another reported the “bulk” of CIA drone 
strikes are signature strikes.100  Moreover, the scenarios that constitute a “signature” shows how 
the original purpose was for high-value targets and then devolved to low-level combatants.   
Scott Shane of the New York Times reported, that originally the term signature strike was meant 
to identity characteristics specific to known high level commanders.101  One such characteristic, 
for example might be, the leader’s vehicles parked at a training camp, where the signature is the 
vehicle.  While the CIA and Pentagon originally designed to target high-value signatures, the 
practice devolved to delineate the signature of militants in general.102  Shane adds that the 
signature for general militants usually meant military age males participating in a wide range of 
nefarious activity such as meeting with known terrorists or operating in insurgent or terrorist 
controlled areas.103  
 The criteria used for signature strikes also highlights the preemptive nature of the 
operations.  The signature strikes in Yemen and Somalia reflect this preemption.  While the 
majority of the Obama administration’s drone strikes have occurred in Pakistan, the military and 
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CIA also run drone programs in Yemen and Somalia.  After an increased use of signature strikes 
in Pakistan, CIA officials lobbied to expand the authority to target unidentified combatants in 
Yemen as well, but President Obama did not grant similar authority.104  After the 2011 Anwar al-
Awlaki targeted killing and an increase of threats from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
President Obama allowed the CIA to use signature strikes in Yemen with tighter restrictions.105  
The approval for signature strikes in Yemen in 2012 led to a similar surge in total strikes, as seen 
in Pakistan in 2010.  In 2011, there were six drone strikes in Yemen.106  After President Obama 
granted the CIA signature strike authority in Yemen, there were 46 drone strikes in 2012.107  
During the surge of strikes in Yemen, the CIA and military pushed to rename signature strikes 
“terrorist-attack-disruption strikes” or TADS.108  Terrorist-attack-disruption implies preemption.  
By disrupting a terrorist attack, it suggests that the United States government has the knowledge 
that the militants or individual will attack and the decision-makers will strike first to avoid to 
terrorist attack.  Drone technology facilitates preempting or disrupting terrorist attacks easier.  
The ability to see militant’s activity—whether it be transporting weapons or handling 
explosives—allows the UAV operators and their commanders to assess the likeliness and 
imminence of an attack.   
 Thus, after an increased threat emanating from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Obama administration granted the CIA the ability to use preemptive signature strike or terrorist-
attack-disruption to combat the rising threat.  In addition, the scenarios provided by Kevin Heller 
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all are preemptive.  These scenarios, which can lead to a signature strikes, include UAV pilots 
seeing militants: planning attacks, transporting weapons, handling explosives at an al Qaeda 
compound or training camp, traveling in trucks towards a conflict, or working trainees camps in 
al Qaeda controlled areas.109  All of these situations imply that the militants seen through the 
UAV are engaging in an activity that will result in an attack against the United States; and 
therefore, American decision-makers can combat these threats by preemptively eliminating them.  
 The statistics on drone strikes by the Bush and Obama administrations and the shift in 
requisite scenarios for signature strikes clearly highlight target devolution.  In Pakistan, the Bush 
administration targeted a higher percentage of high-value targets, while the Obama 
administration authorized more strikes, against low-level combatants.  The term “signature” 
originally implied the patterns of behavior of a high-value individual such as the case of Mir 
Ahmad appearing to be Osama bin Laden in 2002.  Then, the term signature evolved to mean 
actions by low-level fighters that permit lethal force.  In addition, Obama’s approval to use 
signature strikes in Yemen shows how the administration was aiming to preempt the growing 
threat of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  The proposed name “terrorist-attack-disruption 
strikes” and the scenarios associated with signature strikes are preemptive in nature.  Therefore, 
by using the two criteria outlined in this chapter—target devolution and preemption—signature 
strikes share direct commonalities with the Phoenix Program and NSDD 138 precedents.   
 
Vexing Problems with Signature Strikes   
 While not directly tied to the study of historical precedents, scholarship rarely discusses 
several important issues with signature strikes policy.  By briefly examining these issues, this 
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section will lay a foundation, which this thesis’s policy recommendations can utilize.  There has 
been significant tension within the White House regarding signature strikes.  In addition, 
Congressional leaders have taken a particular aggressive offensive against signature strikes.  The 
Obama administration has been especially quiet regarding signature strikes, but this section will 
uncover the near non-existent information that the White House has provided.  Lastly, this 
section will show signature strikes have become a policy for diplomatic relations and negations.  
 Implementing the signature strike policy was not a smooth process and there were tense 
debates within the White House.  In 2009, when the policy was still in its infancy, the military 
proposed a signature strike against al-Shabab—a Somali terrorist organization with ties to al 
Qaeda.  The top military officials were making their case to President Obama for the strike.  
Obama asked his advisers’ opinions, James Cartwright, a four star Marine General, argued 
strongly against the strike.  Cartwright reportedly said, “In these places where they have not 
attacked us, we are looking for a person, not a country.  If there is a person in the camp who is a 
clear threat to the United States we should go after him.  But carpet bombing a country is a really 
bad precedent.”110  Top national security lawyers also debated the signature strike policy.  The 
State Department’s legal adviser on counterterrorism, Harold Koh, agreed on the legality of 
targeting senior al Qaeda members, but disagreed with his counterpart in the Pentagon, Jeh 
Johnson, who advocated for pursuing lower ranking militants and co-belligerents.111   
 Tensions within the Obama administration also were high after a signature strike on 
March 17, 2011, when Pakistani officials infuriatingly reported that the strike killed over 40 
people, many of them innocents.112  The CIA disputed the Pakistani claim, but the New 
American Foundation, who synthesizes a variety of news reports, found that the strike killed 
                                                            
110 Daniel Klaidman, “Drones: The Silent Killers.” 
111 Ibid. 
112 Entous, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal. 
Mencini 
 
108 
between 40 and 45 including 38 civilians and no reported militants killed.113  The strike severely 
strained U.S.-Pakistani relations and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon reportedly grilled 
CIA and military participants saying, “O.K.  I got it; it’s war and it’s confusing. Are we doing 
everything we can to make sure we are focused on the target sets we want?  You can kill these 
foot soldiers all day, every day and you wouldn’t change the course of the war.”114  The tension 
over signature strikes, however, is not limited to the annals of the White House.  
 The debate over signature strikes has expanded to punditry, Congress, and diplomatic 
negotiation.  Commentators such as Philip Mudd, a former CIA official and leader in the 
Counterterrorism Center, defended signature strikes.  Mudd argues that targeting leadership 
alone only degrades a small percentage of diffuse terrorist groups and it depletes time and 
treasure to track the tactical intelligence necessary to find, fix, and finish elite commanders.  
Moreover, Mudd asserts that troops, not leaders, execute an organization’s vision to murder 
innocents, and signature strikes have destroyed the support structure and sub-tiers of terrorist 
groups.115  Jennifer Daskai, a Georgetown Law professor and former attorney in the Obama 
administration, also supports signature strikes.  Daskai rationalizes, “the idea of killing members 
of an enemy forces without knowing their identities isn’t itself controversial.  In traditional 
conflict there is no requirement that you know every person’s identity before you strike, so long 
as there are reasonable grounds for deterring that the target is part of an enemy force.”116  The 
issue presented by Daskai raises an important question about whether the drone program is 
comparable to traditional conflict.  Although, American UAVs are currently targeting terrorists 
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in three countries where there are no conventional ground forces mired in conflict and are ran by 
institutions—CIA and JSOC—who are operating under special covert authority. 
 Some Congressional leaders on Capitol Hill have voiced their opposition to signature 
strikes by attempting to ban them.117  A minority of congressional representatives looked to 
provide a provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, which is a bill 
that provides the intelligence community with funds and resources, that would:   
Ban so-called “signature strikes,” require an independent alternative analysis any 
time that U.S. Government is contemplating taking lethal action against a U.S. 
Person…[and] require an annual, unclassified report on the total number of 
combatants, noncombatant civilians and total number of individuals killed…by 
the use of targeted lethal force launched from unmanned aerial vehicles.118  
 
Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), an author of the intelligence reauthorization bill, views 
signature strikes as morally dubious and counterproductive.119  Other Congressmen have 
submitted requests to Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency John Brennan for more information on signature strikes.120 Senator John McCain asked 
in a letter to Brennan, “How do ‘signature strikes’ square with your statement that targeted 
killing operations are only approved when a targeted individual poses a  ‘significant threat to 
U.S. interests?”121  
 Despite their attempts, Congressional leaders have received no answer to their questions.  
Unlike the policy on targeted killings, the Obama administration has made no public reference to 
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signature strikes.  President Obama and multiple members of the administration, have given 
speeches on targeting identified individuals, however, there has been almost zero information 
released by the administration on signature strikes.  The only reference found by the author of 
this thesis was an indirect statement buried in a footnote.  The White House Press Secretary 
released a fact sheet on “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in 
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” in May 
2013.122  In the document the Obama administration outlines standards and criteria for the use 
lethal force. The criteria included: “near certainty that the terrorist target is present, near certainty 
that noncombatants will not be injured or killed, an assessment that capture is not feasible at the 
time of the operation, an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively 
address the threat to U.S. persons.”123  The document defines non-combatants in a footnote as 
“individuals who may not be made the object of attack under applicable international law.”124  
The footnote further explains that “males of military age may be non-combatants; it is not the 
case that all military-aged males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to be combatants.”125  
While it is not a direct response, the fact that signature strikes are aimed at “military-age males” 
is often noted by reporters.”126  
 Drone strikes have also become a major foreign policy obstacle and negotiation tool for 
American policymakers.  The first drone strike in Pakistan conducted in 2004 required the 
explicit authorization of Pakistan’s President.  Eventually, the authorization was relegated to the 
CIA’s control under the White House’s direction, without Pakistani supervision or approval, as 
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long as the strikes occurred in certain Pakistani pre-approved “kill boxes.”127  The relations 
between the American and Pakistani leaders have become increasingly tense because Pakistanis 
overwhelmingly disapprove of drone strikes.  A 2012 poll of Pakistanis found only 17 percent 
approve of the government’s cooperation with the United States on drone strikes.128  In addition, 
former command of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, stated drones in Pakistan 
are, “hated on a visceral level, even by people who have never seen one or seen the effects of 
one.”129  In the beginning of 2014, American policymakers agreed to curb drone strikes in 
Pakistan, the first agreement of any kind between the two countries.130  As Pakistan pursues 
negotiations with the Taliban to assist with America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistani 
leaders wanted the United States to cease all drone strikes in Pakistan, but the Obama 
administration agreed to target only a short-list of high-value terrorists.131  While the Wall Street 
Journal speculates this agreement could lead to an eventual downsizing of the CIA’s drone 
program in Pakistan, it does signify that the Obama administration is eliminating the use of 
signature strikes in the interim. 
  
Conclusion 
 Signature strikes are less studied then targeted killings. Nevertheless, signature strikes—
like targeted killings—have historical precedents in warfare that predate the use of armed drones.  
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This chapter has presented cases, each of which possesses one of the two criteria of signature 
strikes—target devolution and preemption.  Target devolution occurs when states begin targeting 
high-value leaders and then eventually devolve to killing low-value combatants.  The shift from 
targeting high-value leaders to low-value soldiers is most likely due to a lack of pertinent 
intelligence on commanders.  As seen through the consecutive strikes on al Qaeda’s top 
commanders by the Bush and Obama administration, there are only so many high-value targets 
that the intelligence community has identified.  By persistently eliminating top leaders it 
becomes more difficult for the intelligence community to assess the organizational structure and 
operational command of a terrorist organization because militant groups often promote from 
within their own ranks to preserve operational security.  Therefore, target devolution most likely 
occurs because strikes outstrip intelligence.  As targeted campaigns age, the military and 
intelligence communities are more likely to root out notorious leaders, who are then replaced by 
lesser-known mid-level or low-level soldiers.  These internal organizational changes explain why 
over time in both the Phoenix Program and the modern drone campaign the targets shifted from 
high-value targets to low-level commanders.   
 Preemptive strikes are rooted in the expectation that an adversary will attack and that 
striking first is better than suffering an attack.  Signature strikes are preemptive in nature, they 
began as a lethal measure to attack high-value targets, and devolved into eliminating low-level 
fighters based on a variety of signature scenarios. The second precedent analyzed in this chapter 
showed how the Reagan administration’s NSDD 138 policy was also preemptive.  Secretary of 
State George Schultz’s speech reaffirmed one faction in the administration’s support for 
preemptive retaliatory strikes.  Preemption is based on imminence.  Over time, the window of 
imminence has shrunk.  New drone technology has allowed American operators and 
Mencini 
 
113 
policymakers to peek into militant activity long before an attack is possible.  When the Reagan 
administration advocated for a preemptive counterterrorism policy they expected Hezbollah to 
continue to attack American interests because of its past actions.  Now, through signature strikes, 
the Obama administration is able to rationalize preemption because they have visual 
confirmation of militants performing specific nefarious activities.    
 By analyzing the Phoenix Program and the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism 
policy with signature strikes specific criteria—target devolution and preemption—this chapter 
has established both as historical precedents for signature strikes.  Through these cases, I have 
identified three trends, which I will form the basis for the final chapter’s policy 
recommendations.  
1.  Signature strikes and similar historical precedents use the concept of preemption as a 
justification for lethal action.  Imminent conditions underpin this justification for 
preemption.  
 
2.   Within the Reagan and Obama administrations, bureaucratic factions formed within the 
national security bureaucracy over the question of whether to use preemptive lethal force 
and signature strikes.   
 
3.  The Phoenix Program led to a virulent public reaction.  In addition, there seems to be 
more pushback by pundits and Congress about signature strike policy than targeted 
killings policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINDINGS 
  
 
 Hank Crumpton was one of the few American operators who rode in on horseback with 
local Afghan allies during the invasion of Afghanistan after September 11.  Crumpton spent his 
career as a CIA officer and was a driving force behind the America’s counterterrorism strategy in 
the twenty-first century.  He served in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center before September 11 
and then served as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s coordinator for Counterterrorism 
earning the rank of Ambassador.  Crumpton, in his memoir The Art of Intelligence, identifies 
three strategic objectives for counterterrorism: nullify enemy leadership, deny safe haven, and 
ameliorate the local conditions that the enemy exploits.1  In an author interview, Crumpton 
stated, “Drone strikes only complete one of the three strategic objectives.”2  Crumpton explained 
with a pointed Southern drawl: 
Drone strikes do not deny safe havens.  They can achieve the first objective to 
nullify enemy leadership, but do not meet the second.  They can strengthen enemy 
safe havens. If the execution of these operations [drone strikes] are such that local 
inhabitants rally to the side of the enemy and reinforce the safe havens, than the 
drone impacts at the strategic level are counterproductive even if they are killing 
enemy leadership. That’s the challenge of meeting all three objectives. You have to 
weave all the instruments of statecraft together to have the right outcomes.3 
 
 No strategy is a silver bullet.  While Crumpton’s objectives for counterterrorism are clear 
and concise, they lack nuance.  Geographic dispersion is a trait of terrorist groups and al Qaeda 
in particular.  Al Qaeda’s diffusion and factionalization means that there are different local 
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conditions, ideologies, and reliance on safe havens that differ for each affiliate.4  Nevertheless, al 
Qaeda and its affiliates do have enemy leaders and as Crumpton stated, drones strikes do succeed 
in nullifying enemy leadership.   
 Thus far, this thesis has established historical precedents for targeted killings and 
signature strikes and extracted trends from the history that can inform policy.  This chapter will 
analyze those lessons comprehensively and will use them to provide policy recommendations for 
lethal drone policy.  Therefore, fulfilling this thesis’s argument that historical precedents for 
targeted killings and signature strikes can inform modern policy.   
 It is important to distinguish that lethal drone policy is only one of three strategic 
objectives in counterterrorism, and the other two objectives are much more nuanced and 
complicated than killing terrorists.  In addition, nullifying enemy leadership is more complex 
than simply killing every commander who is a “number 2” or “number 3.”  Terrorist 
organizations have different purposes for their leaders.  Some are operational leaders, while other 
are ideological leaders.  Targeting each type of leader can lead to different consequences for the 
organization.  Eliminating an ideologue might cripple the group’s momentum, but it also might 
make the leader a martyr and rally more local support.  Similarly, killing an effective operational 
leader might lead to him being replaced by a more bloodthirsty mid-level commander who is 
trying to make a name for themself.  These nuances vary by organization and make it difficult to 
argue for blanket strategic policy recommendations.  Thus, the recommendations provided in this 
chapter are not a silver bullet strategy for counterterrorism, leadership decapitation, or even 
lethal drone policy as a whole.  The recommendations are solely developed from the historical 
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precedents discussed in this thesis and therefore, only seek to answer select dilemmas regarding 
modern lethal strikes.   
 This chapter will have three sections.  First, it will summarize the key findings from 
historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes that occurred prior to September 
11, 2001.  In the second section, this chapter will analyze and extrapolate on the historical trends 
identified in the final pages of each of the preceding chapters.  Finally, this thesis will conclude 
by providing concrete policy recommendations. 
 
Summary of Historical Precedents 
 The Executive Branch, the CIA, and the military have a history of debating whether to 
kill individual enemies and have launched operations to do so.  Targeted killings are legal 
operations by a state or its agents that intentionally and deliberately target individuals.  Targeted 
killings are find-fix-finish operations.  Governments target an individual, fix their locations, and 
kill them.  The operation against Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is a clear example of a targeted 
killing operation that American policymakers consistently cite to justify modern operations.5  
American aviators gunned down Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor and Admiral of the 
Japanese Fleet, on April 18, 1943.  American intelligence cryptologists deciphered a Japanese 
message identifying the flight itinerary of Yamamoto.  American Admiral Chester Nimitz 
authorized special joint Army-Navy aviators to gun down Yamamoto’s plane en route.  In the 
first decades of the Cold War, the CIA plotted to assassinate various foreign leaders.  
Assassinations are different from targeted killings and are illegal operations to kill individuals.  
                                                            
5 Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” (speech, Chicago, 
IL March 5, 2012), Department of Justice; Harold Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” 
(Speech, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010,) The State Department; Jeh Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers 
and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (Speech, New Haven, CT, February 22, 2012), Department of 
Defense. 
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The Church Committee, a Senate Select Committee convened to study government intelligence 
operations chaired by Senator Frank Church, revealed these plots publicly in 1975.  The public 
reaction was overwhelmingly negative.  While the CIA never succeeded in assassinating enemy 
leaders, the Church Committee and the negative reaction left a significant scar on the CIA and its 
officers.  Moreover, the Church Committee led to three consecutive Executive Orders by 
presidents banning assassination as a foreign policy tool.   
 Subsequent administrations were reluctant to engage in targeted killing operations after 
the Church Committee out of a fear the public would misconstrue them as assassinations.  In 
1986, the Reagan administration authorized an airstrike against terrorist facilities in Libya.  One 
of the facilities was the command-and-control center and home of Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi.  Although targeted killings literature cites the air strike against Libya as a case, it is not 
an operational precedent for targeted killing.6  The United States intelligence community knew 
that Qaddafi moved locations multiple times each night to avoid internal coup attempts; 
therefore, the U.S. military did not equip the aircraft with ordnance powerful enough to destroy 
the bunker at Qaddafi’s command center.7  While the Libyan strikes were not an operational 
precedent for targeted killings, President Reagan invoked a legal justification that the Obama 
administration uses to justify its drone strikes—the right to self-defense as stipulated by the 
United Nations Charter Article 51.  While the executive branch was more reluctant to authorize 
lethal operations in the 1980s and 1990s, the Clinton administration authorized a tomahawk 
missile salvo on a compound where Osama bin Laden was supposed to be located in August 
1998.  The operation against Bin Laden was unsuccessful, yet is a precedent for targeted killings 
                                                            
6 For mentions of the 1986 airstrike in targeted killings literature see: Richelson, “When Kindness Fails: 
Assassination as a National Security Option;” Rachtel, “Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of 
Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy;” Anderson, “Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and 
Law,” Working Paper between the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University Law Center, and Hoover 
Institution (2009). 
7 Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders, 27; Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States, 122. . 
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because the CIA actively hunted Bin Laden and fixed his location.  The failure to kill Bin Laden 
in 1998 and 1999 also led to the development of the armed Predator drone, which became the 
weapon of choice for the Bush and Obama administrations’ targeted killing operations.   
 Signature strikes are preemptive operations aimed at unidentified individuals in which the 
operators target the individuals based on certain characteristics associated with enemy leaders or 
militant organizations.  For example, characteristics associated with militants’ movements are 
when militants are handling explosives, traveling in trucks toward armed conflict, and training in 
al Qaeda compounds.  Signature strikes do not target high-value commanders with known 
identities, but rather the strikes target lower-level fighters.  The Phoenix Program in the Vietnam 
War was an intelligence exploitation program aimed at dismantling Viet Cong Infrastructure 
(VCI).  The Phoenix Program relied on Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) to neutralize 
Viet Cong soldiers and facilitators.  The PRUs had three methods of neutralization: capturing, 
inducing desertion, and killing.  The PRUs and the Phoenix Program neutralized tens of 
thousands of Viet Cong and the PRUs killed a portion of them.  The PRUs used certain criteria to 
target VCI such as evidence of their activities and positions within the VCI organizational 
structure.8  These criteria are similar to how signature strike operators evaluate prospective 
targets.  As the Phoenix Program aged, the PRUs targeted less high-value commanders and more 
low-level combatants.9   
 In 1984, the Reagan administration authorized a new counterterrorism policy, National 
Security Decision Directive 138.  NSDD 138 called for the CIA and military to develop legal 
capabilities to preemptively neutralize anti-American terrorist groups.10  The Reagan 
                                                            
8 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Phung Hoang Adviser Handbook, (Saigon: U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, November 20, 1970): 9. 
9 Rosenau and Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” 14. 
10 National Security Decision Directive 138, “Combatting Terrorism,” The White House (April 3, 1984), 4. 
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administration never implemented NSDD 138 and the CIA, military or America’s allies, did not 
conduct operations to neutralize foreign terrorists; however, the policy explicitly articulates 
preemptive offensive counterterrorism measures.  The Reagan administration’s Secretary of 
State George Schultz also publicly called for the United States to use preemptive force to check 
international terrorist organizations.11  The operational precedent of the Phoenix Program shows 
by their activities how the PRUs chose their VCI targets and how target selection devolved from 
high-value targets to low-level fighters and facilitators.  NSDD 138, while never implemented, 
demonstrates how the Reagan administration authorized the CIA and military to use preemptive 
measures to counter terrorism.  Preemption and target selection are hallmarks of signature 
strikes.   
 There is intense public and scholarly interest in drone strikes.  Many evaluate or opine on 
targeted killings and signatures strikes’ morality, legality, and effectiveness.  Few commentators, 
however, have sought to expand the spectrum of study before September 11.  Targeted killings, 
signature strikes, and armed drones are not interdependent.  Armed drones can carry out 
operations that are not targeted killings or signature strikes, and likewise Special Forces teams 
can carry out the same operations.  The tools are less important than the nature of the operations.  
Historically, the White House has authorized operations to kill its enemies and will undoubtedly 
continue to do so.  These past operations and precedents inevitably raise the question: what can 
targeted killing and signature strikes policy learn from history?  
 
 
Historical Trends 
 This section serves as a bridge between history and policy.  By examining the historical 
precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, this thesis has identified six trends.  This 
                                                            
11 George Schultz, “Terrorism and the Modern World,” Terrorism 7, no. 4 (1985), 431-447. 
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section will analyze each historical trend in turn and then deduce a model for targeted killings 
and signature strikes policy based on the identified patterns.  The trends and concluding policy 
model will form the basis for the policy recommendations in the final section of this chapter.   
1.  In the course of American targeted killings, there has been an increasing fusion between 
the traditional roles of military and intelligence.  The military has become more involved 
in intelligence and collection, and the intelligence community has become increasingly 
invested in war fighting abilities.  
 
2.  There have been more transparent executive command mechanisms during targeted 
killing operations.  The era of “plausible deniability” and hiding operations from the 
public has become increasingly obsolete, as the president has taken a more identifiable 
role in authorizing strikes and informing the public of targeted killing operations.   
 
3.  Targeted killing operations often take place under the highest levels of authority, and as 
such, frequently look to employ new technology.  The public and media closely examine 
the use of technology in targeted killing operations today because the operations employ 
UAVs.  By examining the history of targeted killings, however, it is clear that this 
attribute is not limited to the twenty-first century and in fact, is an identifiable trend.  
 
4.  Signature strikes and similar historical precedents use the concept of preemption as a 
justification for lethal action.  Imminent conditions underpin this justification for 
preemption. 
 
5.  Within the Reagan and Obama administrations, bureaucratic factions formed within the 
national security bureaucracy over the question of whether to use targeted lethal force 
and signature strikes.   
 
6.  The Phoenix Program led to a virulent public reaction.  In addition, there seems to be 
more pushback by pundits and Congress about signature strike policy than targeted 
killings policy.  
 
 
Fusion between Military and Intelligence  
 Throughout the historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, it is clear 
that there has been an increasing convergence between the military and intelligence 
community.12  The military has taken on more responsibilities traditionally assigned to the 
                                                            
12 Mark Mazzetti and Robert Chesney both argue this convergence between military and intelligence as well.  For 
more see: Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2013); Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 
50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5, (2012): 539-629. 
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intelligence community and the CIA has amassed more war fighting capabilities.  The air raid on 
Yamamoto is a clear example of traditional military and intelligence roles.  Intelligence 
cryptologists decrypted a Japanese cable and provided actionable intelligence to the military, 
who then carried out the lethal operation.  The Phoenix Program and the use of Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units, on the other hand, was a convoluted convergence of military and CIA 
responsibility.  The American Advisers on PRUs were either military or intelligence officials and 
the responsibilities for each team included: intelligence collection and analysis and enemy 
neutralization—through capture, desertion, or elimination.  Intelligence collection and analysis is 
a traditional role of intelligence officers, and enemy neutralization is usually the responsibility of 
a soldier.  The targeted killing on Anwar al-Awlaki is an example of a nearly seamlessly fused 
operation.  The CIA and JSOC both had intelligence collection capabilities and armed drones 
programs in Yemen.  Moreover, originally the National Security Council assigned the task to fix 
and finish Awlaki to JSOC, but then switched the mission jurisdiction to the CIA in the final 
months of the hunt.13   
 The fusion of operational jurisdiction is a by-product of the threat and technology.  
Terrorist organizations and insurgent movements are asymmetric threats, which usually demand 
asymmetric responses.14  Thus, it is unsurprising that the military and intelligence community 
look to improve their own capabilities to counter terrorism by expanding their traditional roles of 
war fighting and intelligence collection and analysis.  Moreover, armed unmanned systems are 
the perfect technological platform for these fused operations.  Remotely piloted vehicles by 
                                                            
13 Hakim Almasmari, Margaret Coker, and Siobhan Gorman, “Drone Kills Top Al Qaeda Figure,” The Wall Street 
Journal, October 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602301252340820; Mazzetti, The Way of the 
Knife, 308. 
14 General Carter Ham, former AFRICOM Commander said in this a lecture.  Carter Ham, Graeme Lamb, Marin 
Leed, “Fit for the Future: Cross-Atlantic Perspectives on Ground Forces,” (Lecture: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington D.C.), June 20, 2013. 
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design are Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance systems, meaning the military specifically 
designed them to conduct intelligence collection operations.15  When the CIA and DOD decided 
to equip the MQ-1 Predator drone with a Hellfire II missile in 2000; however, they added a war 
fighting function.  Therefore, there are two layers of fusion.  The first is jurisdictional fusion 
between the CIA and the military, where the military now has greater intelligence capabilities 
and the CIA has more war fighting responsibilities.  The second, more tactical, layer of fusion is 
the technological platform.  Both entities—the intelligence community and Department of 
Defense—are employing armed unmanned systems, which have the capabilities to collect 
intelligence and kill enemy combatants.   
 Another dilemma between the increased fusion of the military and intelligence 
communities is the legal issue of covert authority.  The National Security Act of 1947 
reorganized the defense and intelligence communities.  The National Security Act of 1947 also 
added provisions to the U.S. Code.  Specifically, it clarified the roles of the intelligence and 
defense communities in Title 10 and Title 50 in the U.S. Code.  There is no strict interpretation 
of Title 10 and Title 50.16  The accepted colloquial explanation is: Title 10 refers to the 
Department of Defense and military operations while Title 50 governs the intelligence agencies, 
activities, and covert action.17  The debate over Title 10 and Title 50 burgeoned after the Special 
Forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011.  The CIA temporarily contracted U.S. Navy 
Seals under Title 50 authority to conduct a covert action mission because the United States 
                                                            
15 J.R. Reid, interview with author (Washington D.C., August 2013).  J.R. Reid is a former Air Force Lieutenant and 
currently an engineer with General Atomics, which is the manufacturer of the MQ-1 and MQ-9 remotely piloted 
vehicles.  The MQ-1 and MQ-9 are the primary aircraft used by the military, the CIA, and JSOC to conduct targeted 
killings and signature strikes and are better known for their product names “Predator” and “Reaper.” 
16 Andru Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence 
Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard Law School National Security Journal 3, (2011): 100. 
17 Ibid., 87. 
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military did not have authorization to conduct military missions in Pakistan.18  Mark Mazzetti, a 
national security reporter for the New York Times, notes the national security community’s slang 
term for this phenomenon of temporarily contracting military personnel—notably Special Forces 
operators—to intelligence agencies is “sheep dipping.”19  Title 10 and Title 50 authority further 
explains that the CIA originally secured the contract to use armed drones in Pakistan because the 
Agency needed to conduct strikes under covert authority.   
 The increased fusion between the military and intelligence communities highlights 
important considerations for policy recommendations.  This trend has a history that dates back to 
the Phoenix Program.  In addition, the intelligence community and Pentagon catalyzed this 
convergence when faced with the asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat and the unique war 
fighting and intelligence capabilities of armed drones.  Finally, the U.S. Code has a legal 
framework for aggregating military and covert action activities.  The fusion between the military 
and intelligence communities, therefore, is not a negative development for U.S. National 
Security policy, but policymakers needs to be clarify this convergence, especially when targeting 
terrorists.  
 
Executive Command 
 Throughout the history of targeted killings and signature strikes the executive branch has 
become increasingly more involved and open about its role in the use of lethal force.  The 
Roosevelt administration did not admit that Admiral Yamamoto died in a plane crash until a 
month after the operation when Japanese radio stations eulogized the fallen commander.  Even 
then, President Roosevelt simply responded with “Gosh!”20  Later, the Truman administration 
                                                            
18 Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” 539. 
19 Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 133. 
20 “‘Gosh!’” Says Roosevelt On Death of Yamamoto,” The New York Times, May 21, 1943. 
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did not reveal that American aviators gunned down Yamamoto until after Japanese leaders 
surrendered.  The White House stayed removed from any role in the targeted killing, mainly 
because they did not want to reveal that American intelligence  officer cracked the Japanese 
Code.  
 Following the killing of Yamamoto, in the early years of the Cold War, the National 
Security Council authorized the CIA’s assassination plots under the auspices of “plausible 
deniability.”  The White House intentionally installed mechanisms to distance itself from lethal 
action.  The 1986 airstrike on Qaddafi was a departure from this norm because President Reagan 
addressed the nation announcing the raid on Libya’s terrorist facilities.  President Clinton 
followed Reagan’s lead and announced the cruise missile strike on the al Qaeda compound near 
Kwhost in 1998.   
 President Obama has taken the most active role of any President to date in authorizing 
lethal force.  The National Security Council curates the disposition matrix—the software that 
manages the location and priority of terrorist targets—and President Obama makes the final 
decisions.21  In addition, President Obama and his top officials, for years, have taken to public 
forums to argue the administration’s position and criteria on targeted strikes.  The role of the 
executive branch in targeted lethal strikes is more visible today.  This shift has been for the 
better.   
 If the White House is going to authorize lethal force, it is better to have the President 
intimately involved than cloaked in plausible deniability.  While the Obama administration has 
undeniably taken on a more public role, there is still room for improvement and increased 
transparency.  There are several possible explanations for why the Obama administration has 
                                                            
21 Greg Miller, “Plan for hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists,” Washington Post, 
October 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-
intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_print.html. 
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taken such an authoritative role in authorizing and publicizing targeted strikes.  The far-reaching 
effects from the nation’s Cold War debate over assassinations are still present today because the 
administration actively dismisses accusations that targeted killings are assassinations.  Jeh 
Johnson, the top attorney at the Pentagon and current Secretary of Homeland Security, argued in 
2010: 
On occasion, I read or hear a commentator loosely refer to lethal force against a 
valid military objective with the pejorative term "assassination."  Like any 
American shaped by national events in 1963 and 1968, the term is to me one of the 
most repugnant in our vocabulary, and it should be rejected in this context.  Under 
well-settled legal principles, lethal force against a valid military objective, in an 
armed conflict, is consistent with the law of war and does not, by definition, 
constitute an "assassination."22 
 
 
 It is also possible that presidential politics are the primary driver in the Obama 
administration’s shift for greater control and transparency.  In his most detailed speech on 
counterterrorism policy, President Obama stated that after September 11, “ in some cases, I 
believe we compromised our basic values… So after I took office, we stepped up the war against 
al Qaeda but we also sought to change its course.  We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s 
leadership.”23  Presidential campaign platforms and promises, however, have mixed records.  
The most probable scenario that has led to the Obama administration’s control over targeted 
strikes is the technology.  
 Remotely piloted aircraft have a clear chain of command.  Presidents no longer have to 
wait for the dust to settle to hear the results of cumbersome covert proxy operations.  Once the 
White House authorizes an operation, the results are quickly carried up the chain of command.  
                                                            
22 Jeh Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration,” (Speech, New 
Haven, CT, February 22, 2012), Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-
johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448.  
23 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., May 
23, 2013), The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university. 
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Moreover, the public’s conception that America is waging war by remote control undoubtedly 
pushes the authorizing administration to be more forthcoming about the technology and how the 
respective agency employs it.  Therefore, while technology continues to progress it better to have 
future administrations advance the precedent of greater transparency and control.   
 
 
Technology  
  The military and intelligence community have employed advanced technology throughout 
the history of targeted killings.  In addition, the technology used to kill individuals placed a 
stronger emphasis on removing the human operator from the equation.  From the inventions of 
the longbow to the airplane, distancing humans from conflict is a trend that has long existed in 
warfare.  Remotely piloted vehicles take that trend to a new level.  In the strike on Admiral 
Yamamoto the Army aviators used a plane with less than a year of combat deployment, the very 
maneuverable P-38 aircraft.24  The debates within the Clinton administration over how to kill 
Osama bin Laden also reveal how the administration was fearful of putting U.S. personnel in 
danger.  The administration used Tomahawk Cruise missiles, which removed its American 
operators from battle.  The Tomahawk Cruise missiles, however, had long flight times 
necessitating knowledge that a specific target—in this case Bin Laden—would be in one location 
for an extended period of time.  Military officials proposed using AC-130 gunships but were 
worried about its short flight time, the need for nearby landing zones, and the risk of losing 
American personnel in foreign territory.25  These considerations resulted in arming the MQ-1 
Predator drone, which has provef to be an effective tool for hunting terrorists.    
                                                            
24 “Lockheed P-38J-10-LO Lightning,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, 
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?object=nasm_A19600295000. 
25 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 135-136. 
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 Remotely piloted vehicles—like the MQ-1 and the more advanced MQ-9—are ideal 
platforms for targeted killings and signature strikes.  The MQ-9—which is called the Predator or 
Reaper depending on the agency or military division—can fly for twenty-seven hours at a 
maximum altitude of 50,000 feet, loiter for hours above a target, and can carry a laser-guided 
Hellfire II Missile, as well as more sophisticated and substantial bombs.26  A human operator, 
often thousands of miles away, remotely pilots this aircraft.  The precision munitions systems 
and the remotely-piloted nature of unmanned aerial vehicles are valuable benefits to 
counterterrorism operations, but those features are not what make them the ideal tool for lethal 
strikes.  The reason remotely piloted vehicles—like the Predator and the Reaper—have become 
synonymous with counterterrorism in the Obama administration is because of their unique ability 
to loiter.  The UAV’s capacity to circle for hours at a time overhead make it the ideal tool for 
intelligence collection, target identification, and lethal strikes.  
 Many drone policy pundits focus on the advancements of UAV technology and what it 
means in terms of international proliferation and the creation of autonomous systems.  While 
these are important debates, many of the arguments are for fear mongering purposes.  The 
international proliferation of UAV technology does have important consequences if other nations 
begin to carry out lethal operations, especially outside of their borders; however, it is often 
overlooked that extraterritorial lethal operations can only be carried out with the host nation’s 
consent.  In the current theatres for targeted strikes—Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia—the host 
states grant the military or CIA permission to fly in their airspace.27  UAVs are slow, easy to spot 
on radar, and a country with reasonably adequate air defense systems can shoot them down. 
While the thought of Iran, China, or Russia hunting their enemies with UAVs is frightening, it is 
                                                            
26 “MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B,” General Atomics, (Product Information Card: Received at the AUVSI Unmanned 
Systems Conference, August 2013). 
27 Owen Cote, interview with author (March 2014).  
Mencini 
 
128 
important to recognize any operation would have to be carried out within their borders or with a 
different nation’s explicit consent.   
 Many defense contractors are also building autonomous systems, which means there is no 
human operator.  It is certainly frightening to picture a lethal operation conducted solely by 
robot, however, these speculations are also overblown.  According to a retired naval aviator Jay 
Stout, who advises the Navy on training UAV pilots, the military will not use unmanned systems 
for “hunter-killer” missions because human operators will need to be held responsible for 
targeting mishaps.28  Moreover, autonomous technology is still in its infancy and lacks critical 
technological skills such as the ability to sense and avoid other aircraft.  
 While these major technological advancements and the use of remotely piloted vehicles in 
lethal counterterrorism missions have raised profound ethical questions, drone technology is 
rapidly advancing and its use will undoubtedly continue in targeted strikes by the military and 
CIA.  Using new technology has been a trend in targeted killings for decades and has been one of 
the most debated issues in modern targeted lethal policy.  While technology is important to 
policy, the fears surrounding it are often overblown and it should be apparent that a state seeks 
use of technology with the greatest precision that protects its own soldiers.   
 
Preemption and Imminence  
 Signature strikes and targeted killings are preemptive in nature.  The White House 
authorizes the use of preemptive force under the expectation that an adversary will attack and 
that striking first is better.29  A concept that goes hand-in-hand with preemption is determining 
whether an attack is imminent.  John Yoo, an attorney in the Bush administration, wrote, 
“Imminence classically depends on timing.  Only when a attack is soon to occur, and thus 
                                                            
28 Jay Stout, interview with author (Washington D.C., August 2013). 
29 Mueller et. al,  Striking First, 6-8. 
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certain, can a nation use force in preemptive self-defense.”30  The Obama administration 
explicitly outlines imminence as a criterion for a targeted killing.  Eric Holder, the Attorney 
General, wrote in a leaked White Paper, “an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government 
has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
United States.”31  
 In the historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes, imminence and 
preemption were not always explicitly used as justification by the presiding administrations.  It is 
possible, however, to infer preemption in many of the operations.  NSDD 138 was the most 
explicit reference to using preemptive tactics to counter terrorism, although it is impossible to 
know whether those tactics would have been lethal because the Reagan administration never 
implemented the neutralization policy.  The targeted killings on Yamamoto, Bin Laden, and 
Awlaki all highlight the possibilities of preemptive justification.  Yamamoto was the architect of 
Pearl Harbor and the Commander during Midway, as such, military and national security 
advisors could reason that he would orchestrate a surprise attack on U.S. forces again; therefore, 
the Roosevelt administration could justify the air raid as preemptive.  Bin Laden, by 1998, 
attacked several U.S. assets around the world and intelligence revealed he was planning to attack 
more targets, which he did in the USS Cole bombings and September 11. Anwar al-Alwaki was 
an ideologue turned operator who plotted several attacks against the United States and inspired 
many more, and therefore, there was a clear expectation he would continue to target Americans.  
Signature strikes are preemptive by design.  They kill militants who American officials deem 
pose an imminent threat to the United States.  
                                                            
30 Yoo, “Assassinations of Targeted Killings after 9/11,” 73. 
31 “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-
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 The technology raises the issue of imminence—and by extension,  preemption—which 
drives signature strikes.  Using armed drones allows the pilot to see militants in the early stages 
of any imminent attack.  For example, a militant might be handling explosives or training in an al 
Qaeda compound for an attack that could happen in a day, in a month, or in a year, which raises 
the question: How soon is imminent?  Juan Zarate, the Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Counterterrorism in the Bush administration, stated in an interview that the Obama 
administration has greatly expanded the concept of imminence.  Zarate stated:  
The Obama administration widened the justification for imminence.  It doesn’t 
require any definition of imminent attack.  The notion of preemption changed 
because it was no longer clear imminence, it morphed into a sort of persistent 
imminence.  Eric Holder describes this in his speech and leaked White Paper as a 
“window of opportunity.”  And that window of opportunity has widened.  For 
example the traditional examples of imminence are when tanks are ordered on the 
border, ships are headed towards the harbor, and aircraft are headed into sovereign 
airspace, that is imminence. Now, that concept has changed to they have tanks, 
ships, and airplanes.32 
 
 Preemption has always been implicitly involved in targeted strikes because policymakers 
are looking to eliminate an individual before that individual can attack the state.  Yet even 
though preemption has been associated with targeted strikes, the shift in imminence is evident 
because of UAV technology.  The ability to spy on militants who are performing nefarious 
actions, but may not be explicitly planning an attack on the United States, forms the basis of 
signature strike policy.  This new definition of imminence, which has long been a studied in 
warfare, raises the moral question of when it is too soon to kill an enemy.  While imminence is a 
linchpin justification for the use of preemptive lethal force, it would be prudent to reconsider 
narrowing the “window of opportunity.”33  If leaders continue to expand the concept of 
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33 Ibid.  
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imminence they might begin to make war solely because another nation or actor has “tanks, 
ships, or airplanes.”  
 Expanding internationally recognized concepts such as imminence increases the risk of 
stretching legal authorities.  If the future administrations justify signature strikes because of 
persistent imminence they have to expand legal authorities to match their new preemptive 
authorities.  As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, administrations have a working platter of 
legal justifications to choose from and each administration uses different authorities.   Presidents 
Reagan and Clinton used Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to justify their strikes.  The 
Bush administration used Constitutional authority.  Meanwhile, President Obama has embedded 
his administration’s legal authority in the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force.  
Instead of authorizing strikes from presidential authority, the Obama administration grounded 
their justications in the 2001 AUMF.  Rewriting international and domestic law and 
internationally recognized concepts—such as imminence—sends a message to other nations that 
they too can alter accepted norms as they see fit.   
 
Bureaucratic Factions 
 The debates within the National Security Council over NSDD 138, arming the MQ-1 
Predator, and the use of signature strikes reveal that lethal action often forms strong bureaucratic 
factions within the White House.  In 1984, Secretary of Defense Weinberger did not want to 
retaliate for Hezbollah’s attacks on American assets in Lebanon while Secretary of State Schultz 
did.34  When the CIA and the DOD were testing the capability of arming a Predator drone, James 
Pavvitt—a senior officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations—vehemently opposed the CIA 
                                                            
34 Mattia Toaldo, “The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon and Libya as Case 
Studies,” New Middle Eastern Studies 2, (2012): 3-4. 
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using an armed drone to kill terrorists because he believed it constituted assassination.35  When 
the signature strike policy was in its infancy, factions within the CIA and DOD opposed the 
practice at different times.36  
 Factionalization is a hallmark of any bureaucracy and should occur because it encourages 
public debate.  Unfortunately, administrations are not likely to publicize that there are clear 
factions within their administration surrounding a certain policy.  Thus, it usually falls on 
journalists and reporters to expose those factions or to former officials exposing internal disputes 
in memoirs.37  Therefore, while it is unlikely to assume an administration will expose its internal 
debates, it is reassuring to know that lethal policies are being debated inside the halls of the 
White House. 
 
Public Support  
 This thesis did not explicitly measure the public support to every targeted killing.  There 
are too many variables to calculate—international citizen reaction, international leader reaction, 
Congressional reaction, American public reaction, and historical revisionist reactions.  There are 
generalizations, however, that this thesis will make.  These generalizations are all relative to how 
Americans respond to targeted lethal force.  As opposed to how foreign nations and their citizens 
respond, because the focus of this thesis is on American, not international, historical precedents.   
  Two factors theoretically lead to stronger American responses to the use of targeted lethal 
force.  The first is the target’s value.  The public’s support will be more positive if the threat is 
greater.  Unquestionably, the two most well-received targeted killings in American history were 
                                                            
35 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 581. 
36 Entous, “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal. 
37 Robert Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, highlights many factions within the Bush and Obama 
administrations over defense policy.  His memoir, however, does not reveal any specific inter-administration 
arguments on targeted lethal strikes.  Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
2014). 
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the air raid on Admiral Yamamoto and the 2011 Special Forces raid on Osama bin Laden.  Both 
of these operations were euphorically welcomed because each man had precipitated a devastating 
loss of life, creating a special hatred for them.  The primary differentiating factor between both 
of these targeted killings, however, is the second factor—when the President announced the 
operation.  In the case of Yamamoto, reporters did not announce Yamamoto’s death until a 
month after Japanese radio had mourned his death.  Then, when asked, Roosevelt responded with 
“Gosh!”38  When the White House did reveal that American aviators had killed Yamamoto, it 
coincided with the official Japanese surrender of World War II.  Therefore, the euphoria for the 
operation overlapped with the America victory of World War II and it is difficult to bifurcate 
those public reactions.  Nevertheless, the Yamamoto killing is an example of when the target 
value was high and executive transparency was low.   
 On the other hand, in the Bin Laden 2011 raid, both the target value and the executive 
transparency were high.  Americans turned to their televisions and computers when news began 
to leak that a strike force had killed Osama bin Laden.  Many Americans watched President 
Obama’s televised address when he announced the success of the mission.  The Awlaki drone 
strike, on the other hand, is a mixed case.  From an operational perspective, Awlaki’s target 
value was high, but the Yemeni cleric did not earn the same public hatred as Bin Laden or 
Yamamoto.  Awlaki’s American citizenship complicated the public reaction.  President Obama 
did announce Awlaki’s death the morning after it occurred, but the administration remained 
remarkably quiet once reporters discovered that an American drone accidentally killed Awlaki’s 
son two weeks later.39    
                                                            
38 “‘Gosh!’” Says Roosevelt On Death of Yamamoto,” The New York Times, May 21, 2013. 
39 For President Obama’s speech regarding the Awlaki operation see: Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at 
the ‘Change of Office’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony,” (speech, Fort Meyers, VA, September 30, 
2011), The White House. 
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 A final factor that affects American reaction is the domestic political landscape.  The 2011 
Bin Laden targeted killing resulted in Americans dancing in the streets, but when the Clinton 
administration had targeted Bin Laden in 1998, Americans were indifferent.  The Clinton 
administration’s 1998 cruise missile strike against Bin Laden occurred before September 11, 
2001, the notable event that unleashed America’s hatred for him.  The ongoing Monica 
Lewinsky scandal caused a number of Americans to view the 1998 missile strike on Bin Laden 
with indifference and, in some cases, contempt.  Rating the domestic political landscape is nearly 
impossible because the Executive Branch is unable to control the landscape.  Therefore, two 
factors theoretically contribute to positive American reaction to targeted killings as seen in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Hypothetical Public Support for Targeted Operations 
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 The most positive public support to targeted strikes theoretically will occur when the target 
value is high and executive transparency is high.  Using the same logic, the most negative 
reaction will occur when target value and executive transparency are low.  The other example 
worth noting is the CIA’s assassination attempts in the Cold War, which resulted in negative 
public reactions.  Assassinations are different from targeted killings because the former are 
illegal.  Nevertheless, the executive transparency was very low and the CIA plotted the 
operations in secrecy against a range of targets.  The most notorious target of these proposed 
assassinations, however, was Fidel Castro.  Public reaction where a low target value is coupled 
with high executive transparency, and high target value is coupled with low executive 
transparency are both noted as neutral; however the public will more likely respond better to the 
death of a high-value target (thus neutral to positive), as it did in the Yamamoto raid, even when 
transparency is low.  There is also no real precedent for announcing low-value strikes with high 
executive transparency because there are not many scenarios where the public would be grateful 
that the president informed them the military targeted low-level militants.  The only possible 
scenarios is if the president was clarifying an operational mistake, which certainly would not 
result in positive public support.  At this point, subsequent administrations will certainly follow 
President Obama’s lead and publicly announce the death of extremely high-value targets.  
 This thesis did not explicitly track American public reaction to targeted killings, but 
examining the history does allow for certain inferences.  Therefore, to complement Figure 3 and 
to use the historical precedents and cases (CIA Cold War assassinations) discussed in this thesis, 
Figure 4 charts observed public reaction to lethal targeted strikes.  As noted, it would be bizarre 
for an executive administration to have high transparency for a low-value target unless an 
egregious error occurred.  Therefore, the quadrant for high transparency and low target value 
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highlights the rarity of such an event.  The major implication of this argument is that high-value 
targets and executive transparency are the two most important factors in determining positive 
American reaction to the use of targeted lethal force.    
 
 
Figure 4:  Observed Public Support for Select Targeted Operations 1943-2011 
 
 
 
 
Policy Model 
 Given these historical precedents and trends, what does an ideal theoretical policy look like 
for targeted lethal force?  The best way to propose such a model is to create a mock example of a 
ideal targeted killing operation: 
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  The American intelligence community has compiled the movements and motivations of an 
individual who poses an imminent threat to the United States, which is based on a pattern of 
attempts or disrupted plots to attack the homeland or vital American interests around the globe.  
The President, after soliciting council from his administration through inter-administration 
debates, authorizes the intelligence community to mobilize its resources to find the target.  The 
intelligence community then finds and fixes the target’s location.  After the intelligence 
community fixes its location, the President ultimately decides whether the operation is the best 
course of action and will adhere to the principles of distinction and proportionality.  Then, the 
President authorizes the strike and the intelligence community supports the military by handing 
over all targeting data and reverse sheep-dips its targeting analysts to work for the military 
community for the operation.  Then, military drones carry out the operation while the 
intelligence community’s targeting analysts provide support.  After the operation, the President 
addresses the nation because the individual was an extreme high-value target.  If the target was 
a high-value target but not publicly known, the administration releases information on the 
individual’s past operations and plots against the United States, explaining why the individual 
posed an imminent threat.  In addition, all information that does not spoil future operations or 
intelligence sources is released to the public.  Specifically, the information regarding where, 
when, and why the individual was targeted, the host government’s consent, and any collateral 
damage reported in the operation is released publicly if such information does not compromise 
future operations or intelligence sources. 
 This would be an ideal targeted killing operation.  Unfortunately, however, many of these 
characteristics are not possible today.  The most problematic issue is the role of the CIA and the 
military in conducting lethal operations.  In addition, it may not be feasible for the executive 
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branch or participating agencies to release details of its agreements with host nations, as the 
agreements are mired in complexity and often the host nations wish to keep secret their role in 
allowing American drones in their airspace.  Nevertheless, these trends and this theoretical 
model make it possible to propose three recommendations for America’s lethal drone policy.   
 
Policy Recommendations 
 There are many elements and questions relating to counterterrorism drone policy that this 
thesis cannot answer.  History does not answer all of the questions; however, it can provide 
guidance to some.  All of these policy recommendations rest on one overriding assumption: the 
executive branch will continue to authorize lethal counterterrorism strikes for years to come.  
There are three concrete policy recommendations that are rooted in historical precedents for 
targeted killings and signature strikes.   
1. The Executive Branch should only authorize targeted killings and stop signature 
strikes. 
 
2. The Central Intelligence Agency should be the sole organization in charge of 
conducting targeted killings.   
 
3. The Executive Branch should announce the CIA’s mandate to conduct targeted 
killings and release the targeting “playbook.”  
 
 
 
 
1. The Executive Branch should only conduct targeted killings and stop signature strikes.  
 The White House should eliminate the signature strikes policy.  Targeting individuals by 
characteristics alone, under the justification of persistent imminence, expands the concept of 
imminence too far and is a dangerous precedent to set.  Technological innovations and a public 
appetite for counterterrorism have expanded the concept of imminence too wide.  It is easy to 
explain how a known individual poses an imminent threat to the United States by looking at that 
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individual’s past actions.  It is also possible to convey that individual’s misdeeds to the public 
after the strike.  It is impossible, however, to assess an individual’s plots or operations when the 
state does not know the identity of the individual, which also eliminates the opportunity to 
announce the proposed beneficial ramifications of the strike to the public afterwards.  
 Signature strikes also set a dangerous precedent in the international arena.  If other 
nations decide to conduct lethal operations to counter terrorism or other national security threats, 
the White House’s targeted killings policy sets a better example than it’s signature strike policy.  
The White House is significantly more transparent when it targets individuals than when it 
targets militants based on their behavior.  When a government specifically identifies the 
individual it is targeting, it also makes it possible for scholars, reporters, international 
institutions, and the public to assess whether that person poses an imminent threat and the merits 
of the government’s justifications for the targeted killing.  It is impossible to do the same for 
signature strikes.  The executive branch, based on its past strikes, has a set of criteria for 
signature strikes such as: a militant is handling explosives, traveling in an armed convoy towards 
a conflict, or training in a known al Qaeda facility.  The Bush or Obama administrations have 
never explicitly defined these scenarios; these criteria are only inferred through reports.  Thus, 
another nation’s signature strike policy is open to their own government’s interpretation, which 
is especially disconcerting when considering some of the world’s more repressive regimes.  
 Signature strikes may be effective at killing threats by chance, but the pros of signature 
strikes do not outweigh the cons.  Signature strikes may be more effective in active duty war 
zones when there are troops on the ground and armed drones use the policy for force protection.  
Signature strikes in limited lethal counterterrorism operations, however, are out of place.  The 
chances of a signature strike going awry and killing scores of civilians is much higher than a 
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targeted operation against a well-known individual because the scenarios for signature strikes are 
widely open to the pilot or targeting analyst’s interpretation.  In addition, if the Executive Branch 
decides it needs to continue to kill terrorists outside of active war zones in the future, signature 
strikes run the risk of severely damaging relations with host nations.  Many locals where the CIA 
and military conduct lethal drone operations—most notably in Pakistan—severely oppose 
American counterterrorism policy.   
 If the CIA and military conduct too many unsuccessful or collateral damage-ridden 
signature strikes, as country, the perpetrating agency runs the risk of nullifying the host nation’s 
agreement to allow American UAVs in their airspace.  There has yet to be firm reports of leaders 
from Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia threatening to ban American UAVs from their airspace.  The 
recently reported negotiations between Pakistani leaders and American policymakers about 
curbing low-value strikes, however, signal that foreign nations will use their airspace as a 
diplomatic bargaining chip.40  Nullifying the agreement would then eliminate any opportunity to 
target high-value individuals without the host country’s specific consent.  If the reports are true 
that the Obama administration agreed to scale back its strikes in Pakistan and only target high-
value individuals—which operationally would eliminate all signature strikes—then American 
officials are already moving towards this recommendation.41   
 
                                                            
40 For reporting on this negotiation see: Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. to Curb Pakistan Drone 
Program,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579365112070806176. 
41 For reports of the shift in policy in Pakistan, see: Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. to Curb Pakistan 
Drone Program,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579365112070806176; Karen DeYoung  and 
Greg Miller, “U.S. said to curtail drone strikes in Pakistan as officials there seek peace with Taliban,” Washington 
Post, February 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-
pakistan-as-officials-there-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-11e3-833c-
33098f9e5267_story.html. 
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2.  The Central Intelligence Agency should be the sole organization in charge of conducting 
targeted killings.   
 After President Obama’s counterterrorism speech in May 2013, the media’s consensus 
was that the Executive Branch would shift the control of armed drones from the CIA to the 
military.42  The question of who should run America’s armed drones to counter terrorism has 
been a question since “The Predator Initiative.”43  When the Bush administration was debating 
who should run the armed predator program in 2001, George Tenet, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, raised a series of key questions.  According to the 9/11 Commission, Tenet 
wondered, “What is the chain of command?  Who takes the shot?  Are America’s leaders 
comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control?”44  
These questions over command have only become more complex in the past decade because the 
CIA and JSOC both run parallel drone programs.  
 In January 2014, the United States Congress blocked the move by adding provisions in 
the classified portion of the Federal Budget making it more difficult to transfer the CIA’s armed 
drones to the military, presumably the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).45  The CIA 
should be the sole organization in charge of targeted killings for one very good reason: the CIA 
is better at targeted killings.  The CIA has more intelligence sources, which makes for accurate 
targeting data, less civilian casualties, and a more rigorous decision-making process.46   
                                                            
42 Eric Schmitt, “Congress Restricts Drone Program Shift,” New York Times, January 16, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/us/politics/congress-restricts-drones-program-shift.html?_r=0. 
43 DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central 
Intelligence Agency Analytic Report, March 19, 2004, 60. 
44 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 211. 
45 Greg Miller, “Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to Pentagon,” 
Washington Post, January 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-
stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-
4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html. 
46 Greg Miller, “Obama’s new drone policy leaves room for CIA role,” Washington Post, May 25, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obamas-new-drone-policy-has-cause-for-
concern/2013/05/25/0daad8be-c480-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html; Schmitt, “Congress Restricts Drone 
Program Shift.” 
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 On the surface, it makes more sense for JSOC to run the counterterrorism drone program. 
Many authorities on lethal policy assume that JSOC will take the reins on America’s drone 
program.  Owen Cote, a Security Studies expert who specializes in military operations at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, stated in an author interview, “The CIA will stop 
conducting operations at some point and JSOC will take over.  JSOC is gearing up for the shift.  
JSOC was a killing machine in Iraq.  They would conduct kill-capture raids every night, collect 
the intelligence, and run the next operation.”47  There are two lethal drone programs in Yemen; 
the CIA operates one and JSOC operates the other.  JSOC was the first organization to have 
authority over Yemen, but the CIA was given the authorization to expand to Yemen because 
JSOC made several mistakes including targeting the wrong individuals.48  Moreover, Congress’s 
decision to block the transition is presumed to be influenced by the poorly executed strike on 
December 12, 2013, when JSOC controlled drones killed several civilians, tribal leaders, and 
possibly members of a Yemeni wedding party.49  If the United States Government is going to kill 
individuals around the world with a UAV, correct and accurate execution of the operation is 
more important than which agency controls it.  Although JSOC has experience running Special 
Forces raids in Iraq, the CIA has more experience running lethal drone programs. 
 The CIA is an intelligence organization, not a killing organization.  The CIA, however, is 
an intelligence organization that has superior results with targeted killings.  Targeted killings are 
intelligence driven operations.  The first two legs of a find-fix-finish mission are contingent on 
intelligence.  In addition, the “finish” portion of the operation will only be as successful as the 
intelligence is accurate.  This mission is better suited for the CIA.  After September 11, the CIA 
                                                            
47 Owen Cote, interview with author (telephone, March 2014). 
48 Miller, “Obama’s new drone policy leaves room for CIA role.” 
49 Schmitt, “Congress Restricts Drone Program Shift;.” Zaid Ali and Laura King, “U.S. Drone Strike on Yemen 
wedding party kills 17,” Los Angeles Times, December 13, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/13/world/la-
fg-wn-yemen-drone-strike-wedding-20131213. 
Mencini 
 
143 
swelled with a new class of counterterrorism analysts and targeters who spent over a decade 
hunting terrorist targets in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The CIA has more resources to ensure their 
intelligence is correct.  The CIA also has the ability to use human intelligence in their targeted 
killings, which proved useful in the Anwar al-Awlaki strike.50 
 The CIA was also the first organization to conduct armed drone strikes.  The Agency 
therefore, has created an infrastructure and targeting processes around it.  The drone theatre in 
Pakistan is by far the most pervasive in terms of frequency of strikes and longevity of the 
program.  As a result, the CIA has more experience finding, fixing, and finishing terrorists with 
an armed drone.  The CIA’s experience and seasoned personnel translate to more precise results.  
Austin Long is a scholar at Columbia who specializes in counterinsurgency and has spent time as 
an embedded researcher with Special Forces teams.  Long stated in an author interview, that the 
while JSOC has expanded rapidly over the last decade with massive increases in personnel, “The 
Agency has cadres of personnel who are more refined and have better TTP [tactics, techniques 
and procedures].”51  These tactics lead to greater precision.  Long stated, “In some cases the 
Agency may launch four drones for one strike.  One may designate the target.  One may fire the 
weapons system.  But one’s job is solely to evaluate possible collateral damage.”52  Long argues 
that these procedures help alleviate tunnel vision for the pilots by flying multiple drones on one 
mission, each with different responsibilities.  Long stated, “When you are looking at a screen you 
get so fixed on the target it is sometimes difficult to see a passing car or civilian.”53  Thus, the 
CIA not only has more seasoned targeters with better intelligence resources, they also have better 
techniques honed through more years of experience conducting drone strikes.   
                                                            
50 For more on the human intelligence operation in the Awlaki strike see: Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage, and Scott 
Shane, “How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs,” The New York Times, March 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html. 
51 Austin Long, interview with author, (telephone: March 2014).  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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 The obvious counterpoint to this recommendation is that the CIA is an intelligence 
agency and allowing the CIA to conduct targeted killings in the future is outside the mission of 
the CIA.  This shift in CIA culture has already happened.  The attacks on September 11 
galvanized American leaders to do whatever it took to hunt down terrorists.  In effect, the focus 
on striking down terrorists eliminated any equivocations that top CIA leadership had at the time 
about returning to killing operations.  At this point in U.S. national security policy, it is more 
important that the government conduct its operations diligently and effectively, taking every 
opportunity to account for false intelligence and active civilian presence.  The CIA already has 
the resources and, after September 11, the authorization to kill terrorists.   
 The other counterargument is whether CIA personnel would support continuing targeted 
killings.  According to the media, the most adamant advocate within the CIA to end its lethal 
strikes is John Brennan, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.54  Brennan was the 
architect of the Obama administration’s targeted strikes program when he the Obama’s Deputy 
National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism.  He was also the primary driver behind the 
disposition matrix—the software that tracks and prioritizes identified targets.55  During 
Brennan’s confirmation hearing as Director of the CIA, he stated, “The C.I.A. should not be 
doing traditional military activities and operations.”56  Brennan’s opposition is surprising given 
his influence in amplifying the Obama administration’s drone strikes and his decision to transfer 
the responsibility to hunt Awlaki from JSOC to the CIA.57  Nevertheless, the media reports 
                                                            
54 Mark Mazzetti, “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War,” New York Times, April 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-war.html?smid=nytnow-
share&smprod=nytnow&_r=0.  
55 Greg Miller, “Plan for hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists,” Washington Post, 
October 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-
intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_print.html. 
56 Mazzetti, “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War.” 
57 Hakim Almasmari, Margaret Coker, and Siobhan Gorman, “Drone Kills Top Al Qaeda Figure,” The Wall Street 
Journal, October 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602301252340820 
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Brennan aims to refocus the agency on analysis because of the CIA’s less-than-stellar analytical 
performance in forecasting the Arab Spring.58  Mazzetti reports, that the predominant faction 
within the CIA to continue targeted strikes is the Counterterrorism Center.  The CTC also has the 
support of Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman, Dianne Feinstein, because of the 
Pentagon’s causality prone strikes.59  Refocusing the agency to emphasize analysis over 
counterterrorism does not nullify this thesis’s recommendation.  The dilemma this 
recommendation looks to solve is not whether the CIA should kill terrorists.  The question is if 
the White House is going to continue to authorize targeted lethal action: Which agency will be 
the most diligent, cautious, and precise?  The solution to that question is the CIA.   
 This recommendation hinges on the reporting accuracy of the disparities between JSOC 
and the CIA.  If, as reported, the CIA is more diligent in their decision-making process and more 
accurate in their strikes, the decision should be clear—JSOC should stop running the operations.  
While the CIA already has authority to conduct lethal force, presumably by classified executive 
order, the CIA should retain its ability to conduct targeted operations by expanding the 
organization’s operational jurisdiction to Title 10 authority solely when conducting targeted 
killings for counterterrorism purposes.60  In summation, if the Executive Branch is going to 
authorize operations to continue to kill terrorists, the organization in charge should be the 
organization that is best at the job.  The Obama administration justifies targeted strikes as 
adhering to the principles of distinction and proportionately.  The CIA is superior in gathering 
intelligence and is better at minimizing collateral damage, which means saving innocent lives.  
On a final note, senior officials in the CIA undoubtedly remember the Church Committee and its 
                                                            
58 Mazzetti, “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War.” 
59 Ibid. 
60 It is presumed that after September 11, President George W. Bush authorized the CIA to conduct lethal operations 
against al Qaeda.  Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, “C.I.A Had Plans to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders,” New York 
Times, July 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/14intel.html?_r=0. 
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affect on the CIA.  The American people have already brought the nation’s premier human 
intelligence agency to its knees once in 1975, and it is safe to assume that CIA decision-makers 
want to ensure that never happens again.  
 
3. The Executive Branch should announce the CIA’s mandate to conduct targeted killings 
and release the targeting “playbook.”  
 The third and final recommendation rests on the implementation of the second.  If the 
CIA is going to retain control over lethal counterterrorism strikes, the public should know that 
the intelligence agency is going to continue targeted killings.  There are two steps to 
implementing this change.  First, the White House needs to declassify parts of the “playbook” for 
targeted strikes.  Second, the Executive Branch needs to write a new mandate authorizing the 
CIA to carry out targeted killings solely for counterterrorism purposes.  There have been 
numerous press reports that the National Security Council created a “playbook,” which outlines 
the Obama administration’s procedures for targeting terrorists. 61  The National Security Council 
playbook contains a myriad of sensitive material and is a classified document.  The report in full 
does not need to be declassified because it would most likely compromise agreements with host 
nations, reveal special technologies, and expose informants.  The only substantive material that 
the Executive Branch should declassify is the institutional process for approving lethal strikes.  
Americans are still sensitive to terrorists’ threats and, for the most part, support counterterrorism 
agendas; however, it would be preferred to know the procedures that the government uses for 
killing terrorists and militants.  How many people review the list of priority individuals?  Who 
                                                            
61 Karen DeYoung, “A CIA veteran transforms U.S. counterterrorism policy,” Washington Post, October 24, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-veteran-john-brennan-has-transformed-us-
counterterrorism-policy/2012/10/24/318b8eec-1c7c-11e2-ad90-ba5920e56eb3_story.html;  
Greg Miller, Ellen Nakashima, and Karen DeYoung, “CIA drone strikes will get pass in counterterrorism 
‘playbook,’ officials say,” January 19, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-
19/world/36474007_1_drone-strikes-cia-director-playbook.  
Michael Crowley, “Holder: Obama’s New Drone Strike ‘Playbook’ Has Arrived,” Time, May 22, 2013, 
http://swampland.time.com/2013/05/22/holder-obamas-new-drone-strike-playbook-has-arrived/. 
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makes decisions for the priority of certain individuals?  What is the nominating process for 
adding new extremists to the list?  These are all questions the executive branch could answer by 
releasing a version of the secretive “playbook.” 
 The CIA’s new mandate should address covert authority, include an executive order, and 
outline Congress’s role in the new targeted killings program.  The NSC needs to sift through the 
logistical details to determine whether to conduct operations under covert authority or not.  The 
host nation’s citizens should see that the United States government is conducting lethal 
operations; therefore, the White House and CIA should end the era of keeping the intelligence 
agency’s hand in armed drone strikes hidden.  The Executive Branch should formally authorize 
the CIA to conduct targeted killings by declassifying the original executive order in the Bush 
administration that expanded the Agency’s responsibilities.  Alternatively and preferably, the 
NSC should draft a new executive order with Congressional input.  In this new executive order, 
the White House should outline why the CIA will continue targeted killings by highlighting its 
successes and failures in the part decade.  In addition, the mandate should provide full legal 
justifications for the Agency’s new role in counterterrorism.  Finally, the new mandate for the 
CIA should include new responsibilities for Congressional intelligence oversight committees to 
oversee the program and allow the committees complete access to the disposition matrix and all 
operations.   
w w w 
 Since September 11, 2001 the Bush and Obama administrations have conventionalized 
the use of targeted lethal force, but they did not inaugurate the policy.  For decades, American 
Presidents have waged war by precisely targeting enemies and killing them.  Today’s operations 
only differ from those in prior decades because of their technology and frequency.  These 
operations will undoubtedly continue, as will the debates surrounding them.  Open debate is a 
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fundamental feature of democracy and will only serve to clarify the nation’s position on using 
lethal force.  The impetus is to look forward when considering how, why, and when the 
American government should act with lethal resolve, yet it is equally important to look 
backwards.  Understanding the past debates about killing individual enemies will only serve to 
enlighten the contemporary debates.  Recognizing that our leaders have authorized these 
operations in years past is fundamental to understanding today’s events.  Extracting the lessons 
from history not only teaches us where we have been, it can provide a roadmap for where we are 
and should be going.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mencini 
 
149 
AUTHOR INTERVIEWS 
 
Byman, Daniel.  Professor, Security Studies Program, at Georgetown University. Interview 
conducted in Washington D.C.: August 2013. 
 
CIA Case Officer.  Interview conducted by telephone: February 2013. 
 
CIA Intelligence Analyst.  Interview conducted by telephone: January 2013. 
 
Crumpton, Hank.  Retired CIA Case Officer and Ambassador for Counterterrorism.  Interview 
conducted by telephone: August 2013.  
 
Cote, Owen.  Associate Director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies 
Program.  Interview conducted by Telephone: March 2014. 
 
De Borchgrave, Arnaud. Director and Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats Project, at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.  Interview conducted in Washington D.C.: 
November 2014. 
 
FBI Intelligence Analyst. Interview by telephone: February 2014. 
 
Jones, Seth.  Associate Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, at the RAND 
Corporation. Interview conducted in Washington D.C.: July 2013. 
 
Khong, Yuen Foong.  Professor of International Relations at Oxford University.  Interview 
conducted by email: March 2014.  
 
L3 Communications Engineer.  Interview conducted in Washington D.C.: August 2013.  
 
Long, Austin.  Assistant Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia 
University. Interview conducted by telephone: March 2014. 
 
Mazzetti, Mark.  National Security Reporter at The New York Times. Interview conducted in 
Washington D.C.: July 2013 and August 2013.  
 
Reid, J.R., Military Liaison for General Atomics.  Interview conducted in Washington D.C.: 
August 2013.  
 
Stout, Jay.  Retired Naval Aviator.  Interview conducted in Washington D.C.: August 2013.  
 
Sulick, Michael.  Former Director of the CIA National Clandestine Service.  Interview conducted 
by telephone, February 2014. 
 
Zarate, Juan.  Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism.  Interview by 
conducted in Cambridge, MA: March 2014. 
Mencini 
 
150 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adhan, Rafsheen .“The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killings,” Journal of 
National Security Law and Policy 339 (2012): 259-288. 
 
Al-Awlaki, Nasser.  “The Drone that Killed My Grandson,” The New York Times, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/the-drone-that-killed-my-grandson.html. 
 
Ali, Zaid, and Laura King. “U.S. Drone Strike on Yemen wedding party kills 17,” Los Angeles 
Times, December 13, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/13/world/la-fg-wn-
yemen-drone-strike-wedding-20131213. 
 
Almasmari, Hakim, Margaret Coker, and Siobhan Gorman. “Drone Kills Top Al Qaeda Figure,” 
The Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602301252340820. 
 
Alston, Philip. “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders,” Harvard National Security 
Journal 2, (2011): 283-446.  
 
______. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” 
United Nations General Assembly, (Human Rights Council: Fourteenth session, May 28 
2010).  
 
Ambinder, Marc, and D. B. Grady. The Command: Deep Inside the President’s Secret Army. 
Wiley, 2012. 
 
Ambrose, Stephen E, and Richard H Immerman. Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage 
Establishment. New York: Anchor Books, 2012. 
 
Anderson, Kenneth and Benjamin Wittes. “What, If Anything Is Strategically New About 
Weaponized Drones?,” Strategika 10, (2014): 14-18.  
 
Anderson, Kenneth, “Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law,” Working 
Paper between the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University Law Center, and Hoover 
Institution (2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%
20anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.pdf. 
 
Andradé, Dale. Ashes to Ashes  : The Phoenix program and the Vietnam War. Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books, 1990. 
 
Andrew, Christopher. For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. 
 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 107th Congress 2001-2002 (September 18, 2001). 
 
Mencini 
 
151 
Banks, William. Peter Raven-Hansen. “Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal 
Framework.” University of Richmond Law Review 37 (2003): 1-80. 
 
Beaumont, Roger. “Targeting Military Leaders.” In Lightning Over Bougainville, ed. R. Cargill 
Hall. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990.  
 
Becker, Jo, and Scott Shane. “Secret ‘Kill List’ Tests Obama’s Principles.” The New York Times, 
May 29, 2012, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-
leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html. 
 
Beecher, William. “Seeking an Answer to Terrorism,” Boston Globe, October 26, 1984, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Bellitteri, Thomas. “Drone Warfare: Are Strikes by Unmanned Aircraft Ethical.” CQ Researcher 
20, no. 18 (August 6, 2010): 655–675. 
 
Bergen, Peter. Written testimony, “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism 
Implications of Targeted Killing,” Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, (Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2013). 
 
Blitz, James and Matthew Green. “CIA drone kills ‘most dangerous al-Qaeda cleric,” Financial 
Times, September 30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/48305e6e-eb42-11e0-adbf-
00144feab49a.html. 
 
Breitman, Richard. U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Brennan, John .“The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy.” (Speech, 
Washington, D.C., April 30, 2012). Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100. 
 
______. “Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws." (Speech, 
Cambridge, MA, September 16, 2011). The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-
values-an. 
 
Brooks, Rosa. “Drones in Our Time.” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2013. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/23/drones_in_our_time?page=full. 
 
Brown, Alyssa, and Frank Newport.  “In U.S. 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists 
Abroad,” Gallup, March 25, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-
attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx. 
 
Burke, Jason. “Demise of al Qaida’s ‘Number Three’,” The Guardian, January 31, 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/31/alqaida.afghanistan. 
 
Mencini 
 
152 
 
Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
 
______. “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice.” Foreign Affairs 
92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43. 
 
Campbell, Leah.  “Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike 
Sudan and Afghanistan,” Tulane Law Review 74, (1999): 1067-1096. 
 
Cave Brown, Anthony. The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan. New York, N.Y.: Times Books, 
1982. 
 
Chesney, Robert. “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 
Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5, (2012): 539-629. 
 
______.“The Use of Force Regime and Unconventional Threats: Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case 
Study.” In Counterinsurgency Law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare, ed. Williams 
Banks. Oxford, UK:Oxford University Press, 2013, 162-177. 
 
“Chief of Jap Fleet Killed Fighting U.S.” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 21, 1932, Proquest 
Historical Newspapers. 
 
Cline, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan, Bush & Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from 
Roosevelt to Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981. 
 
Clinton, William. “Address to the Nation by the President,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., August 
20, 1988), http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/08/1998-08-20-president-address-to-the-
nation.html. 
 
Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2008. 
 
Conyer, John, Jerrold Nadler, and Robert Scott. “Letter to Attorney General Eric Holder,” (letter, 
May 21. 2012), United States House of Representatives. 
 
______, Jerrold Nadler, Robert Scott, “Letter to Attorney General Eric Holder,” (letter, 
December 4, 2012), United States House of Representatives. 
 
“Covert Action, Loss of Life and the Prohibition on Assassination,” 1976-1996," Studies in 
Intelligence, 40, 2 (1996): 15-25. 
 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Fail.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 
(2013): 44-54. 
 
Mencini 
 
153 
Crumpton, Henry. The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service. 
NY: Penguin Books, 2013.  
 
Currier, Cora, and Justin Elliot. “The Drone War Doctrine We Still Don’t Know About,” 
realclearworld.com, February 28, 2013, 
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/02/28/the_drone_war_doctrine_we_still_don
t_know_about_100585.html. 
 
Daugherty, William J., and Mark Bowden. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 
 
Davis, Don. Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl 
Harbor. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005. 
 
Davis, Brian.  Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya. New York: 
Praeger, 1990. 
 
Davis, Burke. Get Yamamoto. California: Bantam, 1971. 
 
DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, 
Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report, March 19, 2004. 
 
“Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, 
Missouri, October 21, 1984” Library at University of Texas, Transcript, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/102184b.htm. 
 
Department of Defense, “Joint Targeting,” Joint Publication 3-60, (April 13 2007). 
 
Department of Defense. “UAV Annual Report Fiscal Year 1996,” November 6, 1996. 
 
Department of Justice. “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who 
is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or an Associated Force.” (White Paper: 2013). 
 
DeYoung, Karen. “A CIA veteran transforms U.S. counterterrorism policy,” Washington Post, 
October 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-veteran-
john-brennan-has-transformed-us-counterterrorism-policy/2012/10/24/318b8eec-1c7c-
11e2-ad90-ba5920e56eb3_story.html 
 
______. and Greg Miller, “U.S. said to curtail drone strikes in Pakistan as officials there seek 
peace with Taliban,” Washington Post, February 4, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-
pakistan-as-officials-there-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-
11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html. 
 
Doolittle, James. Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1954. 
Mencini 
 
154 
 
“Drone Wars Pakistan,” New America Foundation, database, 
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis. 
 
“Drone Wars Yemen,”  New America Foundation, database, 
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis. 
 
Dujmovic, Nicholas. “Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Applications of CIA’s 
Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War,” The Journal of Military History 76, 
no. 3 (2012): 775-808. 
 
Entous, Adam, Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes. “U.S. Relaxes Drone Rules,” Wall Street 
Journal, April 26, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304723304577366251852418174. 
 
______,. Siobhan Gorman, and Julian Barnes. “U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 4, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836. 
 
_______, and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. to Curb Pakistan Drone Program,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 5, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579365112070806176. 
 
Engel, Richard. and Robert Windrem. “CIA didn’t always know who it was killing in drone 
strikes, classified documents show,” nbcnews.com, June 5, 2013, 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/05/18781930-cia-didnt-always-know-
who-it-was-killing-in-drone-strikes-classified-documents-show?lite. 
 
“Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” The White House, 
May 23, 2013. 
 
Faint, Charles, and Marshall Harris. “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion “Feeds” The SOF Targeting 
Process.” Small Wars Journal,  January 31, 2012: 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-  
%E2%80%9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-sof-targeting-process. 
 
Finkelstein, Claire., Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman. Ed. Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetrical World. Oxford UK; Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 
 
Finlayson, Andrew. “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh 
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70,” Center 
for the Study of Intelligence 51, no. 2, (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-retrospective-on-
counterinsurgency-operations.html. 
Mencini 
 
155 
 
Finn, Peter. “Secret U.S. Memo sanctioned killing of Aulaqi,” Washington Post, September 30, 
2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-30/world/35274507_1_qaeda-drone-
strike-anwar-al-aulaqi. 
 
Foot, M. R. D.  S.O.E.: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946. London: Pimlico, 1999. 
 
Gates, Robert.  Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.  New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014. 
 
Gehrstein,  Josh. “Lawmakers sought ban on signature drone strikes,” Politico, December 2, 
2013, http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/12/lawmakers-sought-ban-on-
signature-drone-strikes-178537.html. 
 
Ghosh, Bobby. “How Dangerous is the Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki,” Time, January 13, 2010, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953426,00.html. 
 
“Gosh!’” Says Roosevelt On Death of Yamamoto,” The New York Times, May 21, 2013. 
 
Gorman, Siobhan, Adam Entous, and Devlin Barrett. “Push to Expand U.S. ‘Kill List’.” Wall 
Street Journal, February 10, 2013, sec. World News. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324906004578292371006607066.html?
mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories. 
 
Govern, Kevin “Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing Bin Laden a Legitimate Military 
Objective?.” In Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, ed. Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman. Oxford UK; Oxford University Press, 
2012, 358-359. 
 
Hall, R. Cargill, ed. Lightning over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered. 
Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 
 
Ham, Carter Graeme Lamb, Marin Leed,.“Fit for the Future: Cross-Atlantic Perspectives on 
Ground Forces,” (Lecture: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 
D.C.), June 20, 2013. 
 
Haulman, Daniel. “The Yamamoto Mission,” Air Power History (2003): 30-38.  
 
Heller, Kevin Jon. “‘One Hell of a Killing Machine:’ Signature Strikes and International Law,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11, (2013): 89-113. 
 
Henniger, Daniel. “George Schultz, Father of the Bush Doctrine,” The Hoover Digest, no. 3 
(2006), http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7920. 
 
Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1997. 
 
Mencini 
 
156 
Hill,  R. Cargill . “The Yamamoto Mission.” In Lightning Over Bougainville, ed. R. Cargill Hall. 
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990. 
 
Holder, Eric. “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” 
(Speech, Chicago, IL, March 5, 2012). The Department of Justice. 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
 
Hosmer, Stephen. Operations Against Enemy Leaders.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2001. 
 
Hunter, Thomas B. Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism. 
BookSurge Publishing, 2009. 
 
“‘I’ll Capture White House,’ Jap Admiral Bragged Year Ago.” The Washington Post. December 
17, 1941, Proquest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Texas Pan 
American Series). University of Texas Press, 2010. 
 
Irvin, David W. History of Strategic Drone Operations. Turner Publishing Company, 2003. 
 
“Japanese Admiral Killed in Combat,” The New York Times, May 21, 1943. 
 
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. “Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy 
the Viet Cong by Mark Moyar,” The American Historical Review 103, no. 4 (1998): 1354. 
 
Jespersen, Christopher. “Analogies at War: Vietnam, the Bush Administration’s War in Iraq, and 
the Search for a Usable Past.” Pacific Historical Review 74, no. 3 (August 2005): 411-
426. 
 
Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976.  
 
______. “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash.” Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 2 
(2010): 185–204.  
 
Jihbvala, Darius. “CIA Director Defends ‘Covert Actions’ Abroad,” Boston Globe, September 
14, 1974, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Johnson, Jeh. “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration.” 
(Speech, New Haven, CT, February 22, 2012). Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-
lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448. 
 
Mencini 
 
157 
Johnson, Loch. “The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern 
Intelligence Accountability,” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 2 (2008): 198-
225.  
 
______. “Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America’s Secret Foreign 
Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 1 (March 1, 1989): 81–109. 
 
Johnston, Patrick B. “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns.” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 47-
79. 
 
______. “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” Working 
Paper, (July 2013), accessed via Empirical Studies of Conflict at Princeton, 
http://esoc.princeton.edu/files/impact-us-drone-strikes-terrorism-pakistan-and-afghanistan.  
 
Jones, Seth.  Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11. New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2013. 
 
Jordan, Javier. “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against al Qaeda Central: A Case 
Study,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 4-29.  
 
Jordan, Jenna. “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation.” 
Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719-755. 
 
______. “Killing the Snake? Explaining Terrorist Group Resilience to Leadership Targeting.” 
International Security (Spring 2014), forthcoming. 
 
Kagan, Frederick. “Drones—Useful Tools in the Military’s Toolbox.” Strategika 10, (2014): 22-
23.  
 
Keegan,  John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda. New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 2003. 
 
Khong, Yuen Foong.  Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Kibbe, Jennifer D. “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors.” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March 1, 
2004): 102–115. 
 
Kilculllen, David. “Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, version 2.2, (2004): 1-
51.  
 
Klaidman, Daniel. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of Obama’s Presidency. 
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012. 
 
Mencini 
 
158 
______. “Drones: The Silent Killers,” Newsweek, May 28, 2012, 
http://www.newsweek.com/drones-silent-killers-64909. 
 
Kreps. Sarah. and Michah Zenko. “The Next Drone Wars: Preparing for Proliferation,” Foreign 
Affairs 93, no. 2 (2014): 68-79. 
 
Koh, Harold. “The Obama Administration and International Law.”  (Speech, Washington, D.C., 
March 25, 2010). The State Department. 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
 
Lamond, Grant. “Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (forthcoming, Spring 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/.  
 
Lanphier, Thomas .“Flier Who Shot Down Yamamoto Says White House Baited the Trap.” New 
York Times, September 12,1945. 
 
“Lawfulness of Lethal Operations Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior 
Organizational Leader of Al-Qaida or An Associated Force.” Department of Justice, 2013. 
 
Leary, William M. The Central Intelligence Agency, History and Documents. Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1984. 
 
Leich, Marian. “Four Bills Proposed by President Reagan to Counter Terrorism,” American 
Journal of International Law 78, no. 4 (1984): 915-928.  
 
Lipton, Eric. “U.S. Born Cleric Justifies the Killing of Civilians,” New York Times, May 23, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/world/middleeast/24awlaki.html. 
 
Lobel, Jules. “The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan,” The Yale Journal of International Law 24, (1999): 553-557.  
 
“Lockheed P-38J-10-LO Lightning,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, 
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?object=nasm_A19600295000. 
 
Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. .Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 
2011. 
 
Markey, Daniel. “A New Drone Deal for Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, August 8, 2013, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-
pakistan. 
 
 
Martin, Craig.  “Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum 
Regime.”  In Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, Ed. Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman.  Oxford, UK; Oxford University 
Press, 2012, 223-252. 
Mencini 
 
159 
 
Martin, Matt J., and Charles W. Sasser. Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and 
Afghanistan: A Pilot’s Story. Zenith Press, 2010. 
 
May, Ernest.“Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.  
 
Mazzetti, Mark. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the 
Earth. New York: Penguin Press, 2013. 
 
______. and Scott Shane, “C.I.A Had Plans to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders,” New York Times, 
July 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/14intel.html?_r=0. 
 
______.  “Delay in Effort to Refocus CIA from Drone War,” New York Times, April 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-
war.html?smid=nytnow-share&smprod=nytnow&_r=0. 
 
______. Charlie Savage, and Scott Shane, “How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross 
Hairs,” The New York Times, March 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-
americas-cross-hairs.html. 
 
McCain, John. “Letter to John Brennan,” (letter, February 6, 2013), United States Senate, 
accessed via, http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/605297-mccain-letter-to-
brennan-2-6-13#document/p6. 
 
McCrisken, Trevor. “Obama’s Drone War,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 2 
(2013): 97-122.  
 
McGurn, Barrett Papers. Wisconsin Historical Society, MSS 149AF, Box 7, Folder. Herald 
Tribune. SPIES (OSS-CIA). 
 
McSally, Martha. witness testimony, “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism 
Implications of Targeted Killing,” Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, (Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2013). 
 
Miller, Greg. “CIA Seeks to Expand Drone Fleet, Officials Say.” The Washington Post, October 
19, 2012, sec. World. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-
to-expand-drone-fleet-officials-say/2012/10/18/01149a8c-1949-11e2-bd10-
5ff056538b7c_story.html. 
 
______. Ellen Nakashima, and Karen DeYoung, “CIA drone strike will get pass in 
counterterrorism ‘playbook,’ officials say,” Washington Post, January 19, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-drone-strikes-will-get-pass-
in-counterterrorism-playbook-officials-say/2013/01/19/ca169a20-618d-11e2-9940-
6fc488f3fecd_story.html. 
Mencini 
 
160 
 
______. and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Target Killings,” Washington Post, September 1, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-focus-to-killing-
targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_story.html. 
 
______, “Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to 
Pentagon,” Washington Post, January 15, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-
to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-
11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html. 
 
______, “Obama’s new drone policy leaves room for CIA role,” Washington Post, May 25, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obamas-new-drone-policy-
has-cause-for-concern/2013/05/25/0daad8be-c480-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html; 
Schmitt, “Congress Restricts Drone Program Shift.” 
 
______. “Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists.” 
The Washington Post, November 9, 2012, sec. World. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-
signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-
a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.html. 
 
______. “Strike on Aulaqi demonstrates collaboration between CIA and military,” Washington 
Post, September 30, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-
30/world/35272700_1_lethal-operations-cia-director-qaeda. 
 
Moyar, Mark. “Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet 
Cong ,” The Journal of American History 85, no. 4 (1999):1675-1676.  
 
______. “Drones – An Evolution, Not a Revolution, in Warfare.” Strategika 10, (2014): 11-13.  
 
“MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B,” General Atomics, (Product Information Card: Received at the 
AUVSI Unmanned Systems Conference, August 2013). 
 
Mueller, Karl, Jasen Castillo, Forrest Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen.  Striking First: 
Preemptive and Preventative Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2006 
 
Mudd, Philip. “Fear Factor: In defense of Obama’s deadly signature strikes,” Foreign Policy, 
May 24, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes. 
 
Naftali, Timothy. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism.  New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 2006. 
 
Mencini 
 
161 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2004.  
 
National Security Decision Directive 30,  “Managing Terrorist Incidents,” The White House 
(April 10, 1982). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 138, “Combatting Terrorism,” The White House (April 3, 
1984), 
 
National Security Decision Directive 159,  “Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination 
Procedures,” The White House (January 18, 1985). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 176,  “Combatting Terrorism in Central America,” The 
White House (January 9, 1985). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 179,  “Task Force on Combatting Terrorism,” The White 
House (July 20, 1985). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 180,  “Civilian Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program,” The 
White House (July 19, 1985). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 205,  “Acting Against Libyan Support for Terrorism,” The 
White House (January 8, 1986). 
 
National Security Decision Directive 207,  “The National Program for Combatting Terrorism,” 
The White House (January 20, 1986). 
 
“Navy Broke Japanese Code, Causing Yamamoto’s Death,” The Washington Post, September 
11, 1945, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Neustadt, Richard, and Ernest May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. 
New York: The Free Press, 1986.  
 
Nutter, John Jacob. The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy. 
Prometheus Books, 1999. 
 
Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” (Speech, 
Washington, D.C., May 23, 2013). The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
 
 
______. “Remarks by the President at the ‘Change of Office’ Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of 
Staff Ceremony.” (Speech, Fort Meyers, VA, September 30, 2011). The White House. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-president-change-office-
chairman-joint-chiefs-staff-ceremony#. 
Mencini 
 
162 
 
Pargeter, Alison. Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2012. 
 
Parks, W. Hays. “Lessons from 1986 Airstrike,” New England Law Review 36, no. 4, (2003): 
755-766. 
 
______. “Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,” Memorandum of Law, Department of the 
Army, November 2, 1989. 
 
______. , “Truth about 1986 Bombing in Libya,” Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, July 4, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-truth-about-1986-us-bombing-in-
libya/2011/07/03/gHQAjAWHyH_story.html. 
 
Petraeus, David.  “How We Won Iraq,” Foreign Policy, October 29, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_petraeus_how_we_won_the_surg
e_in_iraq. 
 
Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II 
Through the Persian Gulf War. Rev Sub. Ivan R. Dee, 1996. 
 
______.  Safe for Democracy. Ivan R. Dee, 2006. 
 
 
Preston, Stephen. “CIA and the Rule of Law,” (Speech, Cambridge, MA, April 10, 2012). The 
Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/cia-general-counsel-harvard.html. 
 
Rachtel, Howard.  “Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a 
Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Duke Law Journal 55, no. 3, (2005): 677-710. 
 
Radsan, Afsheen and Richard Murphy. “Measure Twice, Shoot One: Higher Care for CIA 
Targeted Killings,” University of Illinois Law Review, (2011): 1201-1242.  
 
Ramsden, Michael. “Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar 
Al-Awlaki,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011): 385-406. 
 
Reagan, Ronald.  An American Life. New York: Pocket Books, 1990. 
 
 ______.“Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike against Libya.” (Speech, 
Washington, D.C., April 14, 1986). 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/41486g.htm 
 
Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. 1 edition. Crown, 
2011. 
 
Mencini 
 
163 
Richelson, Jeffrey. “When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National Security Option,” 
International Journal on Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 2, (2010): 243-274. 
 
Richter, Gary. “Osama bin Laden: A Case Study,” (U.S. Department of Energy: Sandia National 
Laboratories, 1999). 
 
Riedel, Bruce O. The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. NULL edition. 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008. 
 
“The Rise of the Phoenix,” Newsweek, January 12, 1970, 25-27. 
 
Rosenau, William and Austin Long. “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary 
Counterinsurgency,” RAND, (2009): 1-25.  
 
Rudgers, David F. “The Origins of Covert Action.” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 2 
(April 1, 2000): 249–262.  
 
Price, Brian C. “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism.” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 9-46.  
 
Schauer, Frederick. “Precedent.” Stanford Law Review 39, no. 3 (1987): 571-605. 
 
Schlesinger, Arthur. “Review of ‘Lessons’ of the Past.” The Journal of American History 61, 
(1974).  
 
Schmitt, Eric. “Congress Restricts Drone Program Shift,” New York Times, January 16, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/us/politics/congress-restricts-drones-program-
shift.html?_r=0. 
 
Schultz, George. “Terrorism and the Modern World,” Terrorism 7, no. 4 (1985), 431-447. 
 
Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
 
“Select William J. Donovan Documents, OSS 1941-1945.” Office of Strategic Services, n.d. 
 
Singer, P. W. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Reprint. 
Penguin Books, 2009. 
 
Shane, Scott.  “Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,” New York Times, 
November 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-
drone-rule-book.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
______, and Squad Mekhennet. “Imam’s Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad, New 
York Times, May 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/world/09awlaki.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
Mencini 
 
164 
 
______. “U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric,” The New York Times, April 6, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html. 
 
Smith, Bradley F. The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA. New York: Basic 
Books, 1983. 
 
Sofaer, Adam. “Terrorism, The Law and the National Defense,” Military Law Review 129, no. 
89 (1989): 89-123.  
 
Solis, Gary. “Targeted Killings and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Naval War College Review 60, 
no. 2, (2007): 127-146. 
 
“Special Report: Robots,” The Economist, March 29, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21599524-drones-will-change-warand-
more-up-air. 
 
St John, Ronald Bruce.  Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.  
 
Stanik, Joseph.  El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi.  Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2003. 
 
Strickland, Frank. The Early Evolution of the Predator Drone. U. S. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2013. 
 
Struck, Doug. “Casualties of U.S. Calculations: Afghan Victims of CIA Missile Strikes 
Described as Peasants, Not al Qaeda,” Washington Post, February, 10, 2002. 
 
Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: Harper, 2007. 
 
Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. New York: Harper Collins, 1993. 
 
Thomas, Ward.  “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” International 
Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 105-133. 
 
______. “The New Age of Assassination,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 1 
(2005): 27-39. 
 
Thucydides. History of Peloponnesian Wars. trans/ Rex Warner. London: Penguin Books, 1954.  
 
Treverton, Gregory. Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World. London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1988.  
 
______. “Covert Action: From ‘Covert’ to Overt.” Daedalus 116, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 95–123.  
 
Mencini 
 
165 
______. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Toaldo, Mattia. “The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon and 
Libya as Case Studies,” New Middle Eastern Studies 2, (2012): 1-17. 
 
Tovy ,Tal. “The Theoretical Aspects of Targeted Killings: The Phoenix Program as a Case 
Study,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11, no. 4, (2009): 1-24. 
 
Traub, James. ‘The Indispensable Nation’s Indispensable Weapon,” Foreign Policy, May 24, 
2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible_weapon_drones_obama. 
 
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Phung Hoang Adviser Handbook, 
(Saigon: U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, November 20, 1970). 
 
United States House of Representatives, “Drones and the War on Terror: When can the U.S. 
Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?,” Hearing before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary House of Representatives, February 27, 2013. 
 
United States House of Representatives, “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,” 
113th Congress 1st Session, Report 113-277 (November 25, 2013). 
 
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,” Interim 
Report, Report no. 94-465, November 20, 1975. 
 
United States Senate Select Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing Before the Committee on 
Armed Services United States Senate: Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of 
Central Intelligence,” (Washington D.C. 1973 
 
Valentine, Douglas. The Phoenix Program. Lincoln, Neb.: IUniverse.com, 2000. 
 
Vlasic, Mark. “Recent Targeted Killing Policy and President Barack Obama’s Expanded Drone 
Attacks,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 43, (2012): 292-308. 
 
Wall, Andru. “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, 
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard Law School National Security Journal 
3, (2011): 85-142. 
 
Waller, Douglas. Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern 
American Espionage.  New York: Free Press, 2011.  
 
Walsh, Declan, and Eric Schmitt. “Drone Strike killed No. 2 in Al Qaeda, Officials Say,” The 
New York Times, June 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/qaeda-
deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 
Mencini 
 
166 
The Washington Post. The Permanent War: Rise of the Drones. Washington D.C.: Diversion 
Books, 2013. 
 
Wedgwood, Ruth. “Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against bin Laden,” Yale Journal of 
International Law 24, (1999): 559-576.  
 
Welling, Richard. “Intelligence in Public Literature: The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret 
Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth.” Studies in Intelligence 57, no.3 (2013): 1-2. 
 
Whitlock, Craig. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” The Washington Post, 
December 1, 2012, sec. World. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-
bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 
 
Williams, Brian Glyn. Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on Al Qaeda. Washington D.C.: 
Potomac Books, 2013. 
 
______. “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an 
Assassination Campaign.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 10 (2010): 871–892.  
 
Woodruff, Paul. “Was it Right to Gun for Yamamoto?,” In Lightning Over Bougainville, ed. R. 
Cargill Hall. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1990. 
 
“Yamamoto ‘Boast’ Declared a Hoax,” The New York Times, January 11, 1946, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers. 
 
“Yamamoto’s Killer Identified by Army,” The New York Times, September 12, 1945, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers. 
 
Yenne, Bill. Attack Of The Drones: A History Of Unmanned Aerial Combat. Zenith Imprint, 
2004. 
 
Yoo, John. “Assassinations or Targeted Killings After 9/11.” New York Law School Law Review 
56, (2011/12): 57-80. 
 
Zenko, Micah. Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold 
War World. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
 
______. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 
no. 65 (January 2013): 1-27.   
 
______. “Tracking U.S. Targeted Killings,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 31, 2013, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/12/31/tracking-u-s-targeted-killings/. 
 
 
 
 
